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The Case for God
by Karen Armstrong
by Karen Armstrong
Citing the Greeks, Armstrong's argument begins by stating that there are two realms of knowing. One is through "mythos" and the other is through "logos". The former allows us to access ultimate meaning, something logos can't do as it involves pragmatic reason related to survival. She calls ultimate reality God, but she is clear that God is not a being at all. In rejecting God as a personalized deity, she aligns her thought with that of Tillich ("God above God") and others (e.g., Heidegger's Being as fundamental energy; Brahman, the Dao).
Armstrong also makes it clear that opponents to this point of view (fundamentalists and atheists) are defending and reacting, respectively, to a personalized deity that is in her view wrong headed and at odds with the thought of theologians who are "more representative of the mainstream tradition" that has God as a non-being, transcendent reality. Most of Armstrong's book is a detailed substantiation of this history of the non-personalized God concept, and includes the views of Darwin, Einstein and other individuals of science who seem comfortable with a world of the unknown and the lack of proof for some of their views.
It is not clear in Armstrong why the term "God" is necessary at all for this transcendent reality and why, for example, a term such as cosmic energy might not suffice as a substitute. Armstrong offers a possible clue when she says that the primal religious urge "is an attempt to construct meaning in the face of the relentless pain and injustice of life" and that, as meaning-seeking creatures, we fall into despair without religion. Religious rituals and myth enable us to access this higher reality but, to be effective, religious symbols must represent truth, not the make believe, and God is the symbol of this higher reality. Armstrong also believes that we can access the truth of religion and participate in the greater whole only when we rid ourselves of selfishness through compassion and by following the Golden Rule. The "I" must disappear before we can experience God. Drawing on her extensive background in religious history, she also notes that we can access this higher realm in other ways. This includes the doctrine of forms where truth is not something people create but rather is something that "happens to them," and through the use of mathematics as a spiritual discipline because, in removing us from sense perception, we move into a superior level of being and, accordingly, participate in the hidden life of God.
Armstrong's writing is clear and fluid. Her scholarly attention is impressive. However, toward the end of her book, her annoyance at the modern-day atheists, schooled in scientific naturalism, comes through. Armstrong's world is divided into mythos and logos. She believes there's room for each and resists strenuously the "secularization of reason, which denies the possibility of transcendence" and becomes "an idol that seeks to destroy all rival claimants." While she references the "intemperate" voices of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, polemics (her "case for God") can come in a softer voice as well. She comments that "like all religious fundamentalists, the new atheists believe they alone are in possession of the truth." That may be, but the implication of that statement is that her version is the only truth left standing, particularly when, by her own rules, Armstrong has taken the legitimacy of "mythos" off the table as a subject for debate. She also notes that "these proselytizing atheists" are reacting to fundamentalist belief systems that "have an extremely literal notion of God" that is not typical of Christian religion as a whole. Tillich, for example, is closer to the "mainstream truth" than any fundamentalists she says. Does "mainstream" mean the philosophers and theologians that she quotes extensively or does it mean the Christian masses, for example, who, served by clergy without "advanced theological training," have seemed comfortable enough through the ages with personified deities and God in full person hood? There's substantial evidence regarding the latter. For example, in his "Age of Faith," Will Durant, who is no slouch when it comes to understanding religious history, comments that in Augustine's day, the church ended up accepting "the inevitable anthropomorphism of popular theology" and that Gregory the Great's theology, which would constitute the theology of "the next seven centuries," was "haunted with angels, demons, wizards, and ghosts."
Armstrong, pointing likely at Dawkins, criticizes "the aggressive tenor of a great deal of modern discourse," adding that there are "very few Socratic 'philosophers' these days who know that they lack wisdom....[and] appear unwilling even to consider a rival point of view or seriously assess evidence that might qualify their case." That advice is a two-way street. While the world of science is open to debate her response hints that a non-personal God whose (to use Heidegger's terminology and strong adjectives) "utter transcendence is wholly other" is off the table. Respectful questioning can can ask, for example, if there are alternative explanations for Armstrong's "mythos" world. Might our need for transcendence come from within, from a need for something eternal that transcends the world of change? Does transcendence tap into our fear of death and our need to love and to be loved? If the personalized god is no longer tenable, then does a non-personalized Godhead serve our need for a Jungian-like father figure archetype that protects and stabilizes us in a sea of change? Can we or do we imagine things that are not there? Do we need a transcendent anchor to be good, to engage in altruism, to follow the Golden Rule, or are these based within our own biology? Can Heidegger's "Being" that supports and animates everything that exists be derived from cosmic energy and matter and the world of Logos?
Armstrong also makes it clear that opponents to this point of view (fundamentalists and atheists) are defending and reacting, respectively, to a personalized deity that is in her view wrong headed and at odds with the thought of theologians who are "more representative of the mainstream tradition" that has God as a non-being, transcendent reality. Most of Armstrong's book is a detailed substantiation of this history of the non-personalized God concept, and includes the views of Darwin, Einstein and other individuals of science who seem comfortable with a world of the unknown and the lack of proof for some of their views.
