false 369409 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 369409 3 359387 book 1965 The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups total:58|5:15|4:24|3:16|2:3|1:0| 58 225 112 7 210850 3.86 84 12 47666611 135991 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 5 0 false Thu Feb 26 22:54:06 -0800 2009 Thu Feb 26 23:05:31 -0800 2009
Within a fairly small space the author puts forward a theory that spans economics, political science, and group psychology. He then applies this to liberal economies, Marxist theory, and past and present America (i.e. unions, lobbies, agricultural coops). He breaks a few myths...more...]]> 42593745 1883859 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 4 0 false Sat Jan 10 13:17:48 -0800 2009 Sat Jan 10 13:47:08 -0800 2009 The Logic of Collective Action, Olson originates what has become the standard story that the public choice economists tell about the role of special-interests in politics. Namely, that a small group is inherently at an advantage against a larger group in arguments...more...]]> 40285447 295313 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 2 0 false Mon Sep 01 00:00:00 -0700 2008 Wed Dec 17 01:53:08 -0800 2008 Wed Dec 17 01:53:34 -0800 2008 34001417 287245 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 4 0 false Sat Oct 25 00:00:00 -0700 2008 Sat Sep 27 18:44:25 -0700 2008 Sat Oct 25 18:27:52 -0700 2008 Once, and that's enough 34035024 107511 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 4 0 false Mon Nov 03 00:00:00 -0800 2008 Sun Sep 28 09:20:28 -0700 2008 Thu Nov 06 18:42:30 -0800 2008 5108501 250795 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 5 0 false Wed Jan 01 00:00:00 -0800 1997 Sat Aug 25 14:30:24 -0700 2007 Thu Dec 17 07:03:32 -0800 2009 2690821 169912 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 4 0 false Tue Jul 03 19:01:26 -0700 2007 Wed Dec 16 23:34:07 -0800 2009 80971452 281409 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Mon Dec 14 09:53:09 -0800 2009 Mon Dec 14 09:53:09 -0800 2009 80144132 3006314 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 4 0 false Sun Dec 06 23:32:16 -0800 2009 Sun Dec 06 23:32:16 -0800 2009 79820319 2894577 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 3 0 false Thu Dec 03 18:54:48 -0800 2009 Thu Dec 03 18:54:48 -0800 2009 79139527 2985588 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Fri Nov 27 13:57:09 -0800 2009 Fri Nov 27 14:15:07 -0800 2009 78935094 2559314 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Wed Nov 25 04:46:12 -0800 2009 Wed Nov 25 04:46:12 -0800 2009 77470346 2921643 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Wed Nov 11 14:12:13 -0800 2009 Wed Nov 11 14:12:13 -0800 2009 77415703 1764794 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Wed Nov 11 04:32:03 -0800 2009 Wed Nov 11 04:32:03 -0800 2009 77237970 1091303 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Mon Nov 09 13:59:55 -0800 2009 Mon Nov 09 14:00:02 -0800 2009 77157735 262222 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 4 0 false Sun Nov 08 19:10:19 -0800 2009 Sun Nov 08 19:10:19 -0800 2009 76182154 2460171 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Thu Oct 29 21:24:22 -0700 2009 Thu Oct 29 21:24:22 -0700 2009 74241768 238665 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 3 0 false Sun Oct 11 22:58:18 -0700 2009 Sun Oct 11 22:58:40 -0700 2009 74008421 2803688 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Fri Oct 09 15:06:21 -0700 2009 Fri Oct 09 15:06:21 -0700 2009 73565735 1010450 369409 0674537513 9780674537514 7 <![CDATA[The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV)]]> http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452m/369409.jpg http://photo.goodreads.com/books/1174191452s/369409.jpg http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/369409.The_Logic_of_Collective_Action_Public_Goods_and_the_Theory_of_Groups 3.88 58 This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.



Second printing with new preface and appendix.]]> 1965 0 0 false Mon Oct 05 17:45:15 -0700 2009 Mon Oct 05 17:45:15 -0700 2009 8 http://www.goodreads.com/book_link/follow/8?book_id=369409