The Unknown Battle Of Midway: The Destruction Of The American Torpedo Squadrons

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The Unknown Battle Of Midway: The Destruction Of The American Torpedo Squadrons

by Alvin B. Kernan

3.21 · rating details · 14 ratings · 7 reviews

The Battle of Midway is considered the greatest U.S. naval victory, but behind the luster is the devastation of the American torpedo squadrons. Of the 51 planes sent to attack Japanese carriers only 7 returned, and of the 127 aircrew only 29 survived. Not a single torpedo hit its target.
A story of avoidable mistakes and flawed planning, The Unknown Battle of Midway reveals...more

Paperback, 208 pages

Published May 28th 2007 by Yale University Press (first published November 11th 2005)

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Feb 15, 2010

Matt rated it

· review of another edition

Shelves: aircraft-carrier-history, naval-aviation, naval-history, naval-disaster, world-war-ii, read-in-2010

This book has nothing new other than studies conducted later in the war on the proper deployment of a torpedo from an aircraft. It is written in a minimalist attack with conclusions that do not support the intended idea of the book to honor the losses of the torpedo squadrons in the Battle of Midway. Kernan wants to attack the senior leadership that he feels sacrificed these torpedo squadron. It must be noted Kernan was a junior enlisted man in VT-6 on the U.S.S. Enterprise during the battle ...moreThis book has nothing new other than studies conducted later in the war on the proper deployment of a torpedo from an aircraft. It is written in a minimalist attack with conclusions that do not support the intended idea of the book to honor the losses of the torpedo squadrons in the Battle of Midway. Kernan wants to attack the senior leadership that he feels sacrificed these torpedo squadron. It must be noted Kernan was a junior enlisted man in VT-6 on the U.S.S. Enterprise during the battle and this book doesn't hide the bias against the senior leadership he has held onto since June 4th 1942. Shame on him for trying to put this attack (some of which is justified) as scholarly work.

Kernan's main theories are that the Navy should have known better to utilize its torpedo bombers, while not yet having a replacement and better bomber, and the leadership should have been better and had other options but doesn't elaborate on what could have been an option. He suggests as if it's the first time this theory has been put forward that the US Navy got lucky on June 4th 1942. That the US Navy got lucky has been a theory for a while. However Kernan's other theories while interesting don't hold much water. Instead of honoring the sacrifice of these brave men who fought the Devastators at Midway and what their sacrifice meant for the Navy Kernan wants to prosecute the leaders long after the leaders had died.

If Kernan's two theories of better torpedo bombers are to be taken seriously one must affix the destruction of the bombers widely around the Navy not just to the squadron commanders. The nation if not the world was coming out of the Depression. Due to this funds were not there to test the torpedoes effectively and nor was there money to develop a new torpedo bomber. After President Roosevelt infused the Navy with money did new weapon systems become a possibility. Many of the new systems, the new fast battleships, the Fletcher class destroyers and new aircraft such as the new Avenger torpedo bombers were just coming into service. Unfortunately for the Battle of Midway there were 6 Avengers from the first production run available. Therefore the Navy was caught in transition rather than as Kernan asserts relegated to obsolete aircraft. Simply put you go to war with what you got not what's coming off the assembly line next month.

If Kernan was really interested in this argument of willful neglect by the senior leadership in utilizing obsolete equipment he would have brought up the Marines flying Brewster Buffaloes which were called by flying coffins by anyone who knew anything about the Buffaloes as supporting evidence but never brings up the Buffaloes. The combat experience and knowledge acquired from the Battle of the Coral Sea and other raids were that the Devastators could take care of themselves while the Dauntlessness needed an escort. With that knowledge it is understandable where the tactical leaders chose to defend the Dauntlessness. A larger question could be did the Japanese realize how ineffective the Devastators were and did not regard them as a threat. But with Fuchida's quotes in Kernan's work it seems that the Japanese did regard the Devastators as a threat and dealt with the threat by bringing Zeroes down to deal with the Devastators. Therefore a better conclusion is that the first part of dumb luck for the Navy was that the Devastator's faults in combat weren't revealed as a lemon earlier. The Japanese Navy was lucky recipient of the lack of knowledge of the Devestators faults. If the US Navy had realized this lesson earlier no doubt the US carriers would have had a different make up of the carrier air group for the Battle of Midway.

Kernan is right in the torpedoes being faulty they were and it was criminal. However the interesting points is that the Navy hadn't developed the correct deployment of the Mark XIII torpedo. That was also criminal, however the question should be did the Devastator have the performance needed for optimum deployment of the weapon. The answer is no. The Devestators were going to be destroyed if they were to be used and according to the knowledge of the time they had to be used (based on strategies and the lack of a replacement aircraft in full production).

The last main theory is the leadership should have been better. Again he is right but he addresses this theory partially. He does not address that the nation had been at war for six months and the separation of peace time officers to wartime leaders was taking place. This was true all over the Navy. The submarine force was brutally separating the peacetime administrators from the wartime aggressive leaders. The difference between the air arm and submarine force here is the amount of enemy contact up to the Battle of the Coral Sea the air arm had been doing isolated raids to keep the Japanese off balance while the submarine force had been continually behind the Japanese lines in contact with the Japanese Navy. The Battle of Midway was the second time the air arm was in contact with the Japanese Navy. This fact would suggest that the air arm was still thinking that peacetime theories and leaders could still be effective. It is to the credit rather the detriment of the air admirals that they made changes and became as brutal as the submarine leaders in finding the wartime leaders after Midway. However Kernan wants to present the worst possible image of the leadership.

