The Evolution of Cooperation

Apr 17, 2013 Brian Powell rated it 4 of 5 stars · review of another edition

Axelrod takes on the problem of how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists without a central authority. The question has important implications for the evolution of cooperation among inherently selfish organisms in biological systems.

Axelrod begins by examining the problem from the standpoint of game theory. Specifically, he considers how cooperation might emerge in the course of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The key here is that the game is iterated – that is, the players m...more Axelrod takes on the problem of how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists without a central authority. The question has important implications for the evolution of cooperation among inherently selfish organisms in biological systems.

Axelrod begins by examining the problem from the standpoint of game theory. Specifically, he considers how cooperation might emerge in the course of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The key here is that the game is iterated – that is, the players meet again and again. This means that choices not only determine the outcome of the present move, but can also influence the later choices of the players. So, for example, it does not necessarily pay to defect like it would in a single round match. Axelrod’s approach was to solicit strategies from colleagues and professionals across a range of academic fields, play them against each other, and examine the characteristics of those that performed best.

While continuing interaction between two players is necessary for cooperation to emerge, it is not sufficient. Axelrod identifies four properties that tend to make a strategy successful: it should be nice (it should never be the first to defect), retaliatory (it should defect when defected against), forgiving (it should cooperate when cooperation is sought), and have clear behavior so that the other player can recognize the strategy and adapt to it. One entry in the prisoner's dilemma "tournament" possessed all of these qualities and it proved to be the most successful strategy overall. Called TIT FOR TAT, the strategy cooperates until defected against, after which it defects until it is cooperated with again.

Axelrod’s use of the prisoner’s dilemma is beautiful in its simplicity and power – when filtered through the classic game-theoretic workhorse, of the wide range of possible strategies, successful schemes are found to have a small number of simple characteristics in common.

Armed with the results from these initial game-theoretic considerations, Axelrod turns to the emergence of cooperation in biology, drawing on the seminal work of biologist W. D. Hamilton. Of particular interest is the question of how certain modes of cooperation evolve within a population of individuals, and given a prevailing strategy for dealing with conflict, is it possible for alternative strategies to “invade” the population and shift the global behavior? Is it possible for TIT FOR TAT to govern the cooperative interactions of individuals in a population? The goal is to identify those strategies that are collectively stable: those strategies that are the only ones that the entire population can maintain in the long run in the face of any possible mutant strategy. Axelrod confirms that the strategy that always defects (ALL D) is collectively stable, and that no strategy that ever cooperates can invade a population using ALL D. This result, however, applies to individual mutants; consider instead what happens when a small group of TIT FOR TAT invades a population of ALL D. In this arrangement, if the individuals in the TIT FOR TAT group interact enough, they will manage a higher average “pay out” than the ALL D will generate among themselves. And so TIT FOR TAT not only forms the basis of cooperative behavior, it appears to be the target strategy of any evolutionary process with the reward structure of the prisoner's dilemma.

This observation leads to an important conclusion of this work: Mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central control within a cluster of individuals who rely on reciprocity. This has decisive implications for biological evolution, because it underscores the importance of reciprocity based generally on symbiosis rather than kinship or true altruism. Relatedness is not necessary for the emergence of cooperation – what matters is the probability that two individuals will meet again in the future, and that they know it. It’s an exciting validation of this proposal that there are many examples in nature of symbiotic relationships in which the individuals have developed the ability to recognize one another. This, to me, is why Axelrod’s work is so noteworthy and intriguing: using a simple, theoretical device he is able to develop a predictive model of cooperative behavior in complex, biological systems. There are limitations, to be sure, but the method appears to successfully resolve the broad characteristics of evolved cooperation.(less)

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Jan 11, 2011 Mangoo rated it 5 of 5 stars

