The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values

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The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values

3.88 of 5 stars 3.88 · rating details · 6,043 ratings · 464 reviews

Sam Harris’s first book, The End of Faith, ignited a worldwide debate about the validity of religion. In the aftermath, Harris discovered that most people—from religious fundamentalists to nonbelieving scientists—agree on one point: science has nothing to say on the subject of human values. Indeed, our failure to address questions of meaning and morality through science ha...more Sam Harris’s first book, The End of Faith, ignited a worldwide debate about the validity of religion. In the aftermath, Harris discovered that most people—from religious fundamentalists to nonbelieving scientists—agree on one point: science has nothing to say on the subject of human values. Indeed, our failure to address questions of meaning and morality through science has now become the most common justification for religious faith. It is also the primary reason why so many secularists and religious moderates feel obligated to "respect" the hardened superstitions of their more devout neighbors.

In this explosive new book, Sam Harris tears down the wall between scientific facts and human values, arguing that most people are simply mistaken about the relationship between morality and the rest of human knowledge. Harris urges us to think about morality in terms of human and animal well-being, viewing the experiences of conscious creatures as peaks and valleys on a "moral landscape." Because there are definite facts to be known about where we fall on this landscape, Harris foresees a time when science will no longer limit itself to merely describing what people do in the name of "morality"; in principle, science should be able to tell us what we ought to do to live the best lives possible.

Bringing a fresh perspective to age-old questions of right and wrong and good and evil, Harris demonstrates that we already know enough about the human brain and its relationship to events in the world to say that there are right and wrong answers to the most pressing questions of human life. Because such answers exist, moral relativism is simply false—and comes at increasing cost to humanity. And the intrusions of religion into the sphere of human values can be finally repelled: for just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, there can be no Christian or Muslim morality.

Using his expertise in philosophy and neuroscience, along with his experience on the front lines of our "culture wars," Harris delivers a game-changing book about the future of science and about the real basis of human cooperation.(less)

Hardcover, 291 pages

Published October 5th 2010 by Free Press (first published 2010)

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Dec 28, 2010 Costa rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: culture, evolution, intelligence, logic, mind, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, religion, science

Religion and science are in a zero-sum conflict with respect to the facts. Science can, in principle, help us understand what we should do and should want—and, therefore, what other people should do and should want in order to live the best lives possible. Sam Harris explains there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, just as there are right and wrong answers to questions of physics, and such answers may one day fall within reach of the maturing sciences of mind.

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Mar 30, 2012 Nebuchadnezzar rated it 1 of 5 stars

Shelves: philosophy, religion-and-atheism, hack-jobs-and-bullshit

Why am I sitting here reviewing another Sam Harris book? People keep telling me that I have to have to have to read them, and they seem to generally be what's called in military jargon "target-rich environments."

Harris sets out to hunt two of his bugbears: Moral relativism and fundamentalist forms of religion, the former being equated with the political left and the latter with the right. These seem to be the only moral-political systems that exist in his world beside the one he goes on to promo...more

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Nov 04, 2012 Richard rated it 4 of 5 stars

Given that nearly everyone who reads this book will disagree vehemently with its conclusions, and given that the subject matter is almost entirely theoretical, Moral Landscape needed to have been more thoroughly researched and more scholarly in its presentation in order to achieve Harris' goals. I'd originally given the book five stars because, in my opinion, Harris' central points are intriguing and probably correct, but on further reflection I've had to scale my enthusiasm back.

Those who disag...more

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Nov 02, 2012 Andrew Langridge rated it 2 of 5 stars

Although Sam Harris would deny that philosophy prior to the age of science has anything worthwhile to teach us, The Moral Landscape falls squarely within two long traditions of philosophy that could be said to include Aristotle; namely utilitarianism and naturalism. I find it admirable that Harris dispenses with philosophical jargon in making his book accessible to the general reader, but I also find it rather disingenuous to pay no regard to these traditions.

Harris’ utilitarianism starts from t...more Although Sam Harris would deny that philosophy prior to the age of science has anything worthwhile to teach us, The Moral Landscape falls squarely within two long traditions of philosophy that could be said to include Aristotle; namely utilitarianism and naturalism. I find it admirable that Harris dispenses with philosophical jargon in making his book accessible to the general reader, but I also find it rather disingenuous to pay no regard to these traditions.

Harris’ utilitarianism starts from the premise that there may not be one perfect way to organize society, but there are clearly better and worse ways of doing it, and he envisages an ethical continuum (or ‘landscape’ of peaks and troughs) in which we are able to rank our moral beliefs in terms of their positive or negative impacts on human well-being. So our values are always expressible in terms of our well-being as conscious individuals and reducible, in principle, to facts about our brains and our environment. Thus, Harris’ naturalism reveals itself as a demystifying worldview in which all human values and ethical positions are explainable in terms of scientific concepts. If defining and objectifying them in this way is not always possible in practice, owing to the complexity of human society, then Harris thinks it is bound to be possible in the future with developments in neuroscience.

There are some aspects of this book about which I am not going to take issue, such as the centrality of consciousness in morality and the difficulty in separating facts about our lives from our moral values. I also agree that religious prescription is superfluous in moral discourse and often damaging, although I would not want to dispense with concepts such as ‘authority’ and ‘power’ altogether when analyzing the origin of moral terms such as ‘ought’. The key question is whether what we care about in life is actually measurable; whether moral terms are really susceptible to objectification, as Harris believes. I agree that moral relativism is wrong as a metaphysical position, but the relativistic aspect of moral argument is not so easily swept under the carpet. Moral reasoning always seems to involve an open-ended ‘stepping back’ process. Hence, it is impossible to simply state “murder is wrong”, since murder is typically permitted in the case of a ‘just war’; which in turn forces a consideration of the meaning of ‘just’. Most of us would agree with Harris that the moral beliefs of the Taliban are condemnable, and yet every member of the Taliban must surely be worthy of respect as a human being, whatever his or her beliefs. It is very easy for moral approbation to become a pretext for imperialism and domination of those deemed somehow less than human. The very notion of ‘human rights’ is capable of being used as a weapon for the strong to control the weak. This moral complexity is clear on an individual level, and even on a political level moral assessments are never unproblematic, as evidenced by the fact that the USA initially supported the Taliban on grounds of their opposition to Iran.

