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The Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction
by Edward Feser

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<a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/752479.The_Philosophy_of_Mind_A_Short_Introduction?utm_medium=api&amp;utm_source=blog_review" style="float: left; padding-right: 20px"><img alt="The Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction" border="0" src="http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1178044259m/752479.jpg" /></a> <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/752479.The_Philosophy_of_Mind_A_Short_Introduction?utm_medium=api&utm_source=blog_review">The Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction</a> by <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/43145.Edward_Feser">Edward Feser</a> 
 <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/review/show/27209568?utm_medium=api&utm_source=blog_review"><h3>My review</h3></a>
 rating: 5 of 5 stars As an introduction, this book is excellent. Feser begins with Descartes and two theories of perception - indirect and direct realism. He then offers and introduction to dualism, claiming that the mind is different than the brain just like apples are differant than oranges. In one sense, you shouldn't even need an argument to see that. He shores this claim up by getting more specific about some of the differences. He then moves to materialism about the mind, providing some of the motives they have for being materialists about the mind, and then introduces some of the main features of the mind that any view of the mind must come to grips with - qualia, intentionality, mental causation, unity of consciousness, consciousness, nature of persons, etc. He spends the rest of the book discussing these issues. He does a good job surveying the literature and presents both sides well. Though the book is accessible to the non-specialist, it has a few rough parts. This is mainly due to the challenege of explaining various materialist theories, which are usullly strange and wild to the ears of normal people! Besides serving as a great introduction to the philosophy of mind, many other philosophical issues are discussed throughout the book and so it can serve as a good general introduction to philosophy qua intellectual discipline. Feser ends by endorsing Thomistic (and stands in the tradition of analystic Thomism) dualism. Stated differently, he defends hylomorphic dualism (a person is a soul-body composite). This is opposed to Cartesian or simple dualism. His main argument against simple dualism was not too convincing for me. He says that it has the epistemological problem of not being able to know that the cognizer you interacted with yesterday is the same today - the problem of other minds. It's not clear why this couldn't be a basic belief and be warranted in light of that. It's also not clear to me what Feser would say about how disembodied persons, viz., angels, knew they were speaking to the same being as the day before. And Feser did not speak to the question posed to hylomorphists about who does the thinking. If it is the soul, and the soul is not me but rather the composite is me, then my thinking is done by something numerically distinct from me. If it is the composite that thinks, and if we exist disembodied while we await the resurrection of our bodies, then my disembodied soul does not think. But then why try to defend the intermediate state? Well, I'm sure Feser has answers, but none forthcoming in the book. At any rate, I would highly recommend it as an intro to the philosophy of mind.
 <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/review/list/743812?utm_medium=api&utm_source=blog_review">View all my reviews.</a>

Paul's review
rating:
bookshelves: anthropology, evolutionary-psychology, introduction-to-philosophy, metaphysics, mind-body

As an introduction, this book is excellent. Feser begins with Descartes and two theories of perception - indirect and direct realism. He then offers and introduction to dualism, claiming that the mind is different than the brain just like apples are differant than oranges. In one sense, you shouldn't even need an argument to see that. He shores this claim up by getting more specific about some of the differences. He then moves to materialism about the mind, providing some of the motives they have for being materialists about the mind, and then introduces some of the main features of the mind that any view of the mind must come to grips with - qualia, intentionality, mental causation, unity of consciousness, consciousness, nature of persons, etc. He spends the rest of the book discussing these issues. He does a good job surveying the literature and presents both sides well. Though the book is accessible to the non-specialist, it has a few rough parts. This is mainly due to the ch...more As an introduction, this book is excellent. Feser begins with Descartes and two theories of perception - indirect and direct realism. He then offers and introduction to dualism, claiming that the mind is different than the brain just like apples are differant than oranges. In one sense, you shouldn't even need an argument to see that. He shores this claim up by getting more specific about some of the differences. He then moves to materialism about the mind, providing some of the motives they have for being materialists about the mind, and then introduces some of the main features of the mind that any view of the mind must come to grips with - qualia, intentionality, mental causation, unity of consciousness, consciousness, nature of persons, etc. He spends the rest of the book discussing these issues. He does a good job surveying the literature and presents both sides well. Though the book is accessible to the non-specialist, it has a few rough parts. This is mainly due to the challenege of explaining various materialist theories, which are usullly strange and wild to the ears of normal people! Besides serving as a great introduction to the philosophy of mind, many other philosophical issues are discussed throughout the book and so it can serve as a good general introduction to philosophy qua intellectual discipline. Feser ends by endorsing Thomistic (and stands in the tradition of analystic Thomism) dualism. Stated differently, he defends hylomorphic dualism (a person is a soul-body composite). This is opposed to Cartesian or simple dualism. His main argument against simple dualism was not too convincing for me. He says that it has the epistemological problem of not being able to know that the cognizer you interacted with yesterday is the same today - the problem of other minds. It's not clear why this couldn't be a basic belief and be warranted in light of that. It's also not clear to me what Feser would say about how disembodied persons, viz., angels, knew they were speaking to the same being as the day before. And Feser did not speak to the question posed to hylomorphists about who does the thinking. If it is the soul, and the soul is not me but rather the composite is me, then my thinking is done by something numerically distinct from me. If it is the composite that thinks, and if we exist disembodied while we await the resurrection of our bodies, then my disembodied soul does not think. But then why try to defend the intermediate state? Well, I'm sure Feser has answers, but none forthcoming in the book. At any rate, I would highly recommend it as an intro to the philosophy of mind....less

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