Dagli anni '40 dello scorso secolo, attraverso i contributi seminali di Neumann & Morgenstern, Nash e Wittgenstein tra l'altro, la teoria dei giochi e' emersa come uno strumento potentissimo e affascinante per l'analisi e la possibile soluzione di molteplici situazioni economiche, politiche, sociali, ecologiche. E questo accadeva proprio mentre la Guerra Fredda richiedeva un simile archivio di strategie ed esempi di condotta per scongiurare una guerra calda ancora piu' distruttiva di quella...more Dagli anni '40 dello scorso secolo, attraverso i contributi seminali di Neumann & Morgenstern, Nash e Wittgenstein tra l'altro, la teoria dei giochi e' emersa come uno strumento potentissimo e affascinante per l'analisi e la possibile soluzione di molteplici situazioni economiche, politiche, sociali, ecologiche. E questo accadeva proprio mentre la Guerra Fredda richiedeva un simile archivio di strategie ed esempi di condotta per scongiurare una guerra calda ancora piu' distruttiva di quella mondiale appena conclusa.
Il Dilemma del Prigioniero cattura nella semplicita' della sua astrazione una situazione comportamentale che si ritrova in molti contesti, dal disarmo alla politica estera, dall'organizzazione delle gerarchie burocratiche al libero commercio. In questo gioco, due prigionieri vengono catturati ed il risultato del loro interrogatorio puo' portare a diverse ricompense. Se un prigioniero collabora mentre l'altro trasgredisce, il trasgressore prende la massima ricompensa mentre il collaboratore la minima; se entrambi collaborano, prendono una ricompensa intermedia; infine se entrambi trasgrediscono, ricevono una ricompensa inferiore a quella che avrebbero se avessere collaborato. Se la partita e' giocata una volta sola, un semplice ragionamento porta a concludere che la migliore strategia e' trasgredire. Ma se il gioco e' ripetuto un numero indefinito di volte, allora trasgredire non e' sempre conveniente. E da qui nasce la cooperazione.
Il libro di Axelrod si impernia attorno ad un torneo di Dilemma del Prigioniero cui furono presentate diverse strategie da diversi partecipanti appartenenti a varie discipline scientifiche. Il primo round fu vinto dalla strategia piu' semplice: TIT FOR TAT, ovvero la legge del taglione: il giocatore collabora all'inizio, e poi compie la mossa che l'avversario ha compiuto nel turno precedente. E il secondo round del torneo, con molti piu' partecipanti del primo, e tutti al corrente del risultato e dell'analisi del primo round, fu ancora vinta da TIT FOR TAT.
Da qui Axelrod deriva una quantita' di osservazioni, teoremi e suggerimenti per sviluppare la cooperazione in diversi ambiti. Per i giocatori, consiglia di non essere invidiodi, non essere mai i primi a trasgredire, usare un comportamento reciproco e non essere troppo cervellotici. Per i promotori della cooperazione, egli suggerisce di rendere le interazioni tra partecipanti durature e frequenti (per far pesare l'"ombra del futuro" sul presente), sviluppare le capacita' di riconoscimento della strategia degli avversari, interessarsi agli altri, e forzare comportamenti cooperativi attraverso ricompense e punizioni.
Il testo e' semplice, molto scorrevole, molto chiaro e interessante. E' sorprendente in effetti pensare che un grande insieme di insegnamenti pratici (e confermati anche da molti esempi pratici, come la tattica vivi-e-lascia-vivere sviluppatasi lungo le trincee nemiche durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale) sulla condotta in situazioni di paradosso possano scaturire da un torneo per computer. L'autore commenta ogni minimo aspetto delle strategie piu' interessanti , i motivi del loro successo (sintetizzabili in: essere buoni, perdonare, essere provocabili, essere chiari) o dell'insuccesso (troppa competitivita', pessimismo). Sono spesso osservazioni quasi triviali, eppure profonde e ramificate. Si scopre in sostanza che nelle situazioni descritte del Dilemma del Prigioniero ripetuto, essere in grado di sviluppare ed indurre la cooperazione paga.
Un testo fondamentale, che mostra come in un mondo di egoismo una condotta altruistica puo' essere la soluzione piu' auspicabile per tutti, anche senza la presenza di un Leviatano coordinatore.(less)

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Jan 05, 2009 getAbstract rated it 5 of 5 stars

A groundbreaking study on effective cooperation

Every so often a book comes along that is so groundbreaking it changes the popular worldview. This book, written in 1984 by Robert Axelrod, is just such a seminal work, an original analysis that changed the way experts view cooperation. Its ramifications apply to individuals, organizations, countries and even nonthinking – but nevertheless cooperative – biological life forms, such as bacteria. Axelrod based his book on the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma,...more

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Mar 16, 2013 Eva rated it 4 of 5 stars

A bit academic, but still pretty easy to read and a fun exploration of the prisoner's dilemma in a wide variety of hypothetical and concrete contexts.