As I see it, there are two major problems at the heart of Harris’ arguments. Firstly there is a lack of appreciation for the limitations inherent in the scientific method and, secondly, there is a lack of acknowledgment of the role that historical contingency plays in social and political analysis. I think that these two problems are related, but let me start with science. There are, of course, some basic empirical facts impinging on any analysis of the human condition such as our requirement for food, drink and shelter. These isolated facts are not very interesting from an ethical point of view, and they gain their significance from the context or hypothetical structure in which they appear. In physical science we rely on abstract rationalization to reduce any natural phenomenon to a few definable and repeatable variables; so for example, Newton's second law says that the gravitational force acting on a falling body is proportional to its mass, but is independent of the size, material and shape of the body. By contrast, in any moral or political analysis, the historical and social context in which decisions are made is always relevant and so abstraction is not effective. We must endeavor to leave out as few variables as possible and try to synthesize all the available information. I disagree with Harris that adding this layer of complexity leads to a moral relativism in which we are impotent to judge. It simply means that owing to the ‘accidental’ contingencies of history, there are an excess of possible reasons and reason is never sufficient to make judgments. We rely on something besides our rational faculties when putting ourselves in the position of another individual; a difficult empathy that is generally understood to be what morality consists in (“love thy neighbor as thyself”). The closer our proximity in space and time to the subject, the easier it is for us to pass judgment. Thus, we are much more comfortable judging the practice of slavery wrong in contemporary western society than in ancient Greek society; more comfortable judging a friend wrong to divorce his wife than someone with whom we have no connection. Even if empathy is ultimately reducible to a brain process (which I doubt), the historical content of empathetic attention is not.

Harris wants to replace all appeals to abstract moral values by a grounded empirical analysis of consciousness and environment. We certainly cannot afford to ignore the latest scientific findings in evaluating the human condition, but this book manages, somehow, to ignore history, and that is equally unaffordable. Rather than trying to objectify consciousness in natural terms, Harris would be better advised to acknowledge Kierkegaard’s dictum that we become who we are and have no essential nature. Things happen to us as individuals, and it is how we react and cope with them that forms the basis of our morality.
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Oct 20, 2011 Peca rated it 1 of 5 stars

Yet another believer in objective morality. To Harris morality, to be crude, is any set of rules that maximizes wellbeing of the largest possible number of people on the planet. I'm not positive if he thinks that this is objective morality, because it is obviously not. Morality is subjective like most things and it is usually justified by expression of power.
I'll give a hypothetical example. Let's say that a horrible virus started spreading around the globe and humans are dying rapidly. There...more Yet another believer in objective morality. To Harris morality, to be crude, is any set of rules that maximizes wellbeing of the largest possible number of people on the planet. I'm not positive if he thinks that this is objective morality, because it is obviously not. Morality is subjective like most things and it is usually justified by expression of power.
I'll give a hypothetical example. Let's say that a horrible virus started spreading around the globe and humans are dying rapidly. There is a cure but to utilize it we must take radical measures. Let's say that scientists had discovered a cure but to create one cure for one person you need, let's say two human livers. So in other words to save one life you must take two. If you don't do this, everybody dies. If you do it few survive and not the majority. You can't just save the children because without adults they'll be lost. So children must die too. How can these two choices be justified as moral? I'm not sure.If you go with morality everybody dies. If you renounce it, few survive but at tremendous cost. The example is extreme, I realise that, but Harris doesn't address it. At least I can't recall any such example.
What's happening in the book is what happens in every book written by a person that believes in objective morality(Ayn Rand). You have a person that is trying to subjectively set what moral behaviours is and try to convince as many people as possible that their way is the right way. Then, when or if they manage to get the mob on their side, they would proclaim their subjective morality as objective one. This is done in religion, where morality is a set of rules given to us by god. In this book morality is a set of rules given to us by science or by Sam Harris. I agree with Harris when it comes to trying to maximise wellbeing of the global population because this way you are creating healthier and more productive society. But there will be times when this doesn't apply. And to claim that this is moral is simply trying to proclaim that your idea of morality is "right" and noting more. If he went another route and claimed that we should look at things from what works and what doesn't perspective, in other words rely on practicality and not morality I might of have bought the "wellbeing" concept; otherwise one star.
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Chris If you look at everything as right/wrong or good/bad in a moral system, you can also use a best/better/good/neutral/bad/worse/worst scale to follow an...more
Jun 30, 2012 09:07pm

Chris For the record I'm not defending Sam Harris. I think he is the smartest moron out there.
Jun 30, 2012 11:59pm

Peca Chris wrote: "If you look at everything as right/wrong or good/bad in a moral system, you can also use a best/better/good/neutral/bad/worse/worst scal...more Chris wrote: "If you look at everything as right/wrong or good/bad in a moral system, you can also use a best/better/good/neutral/bad/worse/worst scale to follow an "objective morality"

In your example it woul..."

I can't, due to my biological make up, see morality in terms of good/bad or as you put it in terms of best/better/good/neutral/bad/worse/worst. This is still subjective morality because you are attaching a value to it. Morality technically doesn't exist because it is just a set of rules we learned to leave with (rules might differ culturally) because these rules seem to be most practical in ensuring our wellbeing and survival. By our survival I don't mean humanities survival or particular group's survival but an individual's survival, a selfish kind. All this love people have for their countries or tribes if you will is because country's survival or tribe's survival means individual's survival. It's all selfish. It's just that people don't question themselves enough, falsely thinking they are good people. When you said that, "It would still be objectively wrong to murder, if one had the view that murder was objectively wrong". There it is, "...if one had a view..." If one felt murder was wrong, this would still be subjective morality. To me , and correct me if I'm wrong, objective morality means absolute set of rules derived from falls sense of omnipotence. Subjective morality is more honest way to go. I, for example have a moral code, but I only see it as my own, and yes many people agree with my moral code, but that doesn't in any way make it objective or in any sense absolute. I certainly have no desire to kill anyone, but watch how that changes when you have to chose between someone you love and a total stranger. And it`s funny, I was talking about practicality in my review, you know using rational and logic to come to conclusions. But this too is subjective. If I was in a situation where I was holding two people over a cliff, one person being someone who stimulates me emotionally, intellectually and physically, and the other is a well know PHD who is just months away from discovering cure for all types of cancer. I'd let him go as if he is worth nothing and yet from a logical and practical sense he would be very voluble to humanity, but from my own perspective he is worthless even though I think he is not. This is fascinating to me. I know what`s logical but I go for what I think is right. I think that objectivity only exists in factual science and when it comes to human condition you are left with variations and chaos. Sorry I didn't reply sooner. I completely forgot this site existed.(less)
Jul 24, 2012 09:06pm

May 03, 2011 Matt rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: philosophy

The Moral Landscape centers on the argument that morality derives from actions which promote well-being, which is itself predictable from the neurological structures and biological processes which form the basis of mind. Harris suggests that right and wrong can be determined by science, in opposition to the long-standing notion expressed by Hume's is-ought problem -- that the empirical can say nothing about the ethical.

