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28th out of 32 books
—
2 voters
The Strategy of Conflict
'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.'
Paperback, 328 pages
Published
May 15th 1981
by Harvard University Press
(first published January 1st 1960)
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If at first this reads like a pop-econ book about counter-intuitive explanations for human transactions, do not stop there. Keep thinking about it.
Schelling's description of variable sum games and bargaining seemed overbearing while I was reading it, but as soon as I finished the book I realized having the analysis systematically laid out was very helpful. In particular, I wish I had read this before studying Contracts. Generally, this book gives me a new perspective for explaining the most diff...more
Schelling's description of variable sum games and bargaining seemed overbearing while I was reading it, but as soon as I finished the book I realized having the analysis systematically laid out was very helpful. In particular, I wish I had read this before studying Contracts. Generally, this book gives me a new perspective for explaining the most diff...more
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book).
His main theses are that not all games are zero-sum. That is, they are 'variable-sum', or dependent upon the strategies used. Not all actors are apparently rational, and some may act on seemingly irrational behavior in order to alter their opponent's responses. On the individual level, this could be the abusive lover threaten...more
His main theses are that not all games are zero-sum. That is, they are 'variable-sum', or dependent upon the strategies used. Not all actors are apparently rational, and some may act on seemingly irrational behavior in order to alter their opponent's responses. On the individual level, this could be the abusive lover threaten...more
كنت مصاباً بالفرح.. لما عرفت أن أحد الدور العربية ترجمت هذا الكتاب الرائع.. ولكني عدت لوضعي الصحيح.. حيث الفرح هو أمر طارئ في ثقافة بلاد تعترف فقط بكتب الشعر والروايات.. وتهمل باقي أنواع الكتب..
ووضعني هذا الكتاب في نسخته العربية أما مأزق النجوم.. فالنسخة الأصلية تستحق على الأقل خمس نجمات بينما هذه النسخة ناقص نجمتان. وعند النظر لمن عمل على النسخة العربية، ترى مترجمان اثنان، والدار العربية للعلوم، وضع ثلاثة خطوط تحت العلوم، ومركز الجزيرة للدراسات.. وضع خطين تحت كلمة دراسات. كل هؤلاء لم ينتبهوا لل...more
ووضعني هذا الكتاب في نسخته العربية أما مأزق النجوم.. فالنسخة الأصلية تستحق على الأقل خمس نجمات بينما هذه النسخة ناقص نجمتان. وعند النظر لمن عمل على النسخة العربية، ترى مترجمان اثنان، والدار العربية للعلوم، وضع ثلاثة خطوط تحت العلوم، ومركز الجزيرة للدراسات.. وضع خطين تحت كلمة دراسات. كل هؤلاء لم ينتبهوا لل...more
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Foundational. I've known for years I should've read this before now. Very worthwhile. If you've ever read anything on deterrence or plan to, stop and read this first.
Please enjoy where Schelling states, on the second to last page, that improving the survivability of retaliatory, second-strike forces makes it more possible that the US could use nuclear weapons on a small scale to oppose Russian conventional aggression: "The risk involved in a bit of less-than-massive retaliation should be less th...more
Please enjoy where Schelling states, on the second to last page, that improving the survivability of retaliatory, second-strike forces makes it more possible that the US could use nuclear weapons on a small scale to oppose Russian conventional aggression: "The risk involved in a bit of less-than-massive retaliation should be less th...more
Thomas Schelling's work on states' strategic thinking was important in the 1960s. This volume, published in 1960, examines, as the title suggests, "the strategy of conflict." How does the threat of conflict or actual use of violence advance the interests of states? Schelling uses game theory to explore the logic of exploiting potential force in international bargaining situations. This book illustrates strategic thinking in the 1960s.
Classic on the game-theoretical aspects of conflicts, in particular, international relations. E.g. the whole discussion of threats/promises/credibility. It abstracts from actual conflicts, and treats them as a kind of chess game. Insightful.
relied heavily on man as a rational actor, a lot of game theory, the only useful concept is "making the pie bigger"
An inarguable, insightful classic. More readable than I could have hoped, despite the proliferation of illustrative mathematical games...
An economic analysis of international conflict using principles from theory of choice.
Jun 25, 2012
Aaron
marked it as to-read
I'm not sure how I didn't hear about this book until now.
May 21, 2010
Lauren Adams
added it
brilliante!
النسخة العربية سيئة للغاية فى طريقة ترجمتها وعرض الامثلة ..ووجد صعوبة بالغة فى فهم كثير من التفاصيل بسبب طريقة الترجمة السيئة..انصح بالنسخة الانجليزية الاصلية
Why MAD is sane, weakness is strength and knowledge is a disadvantage. A classic.
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Discusses the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner...
Another Schelling Classic.
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Thomas Crombie Schelling is an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He is also co-faculty at the New England Complex Systems Institute. He was awarded the
2005 Nobel Prize in Economics
(shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of co...more
More about Thomas C. Schelling...
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