You may also recognize parts of this from a Radiolab episode :)

Notes:

We all know that the success of the tit-for-tat strategy depends on repeated interactions, the assumption that "the future casts a large enough shadow onto the present." So "one specific implication is that if the other player is unlikely to be around much longer because of appar...more A bit academic, but still pretty easy to read and a fun exploration of the prisoner's dilemma in a wide variety of hypothetical and concrete contexts.

You may also recognize parts of this from a Radiolab episode :)

Notes:

We all know that the success of the tit-for-tat strategy depends on repeated interactions, the assumption that "the future casts a large enough shadow onto the present." So "one specific implication is that if the other player is unlikely to be around much longer because of apparent weakness, then...the reciprocity of tit for tat is no longer stable. We have Caesar's explanation of why Pompey's allies stopped cooperating with him. 'They regarded his [Pompey's] prospects as hopeless and acted according to the common rule by which a man's friends become his enemies in adversity.' Another example is the case where a business is on the edge of bankruptcy....[Even] his best customers begin refusing payment for merchandise, claiming defects in quality, failure to meet specifications, tardy delivery, or what-have-you. The great enforcer of morality in commerce is the continuing relationship." - p59-60

The Live-and-Let-Live System in World War I:

“Locally, the [prisoner’s] dilemma persisted: at any given moment it was prudent to shoot to kill, whether the other side did so or not. What made trench warfare so different from most other combat was that the same small units faced each other in immobile sectors for extended periods of time. This changed the game from a one-move Prisoner’s Dilemma in which defection is the dominant choice, to an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in which conditional strategies are possible.” – p77

“In one section the hour of 8 to 9 A.M. was regarded as consecrated to ‘private business,’ and certain places indicated by a flag were regarded as out of bounds by the snipers on both sides.”

“Just as important as getting cooperation started were the conditions that allowed it to be sustainable. The strategies that could sustain mutual cooperation were the ones which were provokable. During the periods of mutual restraint, the enemy soldiers took pains to show each other that they could indeed retaliate if necessary. For example, German snipers showed their prowess to the British by aiming at spots on the walls of cottages and firing until they had cut a hole.” – p79

“What finally destroyed the live-and-let-live system was the institution of a type of incessant aggression that the headquarters could monitor. This was the raid…Raiders were ordered to kill or capture the enemy in his own trenches. If the raid was successful, prisoners would be taken; and if the raid was a failure, casualties would be proof of the attempt. There was no effective way to pretend that a raid had been undertaken when it had not. And there was no effective way to cooperate wit the enemy in a raid because neither live soldiers nor dead bodies could be exchanged.” – p83

“Additional developments are the emergence of ethics and ritual….’I was having tea with A Company when we heard a lot of shouting and went out to investigate. We found our men and the Germans standing on their respective parapets. Suddenly a salvo arrived but did no damage. Naturally both sides got down and our men started swearing at the Germans, when all at once a brave German got on to his parapet and shouted out ‘We are very sorry about that; we hope no one was hurt. It is nor our fault, it is that damned Prussian artillery.’” – p85

“Just as ability to recognize the other player is invaluable in extending the range of stable cooperation, the ability to monitor cues for the likelihood of continued interaction is helpful as an indication of when reciprocal cooperation is or is not stable. In particular, when the relative importance of future interactions, w, falls below the threshold for stability, it will no longer pay to reciprocate the other’s cooperation. Illness in other partner leading to reduced viability would be one detectable sign of declining w. Both animals in a partnership would then be expected to become less cooperative. Again of a partner would be very like disease in this respect, resulting in an incentive to defect so as to take a one-time gain when the probability of future interaction becomes small enough.

These mechnisms could operate even at the microbial level. Any symbiont that still has a chance to spread to other hosts by some process of infection would be expected to shift from mutualism to parasitism when the probability of continued interaction with the original host lessened. In the more parasitic phase, it could exploit the host more severely by producing more of the forms able to disperse and infect. This phase would be expected when the host is severely injured, has contracted some other wholly parasitic infection that threatens death, or when it manifests signs of age. In fact, bacteria that are normal and seemingly harmless or even beneficial in the gut can be found contributing to sepsis in the body when the gut is perforated, implying a severe wound….One tumor-causing virus, that of Burkitt’s lymphoma, may have alternatives of slow r fast production of infectious stages…The point of interest is that, as some evidence suggests, lymphoma can be triggered by the host’s contracting malaria. The lymphoma grows extremely fast and so can probably compete with malaria for transmission (possibly by mosquitoes) before death results.” – p103