By evaluating trends in psychology and neuro-imaging research, Harris argues...more

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Apr 03, 2011 Daniel Toker rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: philosophy, psychology, science

Harris's ideology is incomplete - he admits this much himself. But this book provides the groundwork for a (slightly) new way of conceiving of "morality." The general idea is not new, but his thesis is unique in that it identifies psychology and neuroscience as the tools by which to determine how our actions affect conscious beings. And I think that Harris is thinking in the right direction; though we can derive no moral absolutes, we can identify the "morality" of actions on a spectrum or "land...more

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Apr 27, 2013 Xing rated it 4 of 5 stars

Agreed wholeheartedly with practically everything in the book, except for a couple of things:

1.
Harris repeatedly laments the frequency with which he encounters well-educated, scientifically-minded, secular moral relativists, who defend the practice of repugnant rituals, such as genital mutilation. I imagine that the reason behind their inability to see eye to eye is not due to a fundamental disagreement on morality and the existence of a range of states of being that, for all practical intents a...more

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Apr 14, 2013 Joanna Sundby rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: favorites

For someone with my education to write a review of anything Sam Harris wrote is a bit presumptuous, but here goes. I loved it, starting with the introduction which makes the argument for secular morality about as clear as it can be, in completely graspable layman's terms. The rest of the book is a challenge to read because Sam's vocabulary and scientific expertise are prodigious, but the thrill of what he has to say is well worth the effort. Unlike secular humanist philosophy that can leave one...more

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Mar 18, 2013 Greg Talbot rated it 4 of 5 stars

Science and Religion. Sure you can have both, but it seems self-evident that morality, ethics, values and beliefs are beyond the peer-reviewed scrutiny of the scientific worldview.

Harris hammers the reader on a new worldview. He opens up the discussion with conversation on the goodlife, and gives accounts on different lifepaths - those we generally agree are despicable or those we generally agree are laudable. He tackles the idea of exceptions, moral relativism, the influence of religion among e...more

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Feb 13, 2013 Nathan Titus rated it 2 of 5 stars

You ever read anything that started off super promising and turned into such a huge disappointment that you had trouble finishing it? Such a book is The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris.

Promising: the book proposes to identify a scientific, or objective, morality. It says that an OUGHT can come from an IS: we ARE human, so we SHOULD make this world to better serve humanity. He has a disdain for relativistic viewpoints: there is such thing as an objective true and false, regardless of what you were...more You ever read anything that started off super promising and turned into such a huge disappointment that you had trouble finishing it? Such a book is The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris.

Promising: the book proposes to identify a scientific, or objective, morality. It says that an OUGHT can come from an IS: we ARE human, so we SHOULD make this world to better serve humanity. He has a disdain for relativistic viewpoints: there is such thing as an objective true and false, regardless of what you were taught as a child. Therefore, there is such a thing as an objective right and wrong, regardless of what culture you are raised in. And though he is at times a bit hysterical in his attacks on religion, the direction he uses for his attacks is uniformly the right one. He is a scientist, but he does not condemn religion on scientific grounds. He doesn't disdain them for believing in a god that does not exist. Religion is not a scientific institution, and for a religious person faith trumps evidence every time. Religion is a philosophy, a moral institution. Harris seems to recognize that, and consistently attacks religion on philosophical and moral grounds. Atheists could really take some lessons from this approach. The issue is not: does God exist? Weather we are here by accident or design, the issue is: is the behavior religion prescribes appropriate to our nature as human beings? Although Harris never makes it fully clear that this is the issue he is discussing, time and time again the answer he comes up with is NO.

And if he had left the book off there, I would easily give it a 4 star or even a 5 star rating. But this is The Moral Landscape. He goes on to discuss, for most of the book, his own ideas about morality: "scientific" morality. And his ideas are so bad that every single one of them takes points away from his overall thesis, reducing the whole book to a 2 star rating. Because of his view on morality, one is tempted to think that the whole concept of a scientific, objective morality in inherently flawed. For that I am tempted to give the book one star, because it actually harms the fields of science, objectivity, and morality. But since his approach is so rare (and fundamentally correct, regardless of the inaccuracy of his conclusions), I can't write this book off entirely. High points for a good idea; no points for presentation.

A few of his more obtuse moral ideas:
Free will is an illusion. Not only that, but the illusion of free will is an illusion. Not only does no one have free will, but no one ACTUALLY thinks they do.
response: without free will, without choice, there is no such thing as "morality." How can you condemn certain actions when all action are mechanical and no one has control over what they do? This one idea alone almost dissects the entire book.
There is a "moral hierarchy." Fish may want to live, but we are superior to fish, so we have the moral right to eat them. Likewise, if a being far superior to us that ate planets came along, it would have the moral right to eat our world.
response: this means that every lesser animal that attempts to escape a "superior" predator is evil. It also means that if a world-devouring something came along, we would be evil to fight for our lives. By easy extension, some cultures are "superior" to others, so the subjugation of the "lesser" culture is morally justified. This means a) that colonialism was moral, and b) that if an alien race invaded Earth (never mind a superior being, we're talking regular aliens here; to invade Earth they would need interplanetary travel, which would make them "superior" to us) they would be morally justified in annihilating and enslaving us.
This is clearly nonsense, so let me correct it. There is no "moral hierarchy." Every creature, fish, predictor, human, or world-devouring super-being, has the moral right (and obligation) to fight for its own existence. In the case of a bear or a fisherman, this means killing and eating fish. In the case of the fish, it means escaping a bear or a fisherman. In the case of the world-devourer, it means eating planets. And in the case of humanity, it means fighting the world-devourer, even killing it. Clearly not every creature can have everything it wants, but that's life. There is no "moral hierarchy," there is only the the HIERARCHY OF ABILITY AND SUCCESS. (the passage about the moral hierarchy literally made me shut the book with a snap and nearly return it unfinished.)
He is a supporter of not only altruism but Kantianism.
response: how can you possibly be an advocate of "the good life" while promoting the doctrine that pain and self-sacrifice are man's natural roles and the proper mode of his existence??? (I can't subtract too many points for this one, I suppose, because this seems to be a worldwide mistake.)

