The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology--that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that...more
Hardcover, 234 pages
Published August 21st 2003 by Cambridge University Press
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Jun 08, 2012 Martha added it · review of another edition
Kvanvig argues that knowledge is not more valuable than any subset of its parts, such as true belief, or (gettiered) justified true belief. [sidenote: I think it's one of the wonders of human thought that Gettier managed to get his name made into a widely accepted verb by publishing a three page essay! just sayin...] So Kvanvig brings us this sorrowful news but then hastens to tell us that, rather than fall into despair, burn all our epistemology books and dance naked in the flames with a bottle...more