“Tit for Tat won the tournament because it did well in its interactions with a wide variety of other strategies. On average, it did better than any other rule with the other strategies in the tournament. Yet Tit for Tat never once scored better in a game than the other player! In fact, it can’t. It lets the other player defect first, and it never defects more times than the other player has defected. Therefore, Tit for Tat achieves either the same score as the other player, or a little less. Tit for Tat won the tournament, not by beating the other player, but by eliciting behavior from the other player which allowed both to do well.” = p112

“If the other player is not likely to be seen again, defecting right away is better than being nice. This fact has unfortunate implications for groups known to move from one place to another….In a California community, Gypsies were again found not to pay all of a doctor’s bill, but municipal fines were paid promptly. These fines were usually for breaking garbage regulations. This was among a group of Gypsies who returned to the same town every winter. Presumably, the Gypsies knew that they had an ongoing relationship with the garbage collection service of that town, and could not shop around for another service. Conversely, there were always enough doctors in the area for them to break off one relationship and start another when necessary.” – p115

“The role of time perspective has important implications for the design of institutions. In large organizations, such as business corporations and governmental bureaucracies, executives are often transferred from one position to another approximately every two years. This gives executives a strong incentive to do well in the short run….This gives two executives a mutual incentive to defect when wither of their terms is drawing to an end. The result of rapid turnover could therefore be a lessening of cooperation within the organization.

As pointed out in chapter 3, a similar problem arises when a political leader appears to have little chance of reelection. The problem becomes even more acute with a lame duck. From the point of view of the public, a politician facing an end of career can be dangerous because of the increased temptation to seek private goals rather than maintain a pattern of cooperation with the electorate for the attainment of mutually rewarding goals.

Since the turnover of political leaders is a necessary part of democratic control, the problem must be solved another way. Here, political parties are useful because they can be held accountable by the public for the acts of their elected members. The voters and the parties are in a long-term relationship, and this gives the parties an incentive to select candidates who will not abuse their responsibilities. And if a leader is discovered giving in to temptation, the voters can take this into account in evaluating the other candidates of the same party in the next election. The punishment of the Republican party by the electorate after Watergate shows that parties are indeed held responsible for the defections of their leaders.” – p183

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Feb 02, 2013 Sergei Moska rated it 5 of 5 stars

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here. I know some basic game theory, so I thought that this book would be redundant. Yes, I get it - Tit-For-Tat is the winning strategy in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma games, etc. I frankly bought the book because I found it for cheap and I decided to actually read it because it's a seminal piece of work.

But once I started, I could not put this book down. It was at times very uplifting and at other times horrifying. I was so engrossed that it took real discipline to remind myself throughout that the...more I know some basic game theory, so I thought that this book would be redundant. Yes, I get it - Tit-For-Tat is the winning strategy in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma games, etc. I frankly bought the book because I found it for cheap and I decided to actually read it because it's a seminal piece of work.

But once I started, I could not put this book down. It was at times very uplifting and at other times horrifying. I was so engrossed that it took real discipline to remind myself throughout that the conclusions being drawn stem from simulations that require very important assumptions that are not present in many types of interactions. It's to the author's credit that the book was so engrossing that I constantly had to catch myself over-enthusiastically misapplying its lessons.

In some respects the book is incomplete. For instance, (1)the author rightly advises someone in a PD to maximize one's her own benefit rather than base her success on how she compares to the other player (in fact, one of the interesting and in retrospect obvious points is that Tit-for-Tat will never do better than the particular partner it is playing with). This is sound advice, even if it may run contrary to some hardwired behavioral tendencies (e.g.: see Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest for some arguments to that effect), but it dismisses the possibility that there is a meta-game going on, in which someone with a sufficiently large proportion of "points" may then try to coerce the other. In practical terms: it's great if both of our living standards increase, but if yours increases at a rate that far exceeds mine, I may need to defect in order to prevent future domination. This would not be possible in a PD proper, but Axelrod points out that his analysis does not require payoffs to be symmetric (p.17). To take another example, (2)the author demonstrates that short time horizons are conducive to increased rational likelihood of defection, whether we are microbes or people. It turns out that getting old is a very dangerous thing to do, as formerly cooperative organisms will stop being so cooperative. So why don't we systematically screw over old people?