I could go on, but frankly I've thought about this book more than enough already. I'm happy to read many negative reviews, meaning that this book will most likely not have a big impact. Vonnegut has been described as a "moral mad scientist." Clearly, Harris considers himself a "moral scientist." Given the choice, I guess I'll support madness.(less)

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Dec 28, 2012 Abu Mahmoud rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: philosophy, ethics

This was an excellent book. I had many concerns as I read the opening chapters, but those concerns were addressed, to varying degrees of satisfaction, by the time I had finished reading the book. He makes a strong case for utilitarianism/well-being-of-conscious-creatures oriented consequentialism as the most viable ethical framework for secularists to abide by. He stridently skewers the monstrous pretension of post-Modernists and politically correct apologists for religion as dropping the 'moral...more This was an excellent book. I had many concerns as I read the opening chapters, but those concerns were addressed, to varying degrees of satisfaction, by the time I had finished reading the book. He makes a strong case for utilitarianism/well-being-of-conscious-creatures oriented consequentialism as the most viable ethical framework for secularists to abide by. He stridently skewers the monstrous pretension of post-Modernists and politically correct apologists for religion as dropping the 'moral' ball in favor of an ethical relativism that leaves us powerless to condemn the worst atrocities carried out under the aegis of either religious fanaticism or of a non-Western culture. He also attempts to make the case against the viability of the fact-value distinction.

I think the second case mentioned above is his strongest point. He adequately and at some length illustrates both the logical problems with relativism and its vile consequences.

The first point, favoring utilitarianism over other moral theories is less well developed. While he makes a strong case for why we should value the well-being of conscious creatures, he does not effectively dismiss other loci of value, such as the environmental harmony sought by deep ecology. He also does not present a case for concern for the well being of conscious creatures being something that is aggregative- in fact, he provides evidence that, as a matter of human psychology, we tend to care less about a tragedy the more that the numbers of those affected by it multiply. He does not make a case that our goal should be to increase the raw amount of well being experienced by conscious creatures rather than simply respecting that well being and avoiding actions that reduce it. This is an important distinction. If we our to follow the former dictum, we would be morally required to sacrifice the well being of a few conscious creatures if it meant that the raw amount of well being would be increased thereby. To use an example Harris himself has used in other works, if we were confronted with a terrorist who knew the location of a nuclear bomb about to go off and wipe out a million people, we would be morally required to do whatever is necessary to secure that knowledge from him, including torture. One might add, though Harris doesn’t, that we would also be required to torture and/or murder that terrorist’s family if that is what is required to make him talk. If we take the latter principle, that of respecting the well-being of conscious creatures, as our guide, we cannot resort to torture but must find some other means of gaining the knowledge. He seems to recognize the value of fairness, taken in a broad sense, as a subsidiary one. It is not at all obvious that it is subsidiary; one can argue that it is as deeply rooted in our psyche and evolutionary history as altruism, a point that Harris himself makes. It is by no means clear that, in a conflict between the principles of acting fairly and of maximizing well being, that we should always choose maximizing well being. One can easily devise realistic scenarios that force us to make this choice and that are not easily resolved. One could imagine, for example, a secret governmental medical program designed to accelerate the development of medical science via a regime of secret testing on unsuspecting citizens. A program such as this could very well achieve its goal of making rapid breakthroughs in medicine and thereby enhancing well being, but it would make a mockery of the principles of informed consent and of rule of law that are deeply grounded in the principle of fairness. There is a real conflict here between two foundational moral principles or intuitions that Harris fails to address.

His final point, attacking the tenability of the fact/value distinction in the light of modern advances in neuroscience is as fascinating as it is underdeveloped. His key piece of evidence is that the centers of the brain that are active when assessing facts are the very same centers that are active when making value judgements. There are several responses to this:
1. This could very well reflect the mistaken view of the subjects that they are dealing with facts when they are actually simply making value judgements with no factual content. It would not be surprising to learn that,if the subjects themselves believe that their moral or aesthetic judgements are facts, then the parts of brain concerned with ratiocination become more active. It does not follow from this that these judgements are in reality facts.
2. This could also reflect contingent facts of our evolution. Brains are very energy hungry organs and anything that would cut down on that demand while maintaining functionality necessary for survival would tend to be selected for. It is not surprising that certain parts of the brain would be doing ‘double duty.’ involved in both judgements of fact and of values. A theoretical alien race that has evolved a level of intelligence comparable to our may very well have a different neurological set up, vitiating his point. The development of Artificial Intelligence continues apace. If we develop systems capable of passing the Turing test. would the same programming used for calculating the position of objects in space be same as that used for determining which actions are morally acceptable or for determining which objects our beautiful? I would doubt it.

Another omission is aesthetics. Aesthetic judgements are as much value based as those of ethics- together aesthetics and ethics make up the field of axiology, the third point of the ‘philosophical triangle’ alongside the epistemology and metaphysics. It would be interesting to see if the centers in the brain that are active during intense aesthetic experiences are the same as those that are active when contemplating moral quandaries or working through equations.

Despite the issues I have outlined above, I recommend the book highly because it makes a strong case for moral seriousness that is thoroughly lacking amongst modern secularists, in sharp distinction to their predecessors, who were at the forefront of great moral causes in past eras, such as the abolition movement, the suffragette movement, and the birth control movement. It is high time that those of a secular mindset girded themselves with the armor of moral conviction instead of ceding this field to our opponents in the culture wars.

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Dec 05, 2012 Hamish rated it 5 of 5 stars

I genuinely believe this book to be not only good but important.

In short - this book presents the culturally counter-intuitive argument that science has complete legitimacy to speak about morality. It is hinged around the following:
1. Morality is about well-being
2. There are facts about well-being
3. The single best method for uncovering facts is Science
= Therefore, science is not only able to speak about morality, there positively needs to be a science of morality.

If you want a quick intro to...more

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Nov 23, 2012 Socraticgadfly rated it 1 of 5 stars

Shelves: philosophy

Presumably the last Sam Harris book I will ever read

What's wrong? Harris is a Platonic idealist in drag. He also engages in scientism. And, his Islamophobia seems to largely come straight from the neoconservative playbook.

