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Strategy

by B.H. Liddell Hart

4.07 · Rating Details · 1,662 Ratings · 44 Reviews

"The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." – Library Journal

This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Strategy is a seminal work of military history and ...more

Paperback, 2nd revised, 448 pages

Published March 30th 1991 by Meridian/Plume (first published 1941)

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Nov 15, 2011 Mike Hankins rated it did not like it

Shelves: military-history

Few authors have aimed as high as B.H. Liddell Hart has in Strategy. Through a systematic examination of every major conflict throughout human history, Liddell Hart attempts to show that all major victories are achieved through use of what he terms “the indirect approach,” and conversely, that every loss is due to the errors of a “direct approach.” He believes strongly in this key distinction, insisting that “the indirect approach [has] a much wider application—that it [is] a law of life in all Few authors have aimed as high as B.H. Liddell Hart has in Strategy. Through a systematic examination of every major conflict throughout human history, Liddell Hart attempts to show that all major victories are achieved through use of what he terms “the indirect approach,” and conversely, that every loss is due to the errors of a “direct approach.” He believes strongly in this key distinction, insisting that “the indirect approach [has] a much wider application—that it [is] a law of life in all spheres: a truth of philosophy.” This attempt to extract philosophical lessons from history creates a work that is a product of its times, yet seems out of place in a more modern setting. Liddell Hart’s analysis and applications suffer from his inability to define his terms, culminating in a simplistic analysis which, while raising some interesting philosophical questions, provides little for the modern military historian.

The bulk of Strategy is devoted to a chronological survey of major military campaigns of history, attempting to show how in all cases, “effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological.” This is as far as Liddell Hart goes to define his terms. Such a loose definition creates serious problems for his methodology. The “indirect approach” becomes increasingly malleable, molded to become applicable to any example that Liddell Hart needs to support his point. Thus, many of the battles and campaigns he describes become simplistic or even misleading through his analysis.

This method begins immediately in the opening chapters, which discusses the Greek and Roman wars. In analyzing the battle of Marathon, Liddell Hart explains the Persian strategy of landing diversionary forces and setting a bait and trap situation for the Athenians—a strategy which would presumably be considered “indirect.” Yet, the Persians lose this battle, which Liddell Hart claims is due to “the superior armour and longer spears of the Greeks,” in addition to the “energy of Miltiades.” This encouraged the Athenians, who “took their one chance by striking without delay.” In other words, the Athenians used a seemingly direct approach of running straight at the enemy, achieving victory through superior technology. This analysis not only seems to be evidence against Liddell Hart’s thesis, but its analysis is problematic. The drawbacks of using ancient sources for tactical analysis are numerous. The sources (presumably Liddell Hart is using Herodotus and/or Thucydides, although he cites nothing) are not written by eyewitnesses, nor are the writers versed in military matters that would enable them to accurately depict strategic and tactical maneuvers. These writers would also have a vested interest in presenting the victorious Greeks in a positive light. Liddell Hart is very selective about what he chooses to include in his analysis, not only of Marathon, but of all the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. He ignores political, social and economic factors in all of these wars, conspicuously leaving out the internal strife of Grecian cities and the economic influence of Cyrus of Persia. He does not name his sources nor does he consider the inherent problems with those sources.

These problems continue with his discussion of the Punic wars. Again his detailed tactical analysis of the battles of Cannae and Zama can hardly be supported by the sources, which again were not witnesses to events, nor were the writers necessarily familiar with military matters. Here, Liddell Hart does cite Polybius briefly as a side comment in his discussion of Scipio’s victory, however, Polybius, as a conquered Greek, might have a noted bias to portray the Roman army as powerful to justify its victory over his hometown and other Grecian cities. Liddell Hart does not attempt to discuss these subtleties. He is concerned only with cherry-picking evidence for his vague thesis, at the expense of a detailed analysis of actual history. He lays the success or failure for these campaigns solely on individual generals, whether it is Miltiades, Nicias, Hannibal, or Scipio, at the expense of any other factors. This simplistic, “great man” approach undercuts the validity of his arguments, creating difficulty for the reader to take his points seriously.

