Good choice of contributions. The different essays don't stick so close to Hegel's text, but they pair his ideas fruitfully with various new direction...moreGood choice of contributions. The different essays don't stick so close to Hegel's text, but they pair his ideas fruitfully with various new directions.(less)
Obsessive and witty. The exploration of Jewish and Palistinian identity is thought-provoking, but I didn't buy the exploration of identity per se. The...moreObsessive and witty. The exploration of Jewish and Palistinian identity is thought-provoking, but I didn't buy the exploration of identity per se. The problem is the characters; they function better as conduits for thought than as humans. They don't breathe, so it isn't all that exciting to imagine all they ways in which they might be illusions. Philip Roth the writer points out how flat Philip Roth the diasporist detective is, but he ought to, at some point, direct that same critique towards himself. (less)
Because laughter’s like a hiccup or a seizure in the silence, and there is no laughter that does not take place in silence. For this reason you must li...moreBecause laughter’s like a hiccup or a seizure in the silence, and there is no laughter that does not take place in silence. For this reason you must listen to me. OK I’m listening. You, you must let it pass. You ask me then, what then, what then please do I do? As it's passing passing along. Death? Is not the answer. Say They. But tell me, what was it Hesse meant to impart, when he mentioned subtly, snuck it in, that Joseph Knecht oh so longed for death – or he must have? Or was that only a chuckling (Geist-chuckling) nod at the full bellied finalé? You must let it pass, you tell me. Fine. I die. Am dead. Maja! Maja! But why say it? But why teach the young ‘uns when am dead? Knecht wished to teach, teach the young’uns, he longed for it and that (that?)made him longer and bigger and too big for his own outline - he snapped it. he left it. it left him dead against the sunrise. What am I supposed to take away from that? Maja maja? There is one most beautiful thought and that is the taste of the glass bead game. Once we have that, the man who mastered that -- wished for death? Once I let it pass, where then are we? The one force to come and kiss death is the taste of the mastery of the glass bead game. The one weakness of that glass game is its blindness to life. The one glory of this ripe life is made rotten by death. And in circles we end up upended encircled by ands! Hesse! Come on! The synthesis was supposed to be the point! HOW could you leave us here mindsick entrapped by your dissonant ending?(less)
Testimonial justice is a basic ethical and epistemological virtue of truth. To have the virtue, we must try and succeed in adjusting our credibility a...moreTestimonial justice is a basic ethical and epistemological virtue of truth. To have the virtue, we must try and succeed in adjusting our credibility assessments. The adjustment can be either naive, like Huckleberry Finn's, or corrective. If it's corrective, it can be either the result of active reflection or spontaneous. If it's spontaneous, it it was won either through personal familiarity with the informant or through experience. The virtue is probably best maintained through a combination of spontaneous and reflective adjustment.
There are two forms of credibility assessment: unreflective and reflective. Both can be critical. The reliability of unreflective assessments is particularly susceptible to the social imagination, which guides the subject as emotions and visceral images born of diachronic and synchronic social residue. Unreflective assessment is essential to our cognitive heuristics, including in cases of testimony. The social imagination is a good starting point, should you try to set out to make yourself or others more testimonially just. (For the same idea, but with 'belief' as social imagination and 'acceptance' as reflection, see: Jennifer Church, "Taking it to heart")
Testimonial justice is a third basic virtue of truth, next to Bernard Williams' Accuracy and Sincerity. She also uses the geneaological method influenced primarily by Craig's "Knowledge and the state of nature" to isolate those practices necessary to getting a pooling of information going in a state of nature.
I don't think it's so likely though, that Testimonial Justice has the same status as Accuracy and Sincerity. Not because it's a virtue of the hearer rather than the speaker, that's all well and good, but too many societies have met their cognitive needs through a concept of knowledge without at all drawing on the benefits of Testimonial Justice. The same could not be said for Accuracy and Sincerity.
The second form of epistemic injustice is hermeneutical injustice - the inability to explain oneself due to social hermeneutical marginalization. Like a credibility deficit, marginalization can be incidental or systematic, and can be a case of epistemic bad luck or an injustice. Example of overcoming hermeneutical marginilization: the speak outs organized by women during the second feminist movement. Finding words for sexual harassment and post-partum depression, for example, gave them the ability to act as reliable informants about these issues, and the power to insist on their positive credibility. I say, websites like www.dooce.com and http://jezebel.com/ and whatever the future internet world will bring are dynamiting those hermeneutical barriers to dust.
These virtues and vices have political implications, but Fricker sticks with the epistemic and the moral evaluations. (less)