Of course, this is not in any way a critique of the book. And I am aware that these are elementary points. There are answers to these types of problems. With respect to (1), some might say that I just didn't describe a PD after all. Others might say that I did do so, but that it is a PD that is nested in a larger game. With respect to (2), there are certainly stories of social stability, etc., that can be told. I bring this up not to try to point out "flaws" (again: they are not flaws), but actually to say that even the "incomplete" bits left me fascinated.

I have no idea if this is objectively a five-star book, but I couldn't give it anything less given its importance and the effect it had on me while I read it.

(edit: actually, I just remembered that he does address (1) to some extent in his discussion of the bombing of Pearl Harbor)(less)

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Nov 03, 2010 Bart Thanhauser rated it 4 of 5 stars

A very good book that makes me interested in reading more game theory. The first two chapters are a bit dense (but really not too bad) as Axelrod goes over the "Computer Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament" that sparked this book. These chapters are an analysis of computer programs (not as dull as it sounds), but it proves to be the evidence for his theory and the meat of the book.

A quick synopsis of the book: In the late 70s, Axelrod, a University of Michigan poli sci professor, held a Computer Tourn...more A very good book that makes me interested in reading more game theory. The first two chapters are a bit dense (but really not too bad) as Axelrod goes over the "Computer Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament" that sparked this book. These chapters are an analysis of computer programs (not as dull as it sounds), but it proves to be the evidence for his theory and the meat of the book.

A quick synopsis of the book: In the late 70s, Axelrod, a University of Michigan poli sci professor, held a Computer Tournament. The Computer Tournament invited participants to create computer programs to wage battle in a Prisoner's Dilemma. A Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the foundational game theory scenarios/models. In it two prisoners are caught and are being interrogated. Each prisoner has two options. They can either keep quiet (cooperate with their accomplice) or they can rat on their accomplice (defect). As each prisoner has two options, there are four possible results: mutual cooperation (CC), mutual defection (DD), or defection/cooperation (CD or DC) by either of the two prisoners. Game theorists have assigned points to these results--if both prisoners cooperate they both get minimal sentences (3 points). If both defect they get strict sentences (each gets 1 point). If one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator receives a life sentence (0 points) while the defector gets freedom (5 points). The conclusion from this scenario is that it is in each of the prisoner's best interests to rat out their accomplice. If they rat out their accomplice they are guaranteed at least some points. Sure, they receive a harsh sentence if their partner also defects--but if their partner doesn't defect they get freedom! The best result of all. And more importantly, if they cooperate, they risk getting the harshest sentence--life in prison. So what often ends up happening with rational actors is that they both end up with harsh sentences (mutual defection) rather than the more appealing and mutual-beneficial light sentences (mutual cooperation). The Prisoner's Dilemma explains that in acting rationally, actors often forgo mutually beneficial solutions. Downer of a conclusion.

But in steps Axelrod. Axelrod, with the clarity of a political scientist, makes a plain and convincing argument. He answers this book's central question: in a world of egoists without a central authority (some power to force or incentivize), how did cooperation ever come to exist? The key to cooperation is ensuring that a relationship is sufficiently long. He makes this point clearer than I can:

"What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players might meet again. This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the players. The future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation."

In short, people have incentive to cooperate if they meet again and again. If the prisoner's dilemma is run indefinitely (tens, hundreds, thousands of times), then pretty soon people will realize that it's in their best interest to cooperate rather than mutually defect. The two rounds of Axelrod's Prisoners' Dilemma Computer Tournament back this up. The highest finishers are the "nice programs" and the winner of both tournaments is "Tit for Tat" (T4T)--a program that cooperates with its partner on the first move, and then copies whatever it's partner's previous move was. As a result, T4T is never the first to defect and therefore can build a cooperative relationship with other programs. But at the same time, if T4T meets a "mean program" it will respond to defection with defection of its own. So it's no pushover.

I've already gone into too much detail with Axelrod's theory and results, but that's only a testament to how easily understood his ideas are. Pick up the book for more details--chapter 6, "Advice for Participants and Reformers" is particularly good.

A few thoughts on the book in general: at times I thought this book could be significantly shortened so that it was a long academic article. The book itself is pretty short (~190 pages) and Axelrod repeats the same main points over and over. I really enjoyed this repetition, as I felt like I had a firmer understanding of it each time he repeated it. But nonetheless, I think this book could've been a long journal article without losing too much important information. Also, I'd be interested to see this applied to international relations issues. In some ways I'm glad that Axelrod didn't do this himself--otherwise, he would've stamped a Cold War mentality on to his book. The book and its theory seems purer without too many real world applications. But I'd still love to read other people's use of and twists on this theory when applied to international relations.

