http://www.goodreads.com/review/list_rss/76648 en-US Thu, 29 May 2008 11:58:11 -0700 60 http://www.goodreads.com/ 200 41 http://www.goodreads.com/images/layout/gr_logo.gif 20066199 Thu, 29 May 2008 11:58:11 -0700
Weiner argues that the agency has suffered from and still suffers from several cancers. First is the propensity of its directors to bend to the political will of presidents and their underlings, an unfortunate tendency that culminated in the elimination of the position of Director of Central Intelligence under George W. Bush. Scant intelligence from the field was often parlayed into invincible evidence in intelligence reports for decision-makers, since that is often the only type of intelligence they would pay attention to. Reports that did not conform to a president's predetermined mindset, interests, or worldview were routinely discarded. The 'intelligence' was adjusted just to get the big boss' attention. There were precious few moments in the agency's history during which it reliably informed the president as to the goings-on in a particular part of the world.

Second is the CIA's demonstrated inability to collect good intelligence on America's friends and enemies, which are now and always have been numerous and ruthless. The agency totally fudged the call on several important events: the first Gulf War. India's nuke. The Bay of Pigs, part of a more elaborate attempt to dethrone Castro (JFK's mess, but an inherited one). It had close to no idea that Gorbachev was tearing the Soviet Union apart. The 1979 coup in Iran that deposed the CIA-installed and supported shah. Most recently, Sadaam's weapons and the ongoing insurgency. The CIA has had remarkable trouble recruiting reliable Arabic-speaking (and looking) sources to spy on the foreign governments that would most like us to sink into the ocean in much the same way that it found reliable Soviet sources difficult to come by. Weiner offers no prognostication to suggest that we are any safer now than we were under the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. If anything, the current time bodes for the worse: We cannot promise to destroy a terrorist cell in response to an attack. Our credibility in this regard has been savaged by the misguided and mishandled Iraq war.

Third is the string of poor leaders that have infected the CIA like viral bacterial over the years. First was Allen Dulles, an idiot that ruled over the CIA as it were is own personal fiefdom. A lover of covert action, he ceaselessly tried to overthrow governments using the money of the American people and the lives of others. He failed miserably every time. Eisenhower rightfully found him untrustworthy. From that point onward, the relationship between the CIA and and the White House was never fully repaired. There were others, some well-meaning idiots and some just plain idiots with a few bright ones here and there. Dave McCone, Richard Helms and George Tenet were all made some bad decisions but all wanted the best for the agency and for the United States. That none of them could really make the CIA all it could be is perhaps a testament to how broken its relationship with the executive branch was since its inception. The world's most effective intelligence services have their ruler's ear and trust. The CIA did not and does not. The end result of the efforts of its many leaders is a paralyzed relationship between the agency and the military – which, Weiner argues, would like nothing more than the agency's elimination –  and civilian leadership in government.

My personal interpretation of the work is necessarily an analysis of the CIA's performance. Throughout its history, as Weiner shows, the agency devoted significant time, talent, and resources to the overthrow of leftist governments. These attempts resulted in either unmitigated failure (Cuba) or bloody success (Guatemaula). But the CIA failed to understand the unintended consequences these actions provoked. At the time they were seen as victories in the Cold War. But as Afghanistan now clearly demonstrates, many of them were pyrrhic victories. It's necessary to note that most covert actions the CIA undertakes are authorized by the president. JFK and his brother were particularly fond of using the CIA as a private paramilitary force, as were Nixon and Kissinger and LBJ. The Iran/contra scandal and hostage crisis says enough about how Reagan used and abused the agency.

I can't help but feel as though that the allure of covert action distracted the CIA and the presidents that used it from what should have been its fundamental mission: to steal secrets. The CIA's heavy hand, clearly visible is so many countries' internal affairs, clearly damaged the agency's espionage efforts. Spies need the to trust the people they're spying for. But who trusted the CIA? After all, they're just going to overthrow your government tomorrow. The CIA always walked thunderously and carried a big stick. That is not the role of an intelligence agency. Besides, the net effort of its covert efforts was rarely worth the price paid in dollars and in blood, as so many agency sources say in Weiner's brilliant book.

I do not believe the CIA is beyond repair, and indeed, I believe America needs a civilian intelligence service. Military intelligence services are useful for battle intelligence, but an independent, plainclothes intelligence service is best able to run foreign agents deliver unbiased intelligence information and analysis to the nation's decision-makers. It needs crafty spies and skeptical analysts. It still has the money and manpower to do its job: What it needs most is the trust of a president who understands that good intelligence is vital to good diplomacy.









]]>
author: Tim Weiner
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.93
book published: 2007
rating: 5
read at: 05/08
date added: 05/29/08
shelves: americanhistory, commentary, journalism
review:
A sprawling, fierce work of history, scholarship, and journalism. Markedly pessimistic in tone, Tim Weiner chronicles the often tragic history of America's once revered intelligence service. What he finds is that the the CIA has failed in its fundamental mission – to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence –  for the better part of a century.

Weiner argues that the agency has suffered from and still suffers from several cancers. First is the propensity of its directors to bend to the political will of presidents and their underlings, an unfortunate tendency that culminated in the elimination of the position of Director of Central Intelligence under George W. Bush. Scant intelligence from the field was often parlayed into invincible evidence in intelligence reports for decision-makers, since that is often the only type of intelligence they would pay attention to. Reports that did not conform to a president's predetermined mindset, interests, or worldview were routinely discarded. The 'intelligence' was adjusted just to get the big boss' attention. There were precious few moments in the agency's history during which it reliably informed the president as to the goings-on in a particular part of the world.