Read on for the details!

Sam Harris tries to draw a hard-and-fast dichotomy between science-based morals and ethics and religious-based morals and ethics in this book.
However, this is the real world, not a Platonic idea (Harris comes off as quasi-Platonic in more than one way in...more

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Oct 11, 2012 Martin Garrod rated it 1 of 5 stars

Shelves: non-fiction

The book starts with two premise: 1) Some people have better lives than others, and (2) These differences are related, in some lawful and not entirely arbitrary way, to states of the human brain and to states of the world.

The logical place to start then is with his first premise: Some people have better lives than others.

To accept this as a premise I would have to know what "better" means. There might be someone who spent his whole life sitting in alpine meadows painting flowers, whilst someone...more The book starts with two premise: 1) Some people have better lives than others, and (2) These differences are related, in some lawful and not entirely arbitrary way, to states of the human brain and to states of the world.

The logical place to start then is with his first premise: Some people have better lives than others.

To accept this as a premise I would have to know what "better" means. There might be someone who spent his whole life sitting in alpine meadows painting flowers, whilst someone else spent his life growing rice and raising nine children. What does better mean? Or more importantly, what does Sam Harris mean by "better" in this context?

I'm not saying that there are no differences, I'm asking how do we determine whether Harris' premise is correct? How do we know whether someone else's life is "better" than our own? For example, suppose I could measure in some way the quotient of my life and it comes to a. I think Sam Harris is saying that in principle there is someone who's quotient is >a. He isn't saying we have to be able to identify that person, or know who they are or how they lived their life. He is asking us to accept that in principle this person does exist or has existed.

Well, in that case I'm not sure I can accept the premise. I don't think that it is possible for a person to know that a better life exists. I am able to observe that my neighbour has had and is having a very different life than mine, but by what metric is it possible for me to know that it is "better" than mine? The impossibility of answering this question tells me that it is not safe to agree with Harris' premise.

Suppose, though, that isn't what Harris meant by "better". Suppose that he doesn't mean better for me as an individual, he means better for society. It's not about whether painting flowers or raising children is more fun for the individual it's about which of those is better for society.

In which case raising children is clearly better because the one thing the world needs right now is more people, right? Or what about one guy who empties rubbish bins for a living while some other guy does heart transplant operations. Which one of them is "better" for society? The question is unanswerable, and therefore the premise cannot be accepted.

I think at that point Sam Harris would say that heart transplant surgery versus emptying rubbish bins is not a moral choice reflective of the real world. There is no administrator of some city health care budget debating whether to hire a heart transplant surgeon or lay off five dustbin men. He's talking about moral choices we have in the real world not artificial constructs designed to miss the point.

In which case, if Sam Harris is talking about better morally for society then I reply that since morality is not universal I again am unable to accept his premise. Since one man's moral imperative is another man's abhorrent abomination by what standard is he measuring "morally better" for society as a whole? The premise cannot be accepted. And since we cannot accept the premise we don't have to bother reading the book based on it.

There are no spelling mistakes in it, though.(less)

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Jul 15, 2012 Neelesh Marik rated it 4 of 5 stars

The book raises some central questions about the business of human well-being, which is arguably the most important business on earth!

The contentious notion that science and religion deal with different domains of the reality story- namely the objective and the subjective, seems inaccurate, inconsistent, simplistic and remiss in applying principles of reason to human well-being. The fact that there are other ways of knowing beyond science (such as mystical experience) does not and cannot absolve...more The book raises some central questions about the business of human well-being, which is arguably the most important business on earth!

The contentious notion that science and religion deal with different domains of the reality story- namely the objective and the subjective, seems inaccurate, inconsistent, simplistic and remiss in applying principles of reason to human well-being. The fact that there are other ways of knowing beyond science (such as mystical experience) does not and cannot absolve science of addressing the most significant questions on what is good, true and beautiful, especially given the advances made in the objective sciences of subjective experience – such as neuroscience, behavioural science and cognitive science. What science embraces within its domain is not a static set of phenomena, but an ever-expanding array of ‘things’ based on expansion and deepening of human understanding. Therefore notions of faith and belief should not interfere with sincere and honest attempts of empiricism in dealing with the question – ‘What constitutes the greatest good for the highest number of people?’ Moral relativism can at best profess its inability to effect positive change in the human condition, and at worst paralyze that process due to its negligent stasis of consensus. The fact that science cannot answer all questions about reality should not come in the way of its trying to do so, especially on the most important questions that matter – and the only way to do that would be to allow science and spirituality to complement each other in improving the quality of understanding.

The author talks of three distinct projects that are necessary to dispel this stasis:
1) We can explain why people tend to follow certain patterns of thought and behaviour (many of them demonstrably silly and harmful) in the name of ‘morality’
2) We can think more clearly about the nature of moral truth and determine which patterns of thought and behaviour we should follow in the name of morality
3) We can convince people who are committed to silly and harmful patterns of thought and behaviour in the name of ‘morality’ to break these commitments and live better lives.

However I do not agree with the author that the third project can be conducted without the first project, not only because its lack of compassionate ground (refer the writings on free will which posit that cultural conditioning plays an key role in choices), but also its lack of scientific tenability (the very act of convincing will not be successful unless we know how to best convince without the use of brute force).

I reproduce below some very interesting conclusions from behavioural science why defy the rational basis of human decision-making, which inevitably have a high impact on moral reasoning. There are 4 types of biases, in addition to the sensitivity to suffering paradox the author describes (we are much more sensitive to the suffering of a single individual than en masse disasters):
• Prospect Theory –Risk averse on gains, and risk loving on losses: which is a distinctly non-rational thing
• Hyperbolic Discounting – Much higher preference for immediate gratification than discounted value for a future gratification
• Status Quo Bias – check box to donate organ, check box to NOT donate organ. The latter yields much higher results for organ donation
• Base Rate Bias – two independent questions asking for some numerical guesstimates, lead to uncannily close answers despite no correlation between the questions at all.