Lastly, I know this isn’t a self-help book. I know that life is more complex than game theory, but there are things from this book that are helpful/tempting for me to apply to life. And Axelrod encourages this. In the last pages of his conclusion, he writes, "Perhaps it is not too much to hope that people can use the surrogate experience of the Computer Tournament to learn the value of reciprocity for their own Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions” (189). But I'll take these with a grain of salt: people are more complex than computers.

Nonetheless, the idea that life is not a zero-sum game is important to be reminded of. What's more, the fact that T4T, won the tournament and yet lost every single interaction it had resonated. It won by cooperating and establishing mutually beneficial relationships (which it slightly lost/tied), not by defeating its opponents. And the last take away point I'll keep is that, reciprocity is important to interactions. If a partner cooperates, you cooperate. And if someone defects, you respond immediately and clearly with defection of your own. Responding to defection with defection seems sort of rash--especially since it can be tough to interpret other people's actions--but T4T makes a convincing argument that reciprocity is the most stable strategy in a wide range of environments.

In short, this simple read provides a lot of tempting fluff for real world interactions and makes me excited to pick up some more game theory. (less)

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Feb 08, 2010 Steven Peterson rated it 5 of 5 stars

Robert Axelrod’s “The Evolution of Cooperation” is a classic in our understanding of why cooperation occurs in humans. The book begins with a simple question (Page vii): “When should a person cooperate, and when should that person be selfish, in an ongoing interaction with another person?” The ultimate explanation for the choice, according to Axelrod (and evolutionary theorist William Hamilton) is evolution. This is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5, which outlines how cooperation could evolve a...more Robert Axelrod’s “The Evolution of Cooperation” is a classic in our understanding of why cooperation occurs in humans. The book begins with a simple question (Page vii): “When should a person cooperate, and when should that person be selfish, in an ongoing interaction with another person?” The ultimate explanation for the choice, according to Axelrod (and evolutionary theorist William Hamilton) is evolution. This is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5, which outlines how cooperation could evolve as an adaptive behavior within a species.

One key part of this book is a round robin tournament in which a variety of strategies are tested in an “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” game. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game among the variety of those used in what is called Game Theory. The premise is simple: two thieves have been caught by the police. The policy offer a deal: Rat out your partner, s/he gets a tough sentence and the turncoat gets off. If both rat one another out, they both get a tougher sentence (although not as bad as if one person keeps quiet and the other one squeals). The assumption is that neither trusts the other; they rat one another out; they are both worse off than if they had kept their mouths shut.

One approach to Prisoner’s Dilemma that did the best was Anatol Rapoport’s entry, “TIT FOR TAT.” Here, one keeps one’s mouth shut, for example, as long as one’s confederate does not rat him/her out. If the other person rats one out, you turn the tables and rat him/her out. If the other player quits ratting out, then one ceases ratting the other out. This was the simplest of the entries, according to Axelrod. But it is the one that worked best. In short, cooperate as long as the other player cooperates; be nasty when the other player is nasty; don’t hold grudges and keep punishing if the other person begins cooperating.

Of course, things are actually more complex than this, but the above gives a sense of the nature of the winning strategy. It does raise questions about the common assumption that everyone is selfish and will always do what is needed to advance one’s interests at the expense of others. It begins to raise approaches to understanding “altruism,” self-sacrifice that benefits others (and would also benefit the altruist in the long run).

At any rate, this is a thought provoking book and a genuine classic, with many applications in public life and in our own daily lives.
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Feb 13, 2011 Nick Klagge rated it 3 of 5 stars

An interesting analysis and interpretation of the computerized Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments that Axelrod held some 30 years ago. These were the tournaments in which "TIT FOR TAT" was shown to be an extraordinarily successful and robust strategy in the iterated PD. I read this because I read an article about it for one of my classes, which sparked my interest. There was a bit more interesting material in the book than in the article (by Doug Hofstadter), but not a great deal more. The book is a...more

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Aug 19, 2011 Ronald Wise rated it 3 of 5 stars · review of another edition

A study of the game "The Prisoner's Dilemma" in which two players play a number of rounds in which each player can either cooperate with the other or defect. Tournaments were held in which intellectuals of varying professions submitted strategies of play and each was paired against the other. Though this would seem to be very dry material, the implications were fascinating when applied to bacterial and viral survival, individual human behavior, international relations, and military conduct in wa...more

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Feb 06, 2010 Brad rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: business

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here.