Second is the CIA's demonstrated inability to collect good intelligence on America's friends and enemies, which are now and always have been numerous and ruthless. The agency totally fudged the call on several important events: the first Gulf War. India's nuke. The Bay of Pigs, part of a more elaborate attempt to dethrone Castro (JFK's mess, but an inherited one). It had close to no idea that Gorbachev was tearing the Soviet Union apart. The 1979 coup in Iran that deposed the CIA-installed and supported shah. Most recently, Sadaam's weapons and the ongoing insurgency. The CIA has had remarkable trouble recruiting reliable Arabic-speaking (and looking) sources to spy on the foreign governments that would most like us to sink into the ocean in much the same way that it found reliable Soviet sources difficult to come by. Weiner offers no prognostication to suggest that we are any safer now than we were under the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. If anything, the current time bodes for the worse: We cannot promise to destroy a terrorist cell in response to an attack. Our credibility in this regard has been savaged by the misguided and mishandled Iraq war.

Third is the string of poor leaders that have infected the CIA like viral bacterial over the years. First was Allen Dulles, an idiot that ruled over the CIA as it were is own personal fiefdom. A lover of covert action, he ceaselessly tried to overthrow governments using the money of the American people and the lives of others. He failed miserably every time. Eisenhower rightfully found him untrustworthy. From that point onward, the relationship between the CIA and and the White House was never fully repaired. There were others, some well-meaning idiots and some just plain idiots with a few bright ones here and there. Dave McCone, Richard Helms and George Tenet were all made some bad decisions but all wanted the best for the agency and for the United States. That none of them could really make the CIA all it could be is perhaps a testament to how broken its relationship with the executive branch was since its inception. The world's most effective intelligence services have their ruler's ear and trust. The CIA did not and does not. The end result of the efforts of its many leaders is a paralyzed relationship between the agency and the military – which, Weiner argues, would like nothing more than the agency's elimination –  and civilian leadership in government.

My personal interpretation of the work is necessarily an analysis of the CIA's performance. Throughout its history, as Weiner shows, the agency devoted significant time, talent, and resources to the overthrow of leftist governments. These attempts resulted in either unmitigated failure (Cuba) or bloody success (Guatemaula). But the CIA failed to understand the unintended consequences these actions provoked. At the time they were seen as victories in the Cold War. But as Afghanistan now clearly demonstrates, many of them were pyrrhic victories. It's necessary to note that most covert actions the CIA undertakes are authorized by the president. JFK and his brother were particularly fond of using the CIA as a private paramilitary force, as were Nixon and Kissinger and LBJ. The Iran/contra scandal and hostage crisis says enough about how Reagan used and abused the agency.

I can't help but feel as though that the allure of covert action distracted the CIA and the presidents that used it from what should have been its fundamental mission: to steal secrets. The CIA's heavy hand, clearly visible is so many countries' internal affairs, clearly damaged the agency's espionage efforts. Spies need the to trust the people they're spying for. But who trusted the CIA? After all, they're just going to overthrow your government tomorrow. The CIA always walked thunderously and carried a big stick. That is not the role of an intelligence agency. Besides, the net effort of its covert efforts was rarely worth the price paid in dollars and in blood, as so many agency sources say in Weiner's brilliant book.

I do not believe the CIA is beyond repair, and indeed, I believe America needs a civilian intelligence service. Military intelligence services are useful for battle intelligence, but an independent, plainclothes intelligence service is best able to run foreign agents deliver unbiased intelligence information and analysis to the nation's decision-makers. It needs crafty spies and skeptical analysts. It still has the money and manpower to do its job: What it needs most is the trust of a president who understands that good intelligence is vital to good diplomacy.










]]> 16386341 Thu, 22 May 2008 11:35:44 -0700
author: Atul Gawande
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.16
book published: 2003
rating: 3
read at: 05/08
date added: 05/22/08
shelves: commentary
review:
Interesting selection of medical anecdotes with some wonky commentary. Gawande waxes philosophic on the technological, scientific, and human elements of the health care industry. All well and good, but he totally neglects to address how politics and economics influence health care, and his commentary is as a whole pretty limited. A little more perspective would've done wonders, although what's there is pretty good.
]]> 21474895 Fri, 02 May 2008 13:25:39 -0700
author: Gilbert King
name: Aaron
average rating: 2.10
book published: 2004
rating: 2
read at:
date added: 05/02/08
shelves: journalism
review:
3rd rate treatment of international trafficking. Stories pulled from the AP and major newspapers combined with undergraduate-level research on the State Department's website. Also, the typeface is really annoying.
]]> 21474754 Fri, 02 May 2008 13:24:17 -0700
author: Cormac McCarthy
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.98
book published: 2005
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/02/08
shelves: fiction
review:
Don't know why this took me a semester to read.
]]> 17584205 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 07:13:39 -0700
author: Eddie Bravo
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.67
book published: 2007
rating: 5
read at:
date added: 03/12/08
shelves: other
review:

]]> 17584156 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 07:12:51 -0700
author: Eddie Bravo
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.33
book published: 2006
rating: 5
read at:
date added: 03/12/08
shelves: other
review:

]]> 17248128 Fri, 07 Mar 2008 12:12:13 -0800
author: Barbara B. Jelavich
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.50
book published: 1974
rating: 3
read at: 02/08
date added: 03/07/08
shelves: europeanhistory
review:
Straighforward survey of Habsburg foreign policy in the 19th and early 20th century. Good portrait of Metternich and Francis Joseph. The author explains the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in terms relevant to modern day Europe.
]]> 17247315 Fri, 07 Mar 2008 12:05:03 -0800
Several dozen firsthand accounts paint a picture of another holocaust: that of ethnic Germans who were deported, enslaved, raped and murdered by Russians, Czechs, Yugoslavs and Poles during the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.

