Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the internationa...more
Hardcover, 240 pages
Published
March 30th 1990
by Cambridge University Press
(first published 1990)
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