This is one of the classic operational accounts of Barbarossa in the post-Soviet era. Glantz was one of the first to go into the Russian archives after the fall of communism and retrieved large amounts of new source material that fundamentally altered our view of what happened in those fateful months of 1941.

After a short introduction of the run up to the war, Glantz goes into a blow by blow account of the major phases in the campaign. From the border battles to the Red Army counterattacks around Smolensk, through the battles for Leningrad and Kiev, to the final drive on Moscow and the winter counteroffensive. Each chapter is finished with short reflections on the events. These steps back from the immediate action allow some breath for analysis and are very welcome.

The causes for the weak showing of the Red Army are laid squarely at the foot of the Red Army purges of the late 1930s. These, according to Glantz, robbed the Red Army of its experience and initiative. They led to poor showing in the war against Finland and panicked reorganisation afterwards.

Another factor in the defeats was the Soviet emphasis on offensive doctrine. This caused high levels of casualties for little gains. In fact, the success of the Red Army to stem the German advance in the centre indirectly led to the fall of Kiev as Guderian's Panzergruppe was forced towards the south. But more directly, the Western Front wore itself out in futile attacks so much that it became vulnerable to the German thrust in October.

But Glantz goes against those that argue that the Kiev distraction lost the Nazis the battle for Moscow (and the war). He sees the defeat of the Red Army in the Ukraine as a necessary condition to clear the southern flank for the drive on Moscow. The main failure in the final stages of Barbarossa was Hitler's lack of realism in trying to attain too many objectives at once.

Glantz has good reasons why the Hitler underestimated the Red Army. One of the main findings in the 1990s was the planned increase of the Red Army in the run up to the war. This had gone unnoticed to the Germans, who were therefor surprised again and again by Soviet ability to bounce back and plug holes in the line. He shows that in fact the Red Army was consumed on three occassions: first in the border battles, second in the battles for Leningrad, Kiev and the Viazma-Briansk pockets. In each case Stavka was able to create and direct strategic reserves to the threatened spots.

And given the considerable reserves at hand in early December, even though the Wehrmacht might have reached Moscow, the Soviet Union would have been unlikely to give up, and likely to have driven back the invaders in other places along its overextended front line.

Glantz was never a fluent writer, and despite the pretty dense delivery of information on participating units and commanders, Before Stalingrad is pretty readable by comparison to his other books. My major quip with the book is that the maps rarely show the sites that Glantz mentions in the text, which makes for considerable frustration in trying to place events.

Before Stalingrad is a reworking of When Titans Clashed, published in 1995 and also appeared as Barbarossa, Hitlers Invasion of Russia in 2001. Later books by Overy and Bellamy have added new insights, mostly on the German occupation and resistance and social and economical background to the war, but Glantz remains a very useful and relatively concise introduction to the purely military aspects of the war.