The first person account of Frau Neumann, who lived in a Prussian town in modern-day Kalingrad, is one of the most disturbing, hellish, and bestial things I've ever read, and one of the most profound.

The book also details Allied complicity in the expulsion of ethnic Germans from their homes and businesses. Millions of German people endured their own trail of tears - upon which several hundred thousand died - as they were deported to Germany from their ancient lands in Eastern Europe.

It's an unforgiving experience, reading account after account after account of such horrors. Disgusting.]]>
author: Alfred-Maurice de Zayas
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.67
book published: 2006
rating: 5
read at: 03/08
date added: 03/07/08
shelves: europeanhistory
review:
Sickening accounts of the expulsions of Germans from their ancestral lands in Eastern Europe during and following World War II.

Several dozen firsthand accounts paint a picture of another holocaust: that of ethnic Germans who were deported, enslaved, raped and murdered by Russians, Czechs, Yugoslavs and Poles during the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.

The first person account of Frau Neumann, who lived in a Prussian town in modern-day Kalingrad, is one of the most disturbing, hellish, and bestial things I've ever read, and one of the most profound.

The book also details Allied complicity in the expulsion of ethnic Germans from their homes and businesses. Millions of German people endured their own trail of tears - upon which several hundred thousand died - as they were deported to Germany from their ancient lands in Eastern Europe.

It's an unforgiving experience, reading account after account after account of such horrors. Disgusting.
]]> 11316756 Sun, 30 Dec 2007 21:44:41 -0800
author: Seth Jacobs
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.00
book published: 2006
rating: 4
read at: 10/07
date added: 12/30/07
shelves: worldhistory
review:
Great history of Ngo Dinh Diem and both Vietnam wars with a strong attention to detail and willingness to explore Vietnamese sources. Paints a portrait of Diem was a tragic figure, doomed to fail because of his own shortcomings (and strengths) as a leader, the position in which the American posture in Vietnam placed him, and ultimately, history itself. I doubt there exists a better book on Diem, or even the origins of the Vietnam War.
]]> 11313302 Sun, 30 Dec 2007 21:27:21 -0800
While he chose nature has his release from the artificial trappings that he rejected, I think many men, myself included, share or at least empathize with his idealism. In my frequent solitude, I've often considered the arbitrary, temporary comforts that material things bring and the silly, meaningless routines that working adults follow until dying in a much less poetic manner than McCandless (or any other adventurer).

Most men - most people - don't try to understand or transcend the more humdrum aspects of daily life and live out a philosophy or ideal like McCandless. His case is exceptionally rare, especially in a time where the course of one's life - especially a youth's life - is supposed to be predictable. Birth. High school (preferably a private one). College (preferably a 'nice' one). Job for 35 years. Retire. Take a cruise. Die. But McCandless' journey was extreme by any measure.

I think people can find some kind of basic, almost primal pleasure in whatever they choose to do. For Buddhist monks, this could be as simple as sweeping the monastery floor. For disaffected college-aged adults, this could be as (comparatively) complex as an hour in the batting cages or even a game of catch. And here, I am speaking specifically of the satisfying the yearning that McCandless felt so strongly - the complete detachment from the forms that govern life that results not from the dissection of the routine and quotidian, but from a more simple, subtle satisfaction that continually eluded him. He felt his yearning was satisfied in the Alaskan wilderness. And there is certainly something special about the Alaskan wilderness, but the feeling he was after is universal, I am sure of it. A euphoric escape from the banalities of existence and the inevitable frustrations those banalities bring - bills, the mortgage, and so forth. Something altogether rapturous. McCandless wanted the rapture to last forever, but by the end of his story (and the end of his life) I think he had recognized that moment could never be realized forever. Perhaps he had stumbled onto the sublime: that feeling is temporary, not permanent, and cannot be realized emotionally or existentially, but must be incorporated into one's very being, into one's intellect. I think that's why he left the bus.

Intelligent people (like McCandless and Krakauer) eventually make peace - or at least a ceasefire - with society, with the system. Some embrace it, chasing ideals or material pleasure or self-satisfaction or to kill off their personal demons. McCandless' rebellion was a fierce one, but ultimately, he made his peace. What he would've done to sustain that peace is anybody's guess. But his peace, and the peace of many others like him, is an uneasy one. Predictably, I'm predisposed to play the role of the armchair historian. And so I can't help but ask myself if the methods by which we organize the society we live in are not at the root of the matter, and more importantly, how many more McCandlesses are there? How many more souls will the system alienate and eventually destroy? Could a pragmatist, a realist working within the system and relishing every minute of it convince me his beliefs were honest? I don't know anymore. I'm really not questioning whether or not our society can sustain itself. To me, it's obvious that the system works. But assuming that McCandless' frustrations are either irrelevant or obscure is to misunderstand what it's like to be an American, and even a human. ]]>
author: Jon Krakauer
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.84
book published: 1996
rating: 5
read at: 12/07
date added: 12/30/07
shelves: journalism
review:
Really enjoyed it. McCandless had in him an exceptionally large dose of the passions that at one point or another consume most young men, if only for a brief period. His strong distaste, bordering on hatred, of modern American life, with all its easy pleasures is idealistic rebellion at its purest.

While he chose nature has his release from the artificial trappings that he rejected, I think many men, myself included, share or at least empathize with his idealism. In my frequent solitude, I've often considered the arbitrary, temporary comforts that material things bring and the silly, meaningless routines that working adults follow until dying in a much less poetic manner than McCandless (or any other adventurer).