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Dec 28, 2012 James Boyle rated it 5 of 5 stars

To say that a book is required reading is a term that, these days, is very overused (as an aside, to say that something is a term that, these days is very overused is in itself a term that, these days is very overused, and really quite an annoying one. Although my usage of it here is one of the rare cases where it is appropriate, I have only really used it to point out its overuse and in hope that the very few people who are reading this review will think carefully about using it in the future,...more To say that a book is required reading is a term that, these days, is very overused (as an aside, to say that something is a term that, these days is very overused is in itself a term that, these days is very overused, and really quite an annoying one. Although my usage of it here is one of the rare cases where it is appropriate, I have only really used it to point out its overuse and in hope that the very few people who are reading this review will think carefully about using it in the future, but accept its deserved use in this review only in the face of this lengthy, distracting, but necessary disclaimer) but when it comes to Robert Axelrod's magnificent, eye opening book, The Evolution of Cooperation, I have no hesitation in saying that the World would be a considerably safer, happier and fairer place if this were read by each of its inhabitants. The reason I make this bold claim is that the book shows, through the use of computer tournaments of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, pitting strategies against each other, that cooperation is not only the nicest way to behave, it is the way that yields the greatest rewards. Axelrod also applies his findings to real world situations, including antagonists in trench warfare, the cold war, interactions between unthinking organisms such as bacteria and the reasons for symbiotic and parasitic behaviour in plants, insects and animals, all of which confirm his theories and show how cooperation can and does become established and that evolution has favoured organisms that are cooperative and reciprocal in the long term, and that even self serving egoists, living in a world with no central authority would still be wise to adopt cooperative techniques.
The focus on prisoner's dilemma means that this book has a mathematical spine that some people might not enjoy, indeed the book is not necessarily the easiest to read, and Axelrod never assumes that his readers are stupid. It is therefore helpful to know a little about game theory or prisoner's dilemma before reading this book, as the different angles and tests that the most robust strategy, 'Tit for Tat' is subjected to is surprising and exceptionally thorough. The mathematical proofs of the findings are extremely rewarding and anybody who disagrees simply cannot have followed them properly.
In conclusion, the book shows us that by adopting strategies that are none envious, nice, forgiving and retaliating (not able to be taken advantage of) and that by living in small societies that are equal and stable, then prosperity will flourish. It is not an understatement to say that this book should change your fundamental approach to dealing with people and the way you look at the world. Such claims may well be very overused these days, but it is remarkable and true that Axelrod achieved it in this relatively short book as far back as 1984. All that remains now is for more people to read it.
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Oct 27, 2012 Omar Halabieh rated it 4 of 5 stars

As the title indicates this book explores the topic of cooperation, particularly how it can emerge in a decentralized population that seeks individual maximization of self-interest. The book is split into two main sections. The first discusses cooperation through game-theory analysis of computer tournaments played. This includes the various strategies used, and the ones that enjoyed the most success. The second discusses the implications of the findings from the first section, and real-world app...more

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Aug 14, 2010 Mark rated it 5 of 5 stars · review of another edition

Shelves: poli-sci, change, favorites

"Explores how cooperation can emerge in a world ruled by selfishness with no central authority or rule. Axelrod demonstrates that enlightened self interest can lead to effective cooperation in any situation where the participants believe that they will need to interact with each other in the future. These lessons can, and should be applied to personal, corporate, national, and international interactions. After reading this book I noticed that I was much less likely to take an all or nothing appr...more

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Jul 08, 2011 Johann Guenther rated it 3 of 5 stars · review of another edition

AXELROD, Robert: „Die Evolution der Kooperation“, München 2009
Aus meiner Situation heraus in einem Sandwich zwischen Unirat und europäischen Lieferanten zu sitzen habe ich mich intensiver mit Kooperationsmodellen beschäftigt. Die Grundsatzfrage, die sich der Autor stellte war „Wann sollte eine Person bei einer fortlaufenden Interaktion mit einer anderen Person kooperieren, und wann sollte sie sich selbstsüchtig verhalten?“ (Seite VII). Eine Frage, die sich jedem Menschen, jeder Organisation fast...more

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Sep 22, 2011 Henri Hämäläinen rated it 4 of 5 stars

This book is about prisoner's dilemma. It's an older book (from year 1984), but this is a subject that will never go old. It's not an entertaining book, but is full of excellent observations about everyday selections between two living creatures or organisations. Writer of this book is respected professor Robert Axelrod best known from this subject.