It must be addressed that Kernan was a member of VT-6 the USS Enterprise's torpedo squadron that suffered terrible losses. Kernan attacks Jim Grey the leader of the Enterprise's fighters during the attack and all but calls Capt. Grey (USN ret.) a coward because Grey didn't come to the Enterprise's torpedo squadron's rescue. Kernan relates a 1994 public apology at a Midway symposium and ends with an attack of how Capt grey ends his apology, "Sorry about that". Based on Kernan's own evidence he is attacking Grey for not finding VT-6 in Kernan's own words was a "group grope" or confusing circumstances and then Grey didn't hear a radio call for assistance. Kernan here should know better since the Historical record is replete with the air filled with irrelevant communications between planes. It is very plausible in battle Grey didn't hear the communication. This is nothing more than decades old embitterment from when friends of his were shot down because Capt. Grey covered mistakenly covered the wrong squadron. If anyone should be empathetic to Grey it should be Kernan who for decades was erroneously blamed for shooting down Lt. Commander Edward Butch O'Hare. Kernan has been a "victim" of the fog of war as Capt. Grey was one would expect better from Kernan. Instead another "victim" to the fog of war was Grey and Kernan should have realized this and not attacked him.

Kernan directed a large amount of his attack against Commander Stanhope Cotton Ring. This attack seems warranted however Kernan stops short of attacking Capt later Admiral Marc Mitscher. This seems to place all the blame of the Hornet's air group issues on Ring when Mitscher must share some of the blame. Read Mrazek's A Dawn Like Thunder for a synopsis and better interpretation of what should have been Kernan's theory about Ring and Mitscher. Mrazek accomplished Kernan's desire in five pages where Kernan took over 160 it must be said Mrazek didn't have the axe to grind that Kernan seems to have.

What Kernan does not acknowledge in this book is that the Navy learned from Midway and made corrections. The major lesson was that the Navy changed its air group composition to less torpedo bombers and more dive bombers. Later in the war when Kamikazes were a threat the air group composition was changed to more fighters. Again as a gunner on an Avenger throughout the war Kernan would have known about these changes but he refuses to admit to them.

If a reader was just to read this book to understand the Battle of Midway the reader would have a distorted understanding of the battle and this book must be read in concert with other books that abound on the Battle of Midway just so that this book can be put into any Historical context. This book is nothing more than the airing of grievances held by Kernan as an 18 year old junior enlisted man who lost friends. That doesn't make for scholarly or impressive work of History.(less)

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Aug 05, 2011

Urey Patrick added it · review of another edition

157 pages - and I could not put it down. Time and pages flow unnoticed - it is a remarkable, spellbinding book. The author examines and explains the all the factors that came into play at Midway - men, weapons, tactics, movements, strategies, luck - and explains how they affected events and the outcome. He also lays out the inexplicable events surrounding the Hornet's air wing... and the historical fictions that have enveloped them. Good men died for no reason as a result. I would recommend ...more

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Jul 21, 2008

Rod rated it

· review of another edition

Shelves: history

Not recommended. The theme of this book, that the torpedo bombers were sacrificed at Midway for a chance at victory is a truism. Nothing new here. What is objectionable is the author's many ad hominem attacks against many of the participants, mostly Naval officers. Example: Ens. George Gay "smirked" for his photo on Life magazine (Gay was the sole survivor of Torpedo Squadron 8).

The US can do nothing right in this book. Even the code-breaking that allowed the battle to b...more

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May 13, 2009

Ray Pierson rated it

· review of another edition

How on earth did the US win this battle with such terrible training, faulty equipment, and such lousy odds? Luck had something to do with it, but the quality of the men cannot be disputed.

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Oct 10, 2011

Gill rated it

· review of another edition

Shelves: history-wwii

It is a legend that brings tears to American eyes like the story of the Alamo. The three torpedo squadrons at Midway whose doomed and ineffective attacks on the Japanese fleet nonetheless distracted their defenses from our dive bombers making the victory possible.

This book goes into great detail about the deficiencies in weapons, training, and tactics that put those pilots in the position of making those hopeless attacks in which almost all were killed. While their sacrifice was not i...more

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May 21, 2009

Jeff rated it

Not a bad book, but I didn't think it really added anything new to my knowledge of the battle, especially since the virtual floodgates of new books on Midway opened just a few years ago.

· see review

Sep 16, 2009

Snail in Danger (Sid) Nicolaides marked it as maybe-read-sometime · review of another edition

Shelves: military-history

Seems to be a genuine professional history, which makes good use of primary sources, while still remaining accessible to lay audiences.

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Feb 08, 2012

Eyestrain rated it

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Jan 29, 2012

Sjebens added it · review of another edition

Shelves: war

Jan 21, 2012

Orrin Beckham marked it as to-read · review of another edition

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Aug 05, 2011

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Jan 31, 2011

Michael Barr marked it as to-read · review of another edition

Sep 01, 2010

Michael marked it as to-read-own

Shelves: history, military-history, world-war-two, books-i-own, own

Mar 06, 2010

Curtis Smith marked it as to-read · review of another edition

Shelves: to-read-epls

Mar 01, 2010

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