Hanny's review
recommended for:
anybody interested in 20th-century or Cold War history, or nuclear policy
status:
Read in March, 2008
In most of the usual respects, this is a bad book. The writing is dull, if not outright horrible. There is no analysis; every irony implicit in what Lettow talks about is completely lost on him. And, like most books of its type, it is bloated with dozens of examples where two or three would serve.
So why four stars? Because, using documents that have been declassified in the past decade (and many of them only in the past year or two), Lettow establishes a series of important points about the Reagan administration, and thus about the Cold War, that nobody else has yet dealt with. Until somebody reworks this topic into a better book (or, preferably, a thorough essay), it is, I'm afraid, required reading.
Lettow's major point, well established, is that abolishing nuclear weapons was one of Reagan's primary goals. This point is crucial: it was a primary goal *of Reagan's*. It was not shared by most of his advisers. In fact, it was directly and passionately opposed by most of them. Th...more
In most of the usual respects, this is a bad book. The writing is dull, if not outright horrible. There is no analysis; every irony implicit in what Lettow talks about is completely lost on him. And, like most books of its type, it is bloated with dozens of examples where two or three would serve.
So why four stars? Because, using documents that have been declassified in the past decade (and many of them only in the past year or two), Lettow establishes a series of important points about the Reagan administration, and thus about the Cold War, that nobody else has yet dealt with. Until somebody reworks this topic into a better book (or, preferably, a thorough essay), it is, I'm afraid, required reading.
Lettow's major point, well established, is that abolishing nuclear weapons was one of Reagan's primary goals. This point is crucial: it was a primary goal *of Reagan's*. It was not shared by most of his advisers. In fact, it was directly and passionately opposed by most of them. The image of Reagan as an "amiable dunce," plodding along while his cabinet did all the work, has been discredited quite a bit in recent years. This book is valuable by making a few very specific corrections to it:
1) The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars"
The notion of a shared missile defense that would render ballistic nuclear missiles obsolete was conceived and pushed by Reagan alone, often in conflict with his Cabinet and advisers.
2) SDI, the "militarization of space"
In the mid-1980's, propaganda against SDI as a plan for the "militarization of space" was the most widely distributed notion in the Soviet-controlled press. Many in the West, particularly in the Chomsky-ite know-nothing left, found this convincing. The recently declassified "memcons" (memoranda of conversation) from Reagan's summits with Gorbachev in his second term make it clear that this was not a cynical enterprise. Reagan was not using SDI as way to deploy a space shield that would give the United States an advantage in a first strike against Moscow. He repeatedly emphasized this fact, and repeatedly made it clear that once SDI was developed he would immediately give it to the USSR as well as an international body constituted for the purpose. In 1947, something like this was proposed with the "Baruch Plan" that would have internationalized nuclear power and eliminated nuclear weaponry. The plan failed, and SDI was part of Reagan's vision for meeting its goals.
3) SDI and "leverage"
The reason the USSR spent so much time railing against SDI is that they were aware of the fact that they could never compete with the US on a new "Manhattan Project." Their economy was spent, and a new arms race would destroy it. (It may have actually done exactly that.) Some of Reagan's advisers thought they could use this fact to their advantage by keeping SDI alive as nothing more than a bargaining chip. Reagan disagreed. In Reykjavik, he went so far as to pass up an opportunity to eliminate *all* US and Soviet ballistic and strategic nuclear weapons because Gorbachev insisted on tying that deal to a halt to SDI. Reagan felt that a missile shield was necessary to assure a nuclear-free world against a cheater or a "madman." This has proven true: there were a few "madmen" during the Cold War (like Castro or Curtis LeMay in the US) who advocated the use of nuclear weapons. None of them became President of the United States or the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party; none of them had access to The Button. With the possibility of nuclear weaponry coinciding with the full insanity of Islamism, recidivist Zionism or Hindu fundamentalism, protection against a "madman" is no longer guaranteed.
Gorbachev tied his demands about halting SDI to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, and the ABM Treaty brings us to the most important insight in Lettow's book, though it's one that he doesn't understand fully. The ABM Treaty didn't only limit the development of offensive missiles; it also limited the development of defensive systems. Why? Because an effective defensive system would have made it possible for one or both sides to suffer less-than-devastating losses in a "nuclear exchange," and that would mean that MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) would be compromised. Everybody in the policy establishment who felt that nuclear weapons and MAD were an inevitability was determined to make it so. The goal of US-USSR negotiations from the Kennedy-era was not to change this situation. It was to guarantee it. The ABM Treaty, the notion of "parity," Détente: all of this did nothing but enshrine MAD. As Amis put it back then:
"Most of us believe, incorrectly but with good reason, that we live under the auspices of Mutual Assured Destruction. In fact, the Soviet Union has never subscribed to MAD; and neither has the United States, except for a brief period in the Sixties (when McNamara briefly allowed the notion to hold sway as a means of heading off military procurements). The underlying strategy has always been something else: preemption, counterforce, escalation dominance, prevailing, denying victory to the Soviet Union. Or, if you prefer, *winning*, which means *going first*. Why then does MAD continue to loom in the public consciousness? Because it is an accurate description of reality. Whatever the policy, whatever the plan, MAD will result. Mutual Assured Destruction is not an arrangement between the US and the USSR. It is an arrangement between human beings and nuclear weapons." (VMN, 21).
And yet... The bilateral elimination of nuclear weapons, guaranteed by an effective, internationalized, "shield," would have been the end to MAD. This was Reagan's insight, and, perversely, most of those in his administration who shared the insight wanted nothing else but to give SDI away in order to maintain the "parity" status quo. Not Reagan. His policy with respect to the Soviet Union has always been seen as transformative, but everybody has missed the transformation. Reagan's major contribution was not to bankrupt the Soviet Union with a new arms race; it was to recognize the moral bankruptcy of MAD and work to render it obsolete. And, much as it pains me to concede this to the man behind Iran-Contra, 80's South America policy, the S&L Scandal and so much else, he succeeded.
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Of interest to some: this was the first book I read on my new Amazon Kindle. As a device, there's plenty to complain about (it's too easy to his the "Next" button and too hard to take notes). But, as far as the reading experience goes, there's nothing much to say. "e-Ink" passes the major test: before long, I forgot that I was reading a device rather than a book. I was just reading. More than ever, I'm absolutely convinced that paper books are going the way of our CD collections, though we're still on the "Rio" of eBook readers rather than the iPod....less
Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
