Edward's review
Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 by Barbara W. Tuchman
Tuchman allows herself to be distracted by Stilwell's numerous charms and is blinded to his many faults in this well-written but sadly unincisive and obfuscatory work on Stilwell and his experiences within the tangled skeins of the Chinese and SEA commands.
Tuchman unfortunately overlooks Stilwell's greatest failing: despite a faculty for their language and a keen understanding of Chinese psychology, he was never able to think realistically about Chinese capabilities and often derided those who did---both he and Tuchman reserve special scorn for British General Alan Brooke, apparently for the sin of being correct in his contemptous dismissal of the ability of the Chinese army to organize a successful campaign. Brooke was right, however, and Stilwell was wrong; the KMT never fielded a truly effective army, not in World War II, and certainly not afterwards against Mao.
The truth of the matter is that Stilwell was a good man in the wrong job; his intellectual brilliance was not mar...more
Tuchman unfortunately overlooks Stilwell's greatest failing: despite a faculty for their language and a keen understanding of Chinese psychology, he was never able to think realistically about Chinese capabilities and often derided those who did---both he and Tuchman reserve special scorn for British General Alan Brooke, apparently for the sin of being correct in his contemptous dismissal of the ability of the Chinese army to organize a successful campaign. Brooke was right, however, and Stilwell was wrong; the KMT never fielded a truly effective army, not in World War II, and certainly not afterwards against Mao.
The truth of the matter is that Stilwell was a good man in the wrong job; his intellectual brilliance was not mar...more
I'm sorry to say this Edward, but your response is typical of British commentary on the War. Blame the american for not being able to get along with those around him. It is a line often taken up when the european theatre is discussed.A realistic appraisal of the situation was not possible. Chiang's obfuscations at the time make Saddamm Hussein's mid-east tight rope game look like child's play.
Stillwell was not the right man for the job, but then again, there was no right man. Roosevelt obviously felt that if anyone could get something done there, it would be stillwell.
I think the tragedy of this story is that Joe was not used in Europe. Imagine Patton and Stillwell together? Perhaps they could have quashed Market Garden before it materialized!
Hi Lucas,
Although British historians sometimes go too far in their attempts to absolve their country of responsibility for some of the more botched operations, in this case, I'm inclined to agree with them.
I definitely agree with you that Chiang was pretty much a compulsive liar when it came to dealing with Stilwell, Chennault, Roosevelt, Churchill, and so on; even though Stilwell recognized this, he seems---to me---to have failed to understand how pervasive the culture of dishonesty was in the KMT's army. It's also worth noting that while Chinese forces under Stilwell or anyone else achieved only limited successes even into 1945, the British, despite Stilwell's disdain for them, became consistently successful by 1944 and virtually destroyed the Japanese armies in Burma and Malaysia.
I've not, I confess, had a chance to read Field Marshal Slim has written on the war in the SEAC, but Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's wartime diaries and the Stilwell Papers make for interesting reading side-by-side. Stilwell (and Admiral King) both disliked Alanbrooke immensely, but his views on the conduct of the war generally strike me as more lucid and realistic.
I will have to look at those sources, they sound very interesting indeed.thanks for the detailed response!