However, the fact that such anomalies can be studied and modelled provides with rich empirical data to create a moral science, rather than shirking the responsibility of creating one such.
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Jul 08, 2012 Bob Nichols rated it 2 of 5 stars

Harris starts out strong. He argues that we can have a science of morality. Just as there is a general definition of bodily health, he argues that science can tell us how to interact with others. Just as we ought to promote our own welfare, we ought to maximize the welfare of others. Of course, this bumps into the argument that science can't tell us how we ought to live. Harris sidesteps that criticism by, in effect, stating that critics can fiddle with that line of thought all they want but he'...more Harris starts out strong. He argues that we can have a science of morality. Just as there is a general definition of bodily health, he argues that science can tell us how to interact with others. Just as we ought to promote our own welfare, we ought to maximize the welfare of others. Of course, this bumps into the argument that science can't tell us how we ought to live. Harris sidesteps that criticism by, in effect, stating that critics can fiddle with that line of thought all they want but he's going to stipulate the obvious: promoting survival and well-being is not only an obvious good for most, it is also consistent with evolutionary theory. He makes a helpful distinction between "answers in practice" and "answers in principle" to emphasize that while we may disagree about what "well-being" (our own and others) means, that concept is valid as a principle for morality. We can study "subjective" facts objectively, he writes.

Then Harris goes astray. He largely dismisses evolution's relevance to our moral life. What Harris wants is a science of morals, which is a one-hundred percent intellectual enterprise. Harris has the mind take control of our beings so that we leave our "apish ways" behind. "Most of what constitutes human well-being," he writes, "escapes any narrow Darwinian calculus." Of Pinker, Harris writes that, "if conforming to the dictates of evolution were the foundation of subjective well-being, most men would discover no higher calling in life than to make daily contributions to their local sperm bank."

There are a few problems with Harris's approach. Evolution is more than depositing sperm. In fact, there's a strong body of evidence indicating that cooperation is fundamental to the viability of our species, probably because individual survival depends on the support network of the group. Second, evolution most likely designed all sorts of other-oriented emotions and behaviors (love, compassion, empathy, fairness and loyalty) conducive to restricting the self in deference to others. Third, Harris makes an iffy leap when he states that one should maximize the well-being of others and that "we genuinely want fair and just societies." That flies in the face of the evidence of a good part of history and contemporary life. If we're excessively self-oriented, why should we care about others? If we're loyal to our group, why should we care about the welfare of other groups? Evolutionary theory is relevant here as well. Those who are nurturing by nature may have a natural inclination to respect others; for those who are not, they may nevertheless respect the interests of others because they see such behavior benefiting their own interest in the long-run (as a utilitarian calculus). Fourth, in dismissing the animal side, Harris seems to be arguing that reason alone can transform our natures to accord with his scientific view of things. That leaves too much deference to "reason" versus, say, the observation of Hobbes that, in the end, power is essential to preserve order and some semblance of justice. Reason alone cannot do the job. Finally, Harris's faith in reason and science has a hint of arrogance and intolerance about it. In response to criticism of "Orwellian moral experts" telling people what to do, Harris writes revealingly that "If there were a way for you and those you care about to be much happier than you now are, would you want to know about it?" Happiness is such a subjective thing and is most likely highly variable among individuals and groups. Harris's criticism of veiled women may not be as offensive to the women themselves as it is to Harris.

Harris is right to argue that the standard of morality is our well-being. His argument about why we should restrict the maximization of our well being out of deference to others and affirmatively promote their well being is weak. We do that because either we are naturally inclined to be that way, or because we make the utilitarian calculus that it's in our own interest to promote the good of all. The latter translates into a golden rule type of principle that says that it's in our interest to respect the interests of others. What that principle means in practice is where the real challenge lies and where a hefty dose of tolerance and humility is needed. (less)

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Jul 06, 2012 Andrew K. rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: perspective-changing, humanity, religion-and-morality

A really great book. Well-argued. I'm going to try to write a synopsis, but it'll probably fall short of what the author would say about it.

The basic point is that science and morality are not separate. Human subjectivity can actually be studied -- it all connects back to basic brain states for any given perspective -- and so one can (theoretically) make a moral judgement about anything, if you can reduce it to its brain-states and say that it does, in fact, result in either more well-being or m...more A really great book. Well-argued. I'm going to try to write a synopsis, but it'll probably fall short of what the author would say about it.

The basic point is that science and morality are not separate. Human subjectivity can actually be studied -- it all connects back to basic brain states for any given perspective -- and so one can (theoretically) make a moral judgement about anything, if you can reduce it to its brain-states and say that it does, in fact, result in either more well-being or more misery. (Well-being/misery being firmly rooted in specific neural activity, and therefore within the realm of scientific study.)

For instance, a ritual practice that leaves everyone on average worse off -- female genital mutilation, for instance -- is therefore immoral, in that it produces more human misery than well-being. (It's assumed here that morality is about well-being vs. misery, a definition I can't argue with. What does 'good' or 'bad' mean if not words to refer to well-being vs. misery?)

This makes some uncomfortable. It feels like we're judging another culture, which feels wrong. I instinctively feel this to.

But I agree that misery vs. well-being is the most appropriate definition of morality, and that misery/well-being can be rooted in different brain states, which leads to the conclusion that you can make a judgement about an action or practice as immoral if it leads to more human misery for everyone.

It's a theoretical point, that moral judgement CAN be made. We're not trying to label everything moral or immoral at the moment, just to make the assertion that morality can be grounded in neuroscience in a way that is scientifically rigorous and fair. (This assumes we agree with basic scientific principles of observation, falsifiability, etc.) If it turns out that female genital mutilation creates more well-being in everyone than misery, we can reverse the judgement and call it moral. Either way, science can give insight to human values since science can tell us how experience translates into happiness/misery.

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Jul 03, 2012 Jacob rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: religion, ethics, philosophy

Sam Harris is a pretty good author and this book is an interesting read. While there are certainly some issues with Harris's specific answer, I find his basic premise interesting- that you can use a scientific to examine morality. Additionally, I don't think that the failure to use his specific answer to get a clear cut answer on difficult moral issues undermines his whole idea.

In short, Harris basically says that the worst possible suffering for everyone is, obviously, the worst bad, and that...more

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Jun 25, 2012 Mike rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: neuroscience, psychology, philosophy

This book delivers plenty of value for the time investment required to read it. The central argument is sound, given the definitions Harris uses, and in so doing he succeeds in establishing a solid case for a science of (human) well-being which encroaches directly on religion's supposed primacy of authority on the subject.* Moreover, the case is straightforward, provocative, and accessible to a wide audience, which it must be in order for that encroachment to be meaningful in any practical sense...more This book delivers plenty of value for the time investment required to read it. The central argument is sound, given the definitions Harris uses, and in so doing he succeeds in establishing a solid case for a science of (human) well-being which encroaches directly on religion's supposed primacy of authority on the subject.* Moreover, the case is straightforward, provocative, and accessible to a wide audience, which it must be in order for that encroachment to be meaningful in any practical sense.