It is not clear in Armstrong why the term "God" is necessary at all for this transcendent reality and why, for example, a term such as cosmic energy might not suffice as a substitute. Armstrong offers a possible clue when she says that the primal religious urge "is an attempt to construct meaning in the face of the relentless pain and injustice of life" and that, as meaning-seeking creatures, we fall into despair without religion. Religious rituals and myth enable us to access this higher reality but, to be effective, religious symbols must represent truth, not the make believe, and God is the symbol of this higher reality. Armstrong also believes that we can access the truth of religion and participate in the greater whole only when we rid ourselves of selfishness through compassion and by following the Golden Rule. The "I" must disappear before we can experience God. Drawing on her extensive background in religious history, she also notes that we can access this higher realm in other ways. This includes the doctrine of forms where truth is not something people create but rather is something that "happens to them," and through the use of mathematics as a spiritual discipline because, in removing us from sense perception, we move into a superior level of being and, accordingly, participate in the hidden life of God.
Armstrong's writing is clear and fluid. Her scholarly attention is impressive. However, toward the end of her book, her annoyance at the modern-day atheists, schooled in scientific naturalism, comes through. Armstrong's world is divided into mythos and logos. She believes there's room for each and resists strenuously the "secularization of reason, which denies the possibility of transcendence" and becomes "an idol that seeks to destroy all rival claimants." While she references the "intemperate" voices of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, polemics (her "case for God") can come in a softer voice as well. She comments that "like all religious fundamentalists, the new atheists believe they alone are in possession of the truth." That may be, but the implication of that statement is that her version is the only truth left standing, particularly when, by her own rules, Armstrong has taken the legitimacy of "mythos" off the table as a subject for debate. She also notes that "these proselytizing atheists" are reacting to fundamentalist belief systems that "have an extremely literal notion of God" that is not typical of Christian religion as a whole. Tillich, for example, is closer to the "mainstream truth" than any fundamentalists she says. Does "mainstream" mean the philosophers and theologians that she quotes extensively or does it mean the Christian masses, for example, who, served by clergy without "advanced theological training," have seemed comfortable enough through the ages with personified deities and God in full person hood? There's substantial evidence regarding the latter. For example, in his "Age of Faith," Will Durant, who is no slouch when it comes to understanding religious history, comments that in Augustine's day, the church ended up accepting "the inevitable anthropomorphism of popular theology" and that Gregory the Great's theology, which would constitute the theology of "the next seven centuries," was "haunted with angels, demons, wizards, and ghosts."
Armstrong, pointing likely at Dawkins, criticizes "the aggressive tenor of a great deal of modern discourse," adding that there are "very few Socratic 'philosophers' these days who know that they lack wisdom....[and] appear unwilling even to consider a rival point of view or seriously assess evidence that might qualify their case." That advice is a two-way street. While the world of science is open to debate her response hints that a non-personal God whose (to use Heidegger's terminology and strong adjectives) "utter transcendence is wholly other" is off the table. Respectful questioning can can ask, for example, if there are alternative explanations for Armstrong's "mythos" world. Might our need for transcendence come from within, from a need for something eternal that transcends the world of change? Does transcendence tap into our fear of death and our need to love and to be loved? If the personalized god is no longer tenable, then does a non-personalized Godhead serve our need for a Jungian-like father figure archetype that protects and stabilizes us in a sea of change? Can we or do we imagine things that are not there? Do we need a transcendent anchor to be good, to engage in altruism, to follow the Golden Rule, or are these based within our own biology? Can Heidegger's "Being" that supports and animates everything that exists be derived from cosmic energy and matter and the world of Logos?
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Thanks. I think what you are saying is that while you act with "God" and I act without "God," our (hopefully "good") actions can be the same. What does it really matter? My caveat is that I believe questions of fact are involved, as it pertains to credibility of one's perspective and credibility is the prerequisite to action (why we act). To anchor compassionate action on the wholly other, for example, suggests that one must have something along the Armstrong perspective, which is out of reach for most. BTW, I found it particularly interesting that she called her take on all of this "mainstream" when she is really talking about theologians and philosophers, not the masses and their leaders who have been the engine of history involving the various creed wars. To elaborate a bit more, I also think questions of sincerity (in the sense of "trueness" to oneself) are involved, but haven't thought this through so much.On your last line, I believe science can and should tell us what our commitments should be. That is and always has been my central point. Interestingly, on our so-called moral actions, science has more to say than the "compassion" side that Hume, Schopenhauer and others argue is the basis for such actions. As in medical health, once the objective is understood, it brings along certain objectives. It's the same with action in the world. If my biological goal is survival and personal well-being, it brings along certain obligations to oneself and others (respect for self, respect for others). That's the beauty of the Golden Rule and its variations. We can, and do of course, deviate and choose not to follow a prudent course with regard to our goal, either via intention or by making bad choices, but this does not change the fundamental relationship between our own broader and ultimate self interest and action that respects others and our capacity to make such choices.
A couple of points: I don't think that debate is ruled out for "the non-personal God whose 'utter transcendence is wholly other.'" This is a question of what we commit ourselves to, how should we structure our lives, not questions of fact. Apart from whether our needs are dictated by the natural world, does this conception of our meaning and purpose satisfy our needs? Does it satisfy us intellectually and aesthetically? Is it worthy of us as decent and intelligent human beings? These are ways of evaluating myth and symbol and religious language. I think you are in tune with this when you write poetry.
You ask, "does a non-personalized Godhead serve our need for a Jungian-like father figure archetype?" You hit the nail on the head. We have the need and we have the archetype. We might as well work with it.
"Do we need a transcendent anchor to be good?" For whatever reason we commit to be good (or not), we need a name for it, an organizing principle, a way of talking about it. Science may tell us why we have needs, but it doesn't tell us what our commitments should be.