While not always a page turner, Sheehan's book is a must read for anyone interested in modern warfare and nationalism. It meshes very well with Bernard Fall's idea of revolutionary warfare, in contrast to guerrilla warfare. South Vietnam never possessed a government worth fighting for. In fact, the longer we stayed there, the worse their corruption became, largely because our government was unwilling to ever acknowledge faults with our allies.

Guerrilla warfare can be beaten if the terrain and population are not protecting the guerrilla forces. The V.C. had the advantage of being seen as legitimate, in stark opposition to the Saigon forces; to have the reputation of the Viet Minh, itself a legendary nationalist (and not entirely communist) force that almost all Vietnamese could feel pride in; and in the United States appearing (and largely being) a replacement for French imperialism, which drove many in opposition to the puppet government. Combine this with the fact that the Saigon government was almost always under the control of rich Catholics that sided with the French and were brutal to the majority of the population that was Buddhist, and the Viet Cong could operate almost at will in South Vietnam. This book also highlights the dangers of bureaucracy and its hindrance to adaptation when adapting is vital.

Ironically, this book convinces me beyond doubt that the Iraq War has little in common with the Vietnam conflict. The comparison is much more apt for our Afghanistan debacle. Afghanistan has a history of defeating superpowers, the Taliban have inherited the mujahedin's reputation as nationalists fighting foreigners, the Kabul government has the odious role of working with the foreigners, and Pakistan is almost a perfect replica of the porous borders that allowed the Ho Chi Minh Trail to work.

It'll take work to read it (Vann himself was not particularly interesting to me and I ended up skipping over chunks about his personal affairs), but I highly recommend this book.