It does seem to me, however, that Harris failed to adequately reconcile a rational goal of maximizing well-being with the innate mental characteristics commonly and collectively referred to as the basis of morality. Unmindful of this logical misstep, he proceeds to conflate these two distinct concepts throughout the rest of the book, to the detriment of his extended argument. In particular, he appears to assert rather facilely that our "moral intuitions" (as he refers to the latter) are but deficient servants that are nevertheless bound in servitude to the former - such that when the two are in conflict, it is our innate sensibilities that are necessarily wrong. He went on to devote a section of the book to expounding at some length on the apparent rational inconsistencies and paradoxes these intuitions generate. This is, in fact, very interesting material - but is there really any reason to assume that our innate moral sensibilities must in some sense represent blind gropings toward rationality itself? As Harris himself might say, is it really so hard to discern the rationality of morality from the morality of rationality?

This appears to me to cut to the quick of the rationalists' definitional conceit - the "ism" to which they are beholden: that the brain, in all its composite complexity, "wants", ultimately, to be rational. Qualitatively, this cart-before-horse, "just so" argumentation is no different from asserting that the universe was specifically designed for us, because look at how well suited it is for our survival!

Nevertheless, despite its flaws, I give this book three stars because it succeeds in advancing the dialogue on an important subject, adding leverage to the mounting attempts to dislodge the bloated parasite of religion from its smothering embrace of human progress. I only wish Harris had been as provocative, but less incorrect. But we can rest assured that religionists would only be able to convincingly refute his arguments on rational grounds by meeting him halfway, which in itself would be a form of progress.

---

*The vast majority of disagreement on this point among those who both intend to be and are equipped to be intellectually honest seems to result from a lack of expertise in distinguishing axiomatic terrain from referential terrain. Harris himself mops up this confusion quite succinctly, but you'll have to read the book to see how.(less)

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May 22, 2012 Johi rated it 3 of 5 stars · review of another edition

I’m not sure why Sam Harris had to bring morality into this argument at all. If he had just stuck to saying ‘wellbeing is important, and science can help us achieve it’, I would have largely agreed with him. Most of us, as he points out, wouldn’t question the very similar statement that physical health is important, and that science can help us understand how to be healthy.

But Harris thinks he has shown something more than this. Namely, that we are morally required to promote wellbeing – not jus...more

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May 22, 2012 Alan rated it 4 of 5 stars

I love reading Sam Harris, who writes a good argument that is fair to the idea he opposes and that uses reasoning clearly and effectively. The book begins with a good explanation of morality that takes a social perspective but not the same one as John Stuart Mill (greatest good for the greatest number of people). Harris looks briefly at some of the scientific studies of altruism and uses them to show how science is relevant to understanding questions of morality. My favorite chapter was the one...more

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May 02, 2012 John Harder rated it 3 of 5 stars

Sam Harris postulates that there is an objective right and wrong and religion is a tangential result of evolution, not the originator of moral ideals. For the first part of his hypothesis – that there is an objective right and wrong and we can not take into account cultural norms I object up to a point. Harris is correct, regardless of the culture it is immoral to give clitorectomies to teenage girls even if her parents believe in Allah and live in an oppressive state. But what of more the subtl...more

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Mar 30, 2012 Mark rated it 5 of 5 stars

You know what you are going to get with Sam Harris, a member of the so-called "new atheist" movement (a name he shuns). Harris' writings are direct, to the point, and based upon a clear use of critical analysis. What I like about Harris' book the most is that it breaks the illusionary lines between morality, the individual, the society, and science. While Harris is not the first to broach the subject of applying critical analysis to ethics, I would argue that he has done so in the most clear and...more

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Mar 04, 2012 Robin rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: occasionally-clunky, 3-stars, great-ideas

Harris' central premise is fascinating, but he spends only about 5% of the book talking about it. The rest is spent on an admittedly compelling whistlestop tour of modern neuroscience (also some very reasonable but not very exciting smackdowns of religion). There's a meaty reference section here, and I've jotted down a dozen things to google later. This kind of thought-provocation is always to be encouraged.

There are two major flaws with this book. First is Harris' workmanlike prose, which is of...more

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Feb 09, 2012 Nikki rated it 3 of 5 stars

Harris tries to prove with this book that science should be the determining factor when it comes to making moral decisions. He claims that science is the only way we can live a truly moral life. He uses the concept of "well-being" as his ruler for evaluating morality. I found his ideas to be very interesting. His discussion of free will was quite thought-provoking. For most of the book I found him to be fair in his criticism of people of faith as well as people of science (who espouse moral rela...more

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Jan 05, 2012 Dan Martin rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: non-fiction, favorites

This book is absolutely brilliant -- and obviously I'd recommend to anyone, especially those who are religious. The premise, in a nut-shell, is this: can we look subjectively at what is good for each other? Through the better understanding of the functions of the brain, mutual understanding, and logic, can't we tell what makes a person happy? What discerns the state of a person? From learning, can we not have more to say about the well-being of each other than dogma does? Sam Harris, a neuro-sci...more

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Oct 07, 2011 Al Bità rated it 4 of 5 stars · review of another edition

This is an important work dealing with those who believe that Science has nothing to contribute to Morality.

Harris carefully examines what we mean by 'morality', clearing out much debris, and revealing a moral landscape far more complex and interesting than might be elicited by more simplistic moral concerns. In so doing Harris reveals that not only is science needed to assist us in negotiating our way through this landscape, but it is also necessary for scientists to become actively involved in...more

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Sep 24, 2011 Mike rated it 2 of 5 stars

Shelves: philosophy, math-science

Sam Harris starts off his book stating that he has the modest mission to convince the reader that neither divine command theory nor positivistic emotivist theory is a sufficient account of morality. But then he goes somewhat further: His actual mission, as he lays it out, is to show how maximizing human wellbeing--defined as a subjective neurological state of wellbeing--can form the basis for moral reasoning, and that scientific inquiry into neurology and effects of different acts can form the b...more Sam Harris starts off his book stating that he has the modest mission to convince the reader that neither divine command theory nor positivistic emotivist theory is a sufficient account of morality. But then he goes somewhat further: His actual mission, as he lays it out, is to show how maximizing human wellbeing--defined as a subjective neurological state of wellbeing--can form the basis for moral reasoning, and that scientific inquiry into neurology and effects of different acts can form the basis for such a moral system. The scope of his argument is therefore rather limited; however, his writing betrays a lack of the education and clear, analytical thought that would be necessary to make a broadly persuasive or powerful argument.