Most men - most people - don't try to understand or transcend the more humdrum aspects of daily life and live out a philosophy or ideal like McCandless. His case is exceptionally rare, especially in a time where the course of one's life - especially a youth's life - is supposed to be predictable. Birth. High school (preferably a private one). College (preferably a 'nice' one). Job for 35 years. Retire. Take a cruise. Die. But McCandless' journey was extreme by any measure.

I think people can find some kind of basic, almost primal pleasure in whatever they choose to do. For Buddhist monks, this could be as simple as sweeping the monastery floor. For disaffected college-aged adults, this could be as (comparatively) complex as an hour in the batting cages or even a game of catch. And here, I am speaking specifically of the satisfying the yearning that McCandless felt so strongly - the complete detachment from the forms that govern life that results not from the dissection of the routine and quotidian, but from a more simple, subtle satisfaction that continually eluded him. He felt his yearning was satisfied in the Alaskan wilderness. And there is certainly something special about the Alaskan wilderness, but the feeling he was after is universal, I am sure of it. A euphoric escape from the banalities of existence and the inevitable frustrations those banalities bring - bills, the mortgage, and so forth. Something altogether rapturous. McCandless wanted the rapture to last forever, but by the end of his story (and the end of his life) I think he had recognized that moment could never be realized forever. Perhaps he had stumbled onto the sublime: that feeling is temporary, not permanent, and cannot be realized emotionally or existentially, but must be incorporated into one's very being, into one's intellect. I think that's why he left the bus.

Intelligent people (like McCandless and Krakauer) eventually make peace - or at least a ceasefire - with society, with the system. Some embrace it, chasing ideals or material pleasure or self-satisfaction or to kill off their personal demons. McCandless' rebellion was a fierce one, but ultimately, he made his peace. What he would've done to sustain that peace is anybody's guess. But his peace, and the peace of many others like him, is an uneasy one. Predictably, I'm predisposed to play the role of the armchair historian. And so I can't help but ask myself if the methods by which we organize the society we live in are not at the root of the matter, and more importantly, how many more McCandlesses are there? How many more souls will the system alienate and eventually destroy? Could a pragmatist, a realist working within the system and relishing every minute of it convince me his beliefs were honest? I don't know anymore. I'm really not questioning whether or not our society can sustain itself. To me, it's obvious that the system works. But assuming that McCandless' frustrations are either irrelevant or obscure is to misunderstand what it's like to be an American, and even a human.
]]> 2860470 Mon, 10 Sep 2007 07:23:42 -0700
Baer argues - largely through firsthand experience - that the CIA, in the simplest terms possible, bowed to political pressure of all sorts, sent idiots overseas to collect intelligence, and basically forgot what its job was and how to do it. After the Cold War, the CIA - and thus, the US - has virtually no idea what was going on in the world. This almost complete lack of any data as to what kind of organizations were shaping themselves in the mid 90s allowed the anti-US terrorist movement(s) to put themselves together virtually unhindered.

Baer goes on to talk about 9/11, including his theory behind it (Iran and perhaps Palestine may share some responsibility), and George Tenet's efforts to rebuild the shattered institution to its former capabilities. He also talks about Iraq, and shares the opinion of just about every ex-government official who has commented on it to some extent: "That was stupid." From the point of view of an intelligence officer, his criticisms are damning.

A solid read.

]]>
author: Robert Baer
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.96
book published: 2002
rating: 4
read at: 12/07
date added: 09/10/07
shelves: memoirs
review:
Revealing look at the decline of the CIA in the 80s and 90s through the eyes of an old-school operations officer, Bob Baer.

Baer argues - largely through firsthand experience - that the CIA, in the simplest terms possible, bowed to political pressure of all sorts, sent idiots overseas to collect intelligence, and basically forgot what its job was and how to do it. After the Cold War, the CIA - and thus, the US - has virtually no idea what was going on in the world. This almost complete lack of any data as to what kind of organizations were shaping themselves in the mid 90s allowed the anti-US terrorist movement(s) to put themselves together virtually unhindered.

Baer goes on to talk about 9/11, including his theory behind it (Iran and perhaps Palestine may share some responsibility), and George Tenet's efforts to rebuild the shattered institution to its former capabilities. He also talks about Iraq, and shares the opinion of just about every ex-government official who has commented on it to some extent: "That was stupid." From the point of view of an intelligence officer, his criticisms are damning.

A solid read.


]]> 3840256 Sun, 05 Aug 2007 08:25:33 -0700
At some point, though, I started to feel detached, and more cognizant of the fact that I was reading the book. In particular, I felt as though Daisy's character was a bit forced, as if she existed solely for McEwan to comment on literature and serve as the surgeon's intellectual foil. Yet, McEwan's ability to create emotionally and factually convincing emotions, personalities and situations is impressive. I liked it. ]]>
author: Ian McEwan
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.57
book published: 2005
rating: 4
read at: 08/07
date added: 08/05/07
shelves: fiction
review:
An enjoyable read. McEwan is very, very good at describing the feelings and attitudes of Perowne, and by extension, a lot of people. At times - specifically, the squash game and the first encounter with Baxter - you feel totally immersed.

