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The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
by National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
by National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Austen's review
bookshelves: history
May 06, 11
bookshelves: history
Recommended for:
Anyone who wants to understand how 9/11 happened, and how to prevent it from happening again.
Read from September 11, 2010 to May 06, 2011 — I own a copy, read count: 1
In-depth look at the opportunities missed, the glaring errors, the ingenuity and creativity used by the terrorists that lead to the worst attack on American soil in its history.
The shortest chapter "Heroism and Horror" detailing the attacks in print form was minimalist. Reading almost like a checklist, focusing mainly on the NYC attacks, briefly on the Pentagon and none at all on the Shanksville, PA plane, its print tabulation of the madness of that day is just as powerful - in some ways, moreso - than all the pictures and video taken that day.
All other chapters from front to back detailing information about where government and intelligence went wrong, and suggestions (that have yet, in some cases, to be implemented) on how to improve security and relations with Middle Eastern countries and governments, are well written, straight and to the point, and full of necessary reading if we are to understand - even minimally - about what can be done to prevent another situation like this from ever happening again.
Boldly proclaiming in as forward a way possible that Islam and Muslims are not the enemy of America or any other country, it cuts out the idea that all the Islamic world is the new target. Anyone who uses this work to cite violence or revenge against Islam has not read it properly. The book rightly suggests many ideas that should be considered and implemented over time. The difficulty and scope of the problem - radical terrorists with access to money and resources which can gather almost anywhere - pose a real and deadly threat now and for all time anywhere throughout the world. There, indeed, can be no safe haven offered to these merchants of death. This is a threat not only to American interests and citizens, but also to the rest of civilization as a whole.
There must also be a continuing cooperation of agencies of the United States government and intelligence communities, and, as well, between international governments and agencies as well, while at the same time a continual watch on individual liberties and freedoms. We must not allow the diligence of the War on Terror to be turned into a witch-hunt, lest we allow the paranoia of the post-9/11 days to overtake us. This is also outlined in the "What To Do?" chapter at the end of the book.
The shortest chapter "Heroism and Horror" detailing the attacks in print form was minimalist. Reading almost like a checklist, focusing mainly on the NYC attacks, briefly on the Pentagon and none at all on the Shanksville, PA plane, its print tabulation of the madness of that day is just as powerful - in some ways, moreso - than all the pictures and video taken that day.
All other chapters from front to back detailing information about where government and intelligence went wrong, and suggestions (that have yet, in some cases, to be implemented) on how to improve security and relations with Middle Eastern countries and governments, are well written, straight and to the point, and full of necessary reading if we are to understand - even minimally - about what can be done to prevent another situation like this from ever happening again.
Boldly proclaiming in as forward a way possible that Islam and Muslims are not the enemy of America or any other country, it cuts out the idea that all the Islamic world is the new target. Anyone who uses this work to cite violence or revenge against Islam has not read it properly. The book rightly suggests many ideas that should be considered and implemented over time. The difficulty and scope of the problem - radical terrorists with access to money and resources which can gather almost anywhere - pose a real and deadly threat now and for all time anywhere throughout the world. There, indeed, can be no safe haven offered to these merchants of death. This is a threat not only to American interests and citizens, but also to the rest of civilization as a whole.
There must also be a continuing cooperation of agencies of the United States government and intelligence communities, and, as well, between international governments and agencies as well, while at the same time a continual watch on individual liberties and freedoms. We must not allow the diligence of the War on Terror to be turned into a witch-hunt, lest we allow the paranoia of the post-9/11 days to overtake us. This is also outlined in the "What To Do?" chapter at the end of the book.
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Reading Progress
| 09/11/2010 | page 46 |
|
8.0% | |
| 03/31/2011 | page 103 |
|
18.0% | ""There can be no place on Earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, to train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or unilaterally, if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary - anywhere." - Ronald Reagan, speech to the American Bar Association, 1985" |
| 05/04/2011 | page 249 |
|
44.0% | "According to Binalshibh, Atta used a riddle to convey the date in code - a message of two branches, a slash, and a lollipop (to non-Americans, 11/9 would be interpreted as September 11)." |
| 05/05/2011 | page 351 |
|
62.0% | "The methods for detecting and then warning of surprise attack that the U.S. government had so painstakingly developed in the decades after Pearl Harbor did not fail; instead, they were not really tried. They were not employed to analyze the enemy that, as the twentieth century closed, was most likely to launch a surprise attack directly against the United States." |