I really liked it. You just must have some interest towards game theory to take this to your hand. Like said, it's not an easy read, but full of valu...more

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Jul 02, 2009 Tyson Strauser rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: economics

The Evolution of Cooperation is an approachable read on game theory. Evolution was recommended by one of my economics professors in college; this book lays out the prisoner's dilemma, tit-for-tat, and other common games that have been useful tools when analyzing competitive behavior, negotiating tactics, and in investing.

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May 09, 2011 Alex Whalen rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: complex-systems, political-science

Its not an exaggeration to say that this is one of the most important books you will ever read. Nor is it an exaggeration to say that this book completely upended how I see the world. My only complaint? That it took me 39 years of walking around this planet before I finally had the good sense to read it!

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Dec 29, 2010 Al Burns rated it 5 of 5 stars

I think about this book constantly. The book doesn't need to be read thoroughly, just understanding the properties of the "tit for tat" strategy is important, and at the end Axelrod gives some good advice if you want to build cooperative relationships in the future.

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Aug 27, 2011 Words Deeds rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: cred

Truly the first book to discuss the mathematical modeling of evolutionary biology, but not the easiest entry into that space.

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Mar 01, 2008 Gretch Engelson rated it 4 of 5 stars

This book was a great read. There were parts that were hard for me to grasp during my first read, but upon going back to re-read those areas more slowly; I was able to understand the concepts. Robert Axelrod uses a game called "Prisoner's Iterated Dilemma to illustrate how cooperation evolves in real society. His conclusions that were drawn from this game showed cooperation can happen in many forms and under a lot of various conditions. It is a great read for anyone who wants to know more about...more

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Aug 22, 2008 John rated it 4 of 5 stars

I grabbed this book while browsing in the BYU bookstore. It was located with the Computer Science textbooks. It provides an interesting explanation of Cooperation Theory. I think the following provides a great synopsis of the book: "We are used to thinking about competition in which there is only one winner, competitions such as football or chess. But the world is rarely like that. In the vast range of situations mutual cooperation can be better for both sides than mutual defection. The key to d...more

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Dec 30, 2012 Dennis A. V. rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: econ

http://pro-libertate.net/20090114/47-...

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Sep 26, 2008 Sourav rated it 4 of 5 stars

This is probably the first and only book I've read in grad school that was thoroughly enjoyable for me to read -- enjoyable for me while I was actually reading it and not only in retrospect. I usually have slog through most texts for the sake of knowledge and insights I hope to gain if I am able to make it through. As I read Axelrod's book, however, I gained pleasure and insight during the very act of reading. He tackles profoundly important ideas and implications while writing in a style access...more

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Jul 11, 2012 Jorge rated it 5 of 5 stars

Everyone should read it

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Apr 15, 2013 Justin Summay rated it 5 of 5 stars

Excellent book.

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Sep 21, 2009 Kirt rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: 2009

I thought that this was an interesting book. Although it isn't as nearly technical as a research paper would be you do need to have some computer science background to understand the book. I really like the concept of how cooperative and alturistic attributes can be a desirable traight that can be selected by evolution. He applies this to the prisoners dilemma, a classic game theory problem.

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Aug 02, 2009 Frank rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: non-fiction, philosophy

Seminal work demonstrating how cooperation and develop, thrive and protect itself within a society of egotists. This book gave birth to the field of quantiative ethics, pointing a way for separating morality from superstition.

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May 14, 2013 Sam rated it 4 of 5 stars

I was surprised by how much I enjoyed this. It requires one to allow Axelrod to super-simplify situations in order to explain them through the lens of the prisoner's dilemma. Despite that, I found it fascinating. As dry as it was at times, it got me thinking about cooperation in ways I hadn't considered before. It's a quick read, I recommend it.

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Aug 18, 2007 Kevin rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: social

A good introduction to game theory as it pertains the Prisoner's Dilemma. If you aren't seriously into game theory, then it is easy to lose interest after the first half of the book after a few basic lessons are taught. But, if you are interested in applying it to business / software, then it pays to finish the text.

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Jul 08, 2012 Ruby rated it 5 of 5 stars

finished a little while ago but wanted to document what a freakin' great book this is. what a wonderful thing to just immerse yourself in the modeling of the prisoner's dilemma as an underlying algorithm to reconsider our notions of personal strategy.

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