At some point, though, I started to feel detached, and more cognizant of the fact that I was reading the book. In particular, I felt as though Daisy's character was a bit forced, as if she existed solely for McEwan to comment on literature and serve as the surgeon's intellectual foil. Yet, McEwan's ability to create emotionally and factually convincing emotions, personalities and situations is impressive. I liked it.
]]> 1280307 Thu, 02 Aug 2007 12:28:52 -0700
The first couple of parts deal largely with the CIA's anti-terror operations and Tenet's indepartmental struggles to get the CIA in a position to combat the terror threat. The last part of the book deals with the CIA's role in the buildup and execution of the Iraq war. Tenet defends the CIA's intelligence, arguing that the estimates and reports delivered to members of Congress and of the administration was abused, and there were numerous attempts for the administration to affect the content of intelligence estimates. Douglas Feith, in particular, comes off as a complete fucking moron, concocting outrageous 'intelligence' estimates in the basement of the White House suited only for political needs, and not practical ones. The gaping differences between the analysis of the CIA and the administration's pretext for invading Iraq is well-documented, useful, and believable.

Severely lacking in this memoir is a personality. The text is lively and very readable, but somewhat predictable. The entire time, I was very much aware of the fact that I was reading George Tenet's book - a better recollection, such as Dick Clarke's, will completely involve you in the text. Tenet also adamantly refuses to wax philosophic - I had no idea what kind of human being I was dealing with. I mean, his actions indicated that he's obviously a pretty well-intentioned fellow, but I could find no semblance of a worldview or a set of shaping principles that would more fully flush out his character. In short, I had no idea what this guy was fighting for; what he loved or cared about. What ideas motivated him. Perhaps this is what made him such a successful intelligence officer. But it doesn't make for great reading, although the insight into the workings of government is, as it usually is, illuminating.

]]>
author: George Tenet
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.51
book published: 2007
rating: 3
read at: 07/07
date added: 08/02/07
shelves: memoirs, politics
review:
An enjoyable book with some valuable insight into the workings of the administration from a high ranking official. Naturally, the book focuses intensely on the CIA's doings before and after 9/11 and the Iraq War. As should be expected, the agency comes off as an fiercely independent, highly analytical and utterly indispensible service to the American people. And, surprisingly enough, Tenet is pretty convincing. The operations and officers of the agency came off as serious – these guys really want to protect the U.S., and were driving themselves insane before AND after 9/11 trying to do so.

The first couple of parts deal largely with the CIA's anti-terror operations and Tenet's indepartmental struggles to get the CIA in a position to combat the terror threat. The last part of the book deals with the CIA's role in the buildup and execution of the Iraq war. Tenet defends the CIA's intelligence, arguing that the estimates and reports delivered to members of Congress and of the administration was abused, and there were numerous attempts for the administration to affect the content of intelligence estimates. Douglas Feith, in particular, comes off as a complete fucking moron, concocting outrageous 'intelligence' estimates in the basement of the White House suited only for political needs, and not practical ones. The gaping differences between the analysis of the CIA and the administration's pretext for invading Iraq is well-documented, useful, and believable.

Severely lacking in this memoir is a personality. The text is lively and very readable, but somewhat predictable. The entire time, I was very much aware of the fact that I was reading George Tenet's book - a better recollection, such as Dick Clarke's, will completely involve you in the text. Tenet also adamantly refuses to wax philosophic - I had no idea what kind of human being I was dealing with. I mean, his actions indicated that he's obviously a pretty well-intentioned fellow, but I could find no semblance of a worldview or a set of shaping principles that would more fully flush out his character. In short, I had no idea what this guy was fighting for; what he loved or cared about. What ideas motivated him. Perhaps this is what made him such a successful intelligence officer. But it doesn't make for great reading, although the insight into the workings of government is, as it usually is, illuminating.


]]> 2773117 Tue, 31 Jul 2007 06:09:42 -0700
The book's author - Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst - argues that The US is losing, and will ultimately be defeated by militant Islam unless a number of dramatic, even catastrophic changes in US policy take place.

The book is monographic in the sense that it does not deviate from explaining why this is happening - it's 263 pages of punishment. This gives the book focus, but not so much as to feel too academic, as the author is lively and, perhaps more accurately, extremely pissed off.

His prescription for change is reiterated - more like hammered - constantly throughout text. A couple of his points:

1) The elites of the American military-political establishment are moral cowards that will bow to international pressure and corporate lobbying before defending the citizens of the United States
2) Unless several important, almost sancrosanct policies are reversed or simply done away with, al Qaeda and other Islamists will continue to incite directed Muslim hatred which will, in turn, protract a clash with the US can only be won with unimaginable cost in terms of economic costs.

There's plenty more to think about, philosophically speaking, although this book is based and written in very concrete terms. One thing stood out to me the most, and I think it will stick with me for a long time. Scheuer quoted John Quincy Adams a few times, and the following quote I believe contains a truism that is often disregarded by today's policy makers and academics: leave well enough alone.

"[America] well knows that by once enlisting under banners other than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, ambition, which assumed the colors and usurped the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force...she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."







]]>
author: Michael Scheuer
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.00
book published: 2004
rating: 5
read at: 07/07
date added: 07/31/07
shelves: commentary, politics
review:
This book had me thinking oppressively hard.

The book's author - Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst - argues that The US is losing, and will ultimately be defeated by militant Islam unless a number of dramatic, even catastrophic changes in US policy take place.

The book is monographic in the sense that it does not deviate from explaining why this is happening - it's 263 pages of punishment. This gives the book focus, but not so much as to feel too academic, as the author is lively and, perhaps more accurately, extremely pissed off.

His prescription for change is reiterated - more like hammered - constantly throughout text. A couple of his points:

1) The elites of the American military-political establishment are moral cowards that will bow to international pressure and corporate lobbying before defending the citizens of the United States
2) Unless several important, almost sancrosanct policies are reversed or simply done away with, al Qaeda and other Islamists will continue to incite directed Muslim hatred which will, in turn, protract a clash with the US can only be won with unimaginable cost in terms of economic costs.