Pinning down exactly what Harris is arguing in any bigger context is difficult. He is frankly hostile to religion; therefore it seems he is looking for an account of morality that is based on some combination of naturalism and pure reason. He is not at all clear about the distinctions between morality, ethics (he identifies morality and ethics), politics or public policy, and jurisprudence or legal philosophy. It seems that at different times in the book, he addresses all of these issues, without making clear when he's dealing with which. Given that these are usually considered different areas of academic inquiry, and there is a large literature about their similarities, differences, and overlaps, this presents in itself a significant flaw in his book.

A second flaw that makes analyzing Harris difficult is that he is not clear about what "wellbeing" is. On the one hand, he is honest about this; he frequently uses the analogy to health. He points out that health is a poorly-defined concept that nevertheless can be discerned. However, where his analogy becomes a problem is that he does not seem clear about whose wellbeing is being discerned. Is it the wellbeing of the moral actor, or the aggregate greatest wellbeing for the greatest number? He seems to vacillate on this point. At times, he seems at pains to show why helping others is pleasurable to the individual moral actor, and at times he sounds almost like a utilitarian. Either way, he seems to slip in between the two paradigms without signaling or justifying his moves.

He senses his first task is to deal with the problem of question-begging. Both David Hume and G.E. Moore identified a problem in consequentialist moral philosophy: If, as Harris says, the objective of his system is to maximize human wellbeing, then it isn't really a system of moral philosophy. It's a system of wellbeing philosophy, not moral philosophy, because there is as yet an irreducible leap between any state of affairs and the good. In other words, just because something leads to wellbeing, has no bearing on whether it is good; and there is no guarantee, either in principle or practice, that any particular instance of wellbeing is actually "good," unless you simply fiat that wellbeing is good and close your mind to further inquiry. Harris rightly senses that this is a devastating objection that he cannot answer head-on. Hume, Moore, Kant, and others all found more or less convincing ways around this question-begging, but Harris doesn't even try. Instead, he simply says: You don't really believe that. You can identify a better or worse life. And he uses some examples to show that in fact we can identify "good" or "bad" lives and that in many cases, good or evil acts are more or less intuitively clear. And his argument is fairly convincing, even if it is basically special pleading. But this is a insurmountable problem for Harris that I will return to later in my review.

Closely related to his confusion about whose wellbeing he is talking about, Harris seems to have difficulty taking individuality seriously. This shows up in two ways. First, he assumes that everyone wants wellbeing. Either this is meaningless, or it is an unclear statement. If it simply means that even if you do something that objectively harms your wellbeing, you clearly meant to do it in order to increase your wellbeing, then it is a tautology and adds nothing to the discussion. On the other hand, if there is some objective way of measuring wellbeing, then we can at least start making some moves toward thinking about what wellbeing really is and how to get there. But he never really closes that gap. More profoundly, Harris has no answer to the issue of the oppressed minority. Imagine if 80% of the population would have their average wellbeing level go from 75 to 85 if some act were done--with sufficient attenuation to make it not tantamount to slavery, etc.--that would cause the other 20% to have their average wellbeing level go from 75 to 55. Clearly, the aggregate wellbeing of the society has increased; and clearly some individuals are very badly hurt. Harris attempts to deal with this problem three times, and fails every time. First, he simply denies it, when he mentions Rawls' statement of the issue; then he says that the subjective wellbeing of the 80% would be harmed because their neurological state would be harmed; then he says that it just doesn't work that way. But of course all he has to do is look at his native United Kingdom (or my native United States) to see a society where a real-world scenario similar to this has happened over the last decade, and it seems no one is much bothered by it.

It barely deserves mention that Harris's overt hostility toward and determination to misrepresent religion whenever possible mars his arguments. He is a New Atheist, which is to say he's regurgitating some Hume and Voltaire as if he thought of it himself. That will tell the reader of this review all you need to know.

I am also ignoring the philosophy of science issues that using scientific inquiry to get at morals raises. Suffice to say they appear huge on first glance, but I'm not smart enough to suss them out fully.

Very closely related to the Hume issue is the Brave New World issue. Ultimately, because he has no philosophically adequate account of what the word "good" means, he cannot explain why World Controller Mustafa Mond was not correct that he had created the best of all possible worlds, or why the Savage might have had a point. He also, of course, cannot deal with the problem of the suicidal person, except to say (and to his credit Harris is honest about this) that he is wrong about his own wellbeing, unless he takes of course the Vatican-ish position that a life in being, no matter how unpleasant, is always per se infinitely more valuable than a life not in being, which I doubt he would do.

In short, what Harris has done is written an excellent apologia for a particular variety of early-21st-century vision of human wellbeing. He has not written a book of ethics. It is helpful, interesting, and probably is grounds for public policy research and a reasonably good guide to personal action a lot of the time. But it isn't a book about morality.(less)

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Aug 25, 2011 Steve Stein rated it 4 of 5 stars

This is a very useful book, although my gut feeling is that the philosophy is a bit facile and full of holes. The central argument is that science can determine our values. This boils down to a form of Utilitarianism in which "human flourishing" is the ultimate end.

Regardless of whether the philosophy withstands the scrutiny of a thousand rabbis, the basic advice is worth taking to heart. Our problems are not always what we think they are. We lie to ourselves. A lot. Our memory deceives. Ration...more

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About Sam Harris

"Sam Harris (born 1967) is an American non-fiction writer and philosopher and neuroscientist. He is the author of The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason (2004), which won the 2005 PEN/Martha Albrand Award, and Letter to a Christian Nation (2006), a rejoinder to the criticism his first book attracted. His new book, The Moral Landscape, explores how science might determine human...more

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“If our well-being depends upon the interaction between events in our brains and events in the world, and there are better and worse ways to secure it, then some cultures will tend to produce lives that are more worth living than others; some political persuasions will be more enlightened than others; and some world views will be mistaken in ways that cause needless human misery.” — 8 people liked it

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