There's plenty more to think about, philosophically speaking, although this book is based and written in very concrete terms. One thing stood out to me the most, and I think it will stick with me for a long time. Scheuer quoted John Quincy Adams a few times, and the following quote I believe contains a truism that is often disregarded by today's policy makers and academics: leave well enough alone.

"[America] well knows that by once enlisting under banners other than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, ambition, which assumed the colors and usurped the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force...she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."








]]> 2860408 Tue, 24 Jul 2007 08:26:54 -0700
author: John Perkins
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.69
book published: 2007
rating: 2
read at:
date added: 07/24/07
shelves: didntfinish, memoirs
review:
A weird book. I wasn't sure if he was making up half of the stuff he did, but his moral outrage sure seems manufactured, given how he spent 20 years at a consulting firm making millions.
]]> 1095594 Fri, 06 Jul 2007 11:40:33 -0700
author: Jonathan Schell
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.25
book published: 1976
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 07/06/07
shelves: commentary, politics
review:
His conclusion should be required reading for citizenship in the United States.
]]> 1095579 Fri, 06 Jul 2007 11:30:03 -0700
author: George Packer
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.21
book published: 2006
rating: 5
read at:
date added: 07/06/07
shelves: commentary, journalism, politics
review:
If you want to know what went wrong in Iraq, read this. No polemics, no politicking, just the best journalism the conflict has produced.
]]> 2772813 Fri, 06 Jul 2007 11:08:11 -0700
author: Mark Kurlansky
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.63
book published: 2003
rating: 3
read at:
date added: 07/06/07
shelves: worldhistory
review:
Fairly interesting book, for those totally unaware of the role salt collection and trade played in ancient civilizations. The author is particularly good at pointing out the commonalities among ostensibly disparate cultures. Does bog down in the details, though.
]]> 2772440 Fri, 06 Jul 2007 11:03:36 -0700
What made the biggest impression on me the most, however, was the conclusion, the argument in which rang emotionally and intellectually true. Also of note is the annotated bibliography, which is exhaustive and relevant, given the subjective nature of his retellings.

An important analysis and a few good examples. Highly recommended. ]]>
author: Jonathan Cohn
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.53
book published: 2007
rating: 4
read at: 07/07
date added: 07/06/07
shelves: commentary, journalism
review:
Interesting look at health care in the U.S., focusing on the stories of 7 or so families that fell through the cracks of the system. Fairly even-handed throughout, although private insurers come off as dastardly. The history of health insurance, dating back to the old Blue Cross programs, was fascinating.

What made the biggest impression on me the most, however, was the conclusion, the argument in which rang emotionally and intellectually true. Also of note is the annotated bibliography, which is exhaustive and relevant, given the subjective nature of his retellings.

An important analysis and a few good examples. Highly recommended.
]]> 1336310 Thu, 31 May 2007 10:12:01 -0700
O'Neill, for his part, is a sympathetic character. Suskind's narrative paints a portrait of a man who, from very humble beginnings, developed a personality so devoted to truth, he simply couldn't function in an environment that requires, to some extent, deceit.

O'Neill's reflections and Suskind's investigations also suggest what could only be considered an overarching contempt for anything resembling intellectual rigor on the part of most cabinet officials, their deputies, and senior members of the administration. O'Neill's foils, specifically Larry Lindsey, were strongly motivated by ideological fervor, and were often unwilling to compromise their positions based on the data. Accordingly, a lot behavior at meetings and routine functions was highly politicized. It was not the environment of inquiry and debate that O'Neill worked in under Ford and even Nixon; it was a show.

An interesting book. I wonder what it's like it Washington now. I can't even imagine how much of a cirucs it is. ]]>
author: Ron Suskind
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.85
book published: 2004
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/31/07
shelves: biographies, commentary, politics
review:
I ate this book up. Another revealing look at some of workings in Washington in a critical time, the first two years of the Bush presidency. As is more or less commonly understood now, Bush comes off as an insulated and uninterested president with a personality that stifles real debate and deliberation in a White House and a city that could really use it.

O'Neill, for his part, is a sympathetic character. Suskind's narrative paints a portrait of a man who, from very humble beginnings, developed a personality so devoted to truth, he simply couldn't function in an environment that requires, to some extent, deceit.

O'Neill's reflections and Suskind's investigations also suggest what could only be considered an overarching contempt for anything resembling intellectual rigor on the part of most cabinet officials, their deputies, and senior members of the administration. O'Neill's foils, specifically Larry Lindsey, were strongly motivated by ideological fervor, and were often unwilling to compromise their positions based on the data. Accordingly, a lot behavior at meetings and routine functions was highly politicized. It was not the environment of inquiry and debate that O'Neill worked in under Ford and even Nixon; it was a show.

An interesting book. I wonder what it's like it Washington now. I can't even imagine how much of a cirucs it is.
]]> 1280297 Tue, 22 May 2007 12:30:18 -0700
And there are other problems. He suggests that the American media can't be trusted to report economic data accurately, and that the American economic Establishment ensures nothing that might bring into question the literal strength of the American economy. While this is all well and good, it's just conspiracy theory.

The data he actually does give us seems irrelevant given his thesis: birth rates are going down. He draws from this an aborted argument suggesting third world nations are rising from grinding poverty, becoming more literate, etc. and this all means American hegemony will be unnecessary in the future. Sure, guy, sure.

But the book isn't all bad. He seems genuinely concerned that the country is spending itself into oblivion, and that it doesn't make anything except cars and guns. Here, he is on firmer ground, citing the colossal trade defecit of the U.S. as compared to foreign nations, especially China but even older industrial nations like France and Japan that actually make stuff. In the best chapter of the book, he calls out the economic thinking that apologizes for the defecit and tries to explain away the widening of the income gap. He states his concerns most succinctly in the book's last paragraph:

"Let us follow the example of that early successful America. Let us dare to become strong by refusing militarism and concentrating instead on the economic and social problems within our societies."

Words to the wise, methinks. ]]>
author: Emmanuel Todd
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.14
book published: 2006
rating: 2
read at: 05/07
date added: 05/22/07
shelves: commentary
review:
The book is a mess, but occasionally enjoyable. His thesis is essentially threefold: America has overcommitted itself militarily; it consumes far more than it produces and its current position as a 'hyperpower' is unsustainable. Pretty clean so far, but it gets filthy when he tries to describe the details. For example, he argues Russia and Europe and Japan are being inexorably drawn closer to one another in the face of the American imperialist threat. Yeah, that's correct, Russia and Japan. Needless to say, he offers absolutely no evidence to back that claim up.

And there are other problems. He suggests that the American media can't be trusted to report economic data accurately, and that the American economic Establishment ensures nothing that might bring into question the literal strength of the American economy. While this is all well and good, it's just conspiracy theory.

The data he actually does give us seems irrelevant given his thesis: birth rates are going down. He draws from this an aborted argument suggesting third world nations are rising from grinding poverty, becoming more literate, etc. and this all means American hegemony will be unnecessary in the future. Sure, guy, sure.

But the book isn't all bad. He seems genuinely concerned that the country is spending itself into oblivion, and that it doesn't make anything except cars and guns. Here, he is on firmer ground, citing the colossal trade defecit of the U.S. as compared to foreign nations, especially China but even older industrial nations like France and Japan that actually make stuff. In the best chapter of the book, he calls out the economic thinking that apologizes for the defecit and tries to explain away the widening of the income gap. He states his concerns most succinctly in the book's last paragraph:

"Let us follow the example of that early successful America. Let us dare to become strong by refusing militarism and concentrating instead on the economic and social problems within our societies."

Words to the wise, methinks.
]]> 1132715 Fri, 18 May 2007 10:51:47 -0700
But is it ever riveting. While I had read stories in the papers and seen Clarke (and fellow whistle-blower Paul O'Neill) on TV, I didn't fully understand what had been done to counter terrorism before 9/11. Holy shit, this guy was hardcore. He even analogizes, comparing his quest for bin Laden to Ahab's hunt for good ole Dick. He says a lot of good people that really wanted to fight al Qaeda got stiffarmed at every opportunity, and not just by the White House during the four administrations he served under - Defense, CIA, FBI (which comes off as particularly ineffective), Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice - no one seemed all that interested in fighting terrorism until it was too late.

Clinton, surprisingly, comes off as something of a hardass, signing off on just about every anti-terrorist bill or directive put in front of him. If Clarke is to be believed, Clinton did much more to fight terrorism than is commonly assumed. And apparently, the Black Hawk Down incident was more or less a result of a reluctant military not wanting to involve itself any more than absolutely necessary in the ugly Somali conflict. Not the first time this has been postulated, but coming from an insider, it's particularly convincing.

And while this is more or less agreed upon now, Clarke's review of the current administration is not positive. He argues that the war in Iraq distracted us from the task of addressing America's vulnerabilities and eliminating al Qaeda; furthermore, the invasion of Afghanistan was needlessly hampered by bureaucratic infighting, costing lives and valuable time. He also wonders whether or not long-standing alliances with European nations and relations with Islamic societies may have been irreperably damaged by unilateral action. Indeed, it is the last portion of the book that is the most chilling. Clarke tells us that by invading and occupying an Arab nation, we have fed the fires of fundamentalist Islam and provided all the propaganda al Qaeda needs.

An interesting book.

]]>
author: Richard A. Clarke
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.83
book published: 2004
rating: 4
read at: 05/07
date added: 05/18/07
shelves: memoirs, politics
review:
I totally devoured this book. I wish I would have read it three years ago. Essentially, it's a stripped down memoir of former White House counterterrorism expert Dick Clarke's career as a civil servant. I say stripped down, because it focuses almost exclusively on the bureaucratic struggles and politiciking behind the hunt for al Qaeda before 9/11. No time for coffee or breakfast; this guy has four administrations to get through.

But is it ever riveting. While I had read stories in the papers and seen Clarke (and fellow whistle-blower Paul O'Neill) on TV, I didn't fully understand what had been done to counter terrorism before 9/11. Holy shit, this guy was hardcore. He even analogizes, comparing his quest for bin Laden to Ahab's hunt for good ole Dick. He says a lot of good people that really wanted to fight al Qaeda got stiffarmed at every opportunity, and not just by the White House during the four administrations he served under - Defense, CIA, FBI (which comes off as particularly ineffective), Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice - no one seemed all that interested in fighting terrorism until it was too late.

Clinton, surprisingly, comes off as something of a hardass, signing off on just about every anti-terrorist bill or directive put in front of him. If Clarke is to be believed, Clinton did much more to fight terrorism than is commonly assumed. And apparently, the Black Hawk Down incident was more or less a result of a reluctant military not wanting to involve itself any more than absolutely necessary in the ugly Somali conflict. Not the first time this has been postulated, but coming from an insider, it's particularly convincing.

And while this is more or less agreed upon now, Clarke's review of the current administration is not positive. He argues that the war in Iraq distracted us from the task of addressing America's vulnerabilities and eliminating al Qaeda; furthermore, the invasion of Afghanistan was needlessly hampered by bureaucratic infighting, costing lives and valuable time. He also wonders whether or not long-standing alliances with European nations and relations with Islamic societies may have been irreperably damaged by unilateral action. Indeed, it is the last portion of the book that is the most chilling. Clarke tells us that by invading and occupying an Arab nation, we have fed the fires of fundamentalist Islam and provided all the propaganda al Qaeda needs.

An interesting book.


]]> 1095564 Wed, 16 May 2007 11:50:19 -0700
The book's main weakness is its cynicism, which penetrates despite Johnson's mostly even-handed treatment of personalities and events. He really does believe that we're in the middle of a constitutional crisis; accordingly, a lot of his anecdotes and interludes are tinged with an unfortunate cynical attitude. And Johnson's solutions aren't exactly realistic: destroy the CIA as it exists today, dismantle the military-industrial complex, forbid campaign contributions (i.e., mandate publicly-funded elections), and basically rewrite history. A lot to think about, if anything.

]]>
author: Chalmers Johnson
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.16
book published: 2007
rating: 3
read at: 05/07
date added: 05/16/07
shelves: commentary
review:
Johnson has been maligned in the past for shoddy research and a conspiratorial bent, but I found shades of neither in his this most recent work. In fact, the military archives are cited more frequently in his notes than any other source and his overarching thesis is hardly conspiratorial: militarism and imperialism threaten the constitution of the United States and the liberties it grants; not some shady Deus Ex syndicate. Like one of my professors said, it feels good to read an old-fashioned lefty in today's world, seemingly populated entirely by neoliberals, conservatives and fence-sitters, content to ponder and not act.

The book's main weakness is its cynicism, which penetrates despite Johnson's mostly even-handed treatment of personalities and events. He really does believe that we're in the middle of a constitutional crisis; accordingly, a lot of his anecdotes and interludes are tinged with an unfortunate cynical attitude. And Johnson's solutions aren't exactly realistic: destroy the CIA as it exists today, dismantle the military-industrial complex, forbid campaign contributions (i.e., mandate publicly-funded elections), and basically rewrite history. A lot to think about, if anything.


]]> 1227030 Tue, 15 May 2007 11:20:28 -0700
author: Steven D. Levitt
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.74
book published: 2005
rating: 1
read at:
date added: 05/15/07
shelves: commentary, economics
review:
A stupid book. I can't remember whether or not Dubner spent more time worshipping Levitt – a Harvard grad and a 'rogue' economist only to 5th graders – or if Levitt spent more time posturing as some kind of off-the-wall, holy shit this is how it really works teller of fables. Levitt's arguments would be tolerable if only they were presented in a straightforward manner. But alas, it's all wrapped up in such a repugnant air of pretension to make it unreadable. Stupid.
]]> 1222092 Tue, 15 May 2007 07:53:01 -0700
author: Daniel R. Headrick
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.57
book published: 1981
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/15/07
shelves: europeanhistory
review:
The standard text on the industrial tools with which Europe came to dominate the world. Cited in works as diverse as those of Chalmers Johnson, David Kennedy, and Niall Ferguson. The term 'gunboat diplomacy' probably wouldn't exist without this book.
]]> 1222033 Tue, 15 May 2007 07:49:46 -0700
author: Stephen Kotkin
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.00
book published: 1989
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/15/07
shelves: didntfinish, europeanhistory
review:
A rare look at the economic deterioration of the rural parts of the Soviet Union in Gorbachev's era. Glasnost's often contradictory role in Soviet life is fleshed out, perhaps for the first time. Quite interesting.
]]> 1221975 Tue, 15 May 2007 07:45:18 -0700
author: John Rawls
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.87
book published: 2005
rating: 0
read at:
date added: 05/15/07
shelves:
review:

]]> 1221876 Tue, 15 May 2007 07:39:37 -0700
author: Jan T. Gross
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.88
book published: 2002
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/15/07
shelves: europeanhistory
review:

]]> 1132726 Wed, 09 May 2007 17:52:29 -0700
author: Edward W. Said
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.12
book published: 1979
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: commentary
review:
I found this book incredibly influential, and it is probaly the most often-cited text in new books on American imperialism and its effects. Said seems like the last defender of third-world in the wake of the Niall Fergusons of today, that actually favor gunboat diplomacy.
]]> 1132719 Wed, 09 May 2007 17:49:26 -0700
author: Michael Scheuer
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.77
book published: 2005
rating: 5
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: commentary
review:

]]> 1126934 Wed, 09 May 2007 12:55:05 -0700
author: Richard Adams
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.67
book published: 2006
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: fiction
review:

]]> 1123734 Wed, 09 May 2007 10:48:25 -0700
author: J.R.R. Tolkien
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.43
book published: 2006
rating: 5
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: fiction
review:

]]> 1123728 Wed, 09 May 2007 10:48:15 -0700
author: J.R.R. Tolkien
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.31
book published: 2002
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: fiction
review:

]]> 1123722 Wed, 09 May 2007 10:48:02 -0700
author: J.R.R. Tolkien
name: Aaron
average rating: 4.23
book published: 1954
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: fiction
review:

]]> 1123687 Wed, 09 May 2007 10:46:55 -0700
author: Robert M. Pirsig
name: Aaron
average rating: 3.56
book published: 1974
rating: 4
read at:
date added: 05/09/07
shelves: commentary, didntfinish
review:

]]> 1123575 Wed, 09 May 2007 10:44:41 -0700