Liddell Hart continues to explore major conflicts through the Medieval and early modern period. These are usually treated with brevity, focusing only on the elements that serve to enhance his thesis. Thus he limits his discussion to a brief overview of general strategies used and the outcome of battles. However this pattern changes dramatically when he reaches the twentieth century. Discussing the World Wars, Liddell Hart’s analysis abruptly transforms into a detailed operational account. Having spent only 136 pages on 2500 years, he then spends 165 pages on the two World Wars. These detailed operational accounts are not particularly relevant to his thesis except in a few areas, thus leaving the reader with the feeling that his over-attention to these conflicts is self-serving indulgence. He spends much of these sections discussing tactics in detail, whereas his previous discussions were mostly limited to general strategy, as the title would imply. Thus, these chapters become increasingly irrelevant to the establishing of his thesis. These discussions become tedious, and as Liddell Hart is not in the habit of citing sources, serious questions are raised regarding the authenticity of his information.

The largest problem with the book is Liddell Hart’s inability to concretely define his terms. The meaning of the “indirect” approach is stretched to accommodate such a wide range that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In explaining six “exceptions” to the rule, Liddell Hart notes that sometimes a grand strategy that shakes an opponent’s confidence is sufficiently “indirect” enough psychologically to justify a direct approach, especially when superior technology creates a tactical advantage. He notes this is true of Alexander the Great and Napoleon with the Phalanx and massed artillery respectively. Liddell Hart continues to stretch the meaning of what is sufficiently indirect, culminating in a discussion of the Eastern front of World War One. Liddell Hart claims the Austrian attacks on Russia were indecisive because, even though they were an indirect approach, they relied simply on surprise and nothing else, allowing Russia consolidate. Thus this approach, while it was indirect, was simply not indirect enough to achieve victory. Continuing this fuzzy logic, Liddell Hart notes that Austria’s attack on Italy is considered to be indirect because its directness itself was so unexpected that it was thus indirect. Liddell Hart, who often decries the concentration of large forces, here blames Austria’s failure on simply not attacking with a large enough force. This blurring of definitions creates a self-fulfilling prophecy where Liddell Hart is able to apply the “indirect” stamp to any successful example and sufficiently deny it to any examples that seem to betray his theory. His selectiveness and subjectivity undermine his arguments and do more to raise objections in the readers mind than offer convincing proofs.

Ultimately, Strategy can hardly be considered a work of history. Liddell Hart’s discussions are not supported by citations of sources and his analysis is over simplistic, excluding important factors. The book also fails to support its main thesis. Liddell Hart relies on cherry-picking evidence to support his ideas and conveniently ignoring or explaining away anything that would seem to contradict his ideas. This forces him to stretch his definitions and deform his terms to such a degree that the actual thesis becomes almost meaningless and completely subjective. The book may retain some value as a reflection of Liddell Hart as a historical figure or as a dated picture of the state of military historiography in the early twentieth century. However, its thesis and presentation of history are incredibly flawed, thus contributing very little value to objective students of history. ...more

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May 05, 2014 Richard rated it it was amazing

The book in one sentence: no one wins through a direct approach. In the course of history, the most significant battles are the ones that was won using the theory of indirect approach. The aspects discussed there are very much applicable in our daily lives and relevant that we can easily understand and form analogies based on our experiences. The indirect approach can be applied in busniesses, in our work place, in our relationships, in selling our ideas, and more. I highly suggest that you shou ...more

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Sep 01, 2014 Jack rated it really liked it

Shelves: history, history-wwii-nazi-germany, military-history-general, world-war-i, military-strategy, military-history-american, professional-military-education

I really enjoyed this book, especially its broad range of historical studies to back up his conclusions. The 4-star rating is mainly due to the fact that this is an old book (Liddell Hart of course wrote doctrine that was ignored by the allies, but the Germans loved it!). No fault of the author's though. Since this is an old book, many of the terms used in today's militaries are not included. No big deal.

I guess that is another reason to read this book. Liddell Hart's work is early. His ideas we ...more

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Oct 16, 2013 Christopher rated it it was ok

Shelves: nonfiction

'Oh wow, a modern thinker who heavily cites Sun Tzu and loves the Mongols, I better read this.' I thought to myself for both personal and academic reasons. 'Sounds like a perfect fit for me.'

Well, the good news is there are occasional flashes of insight and it certainly is worth reading to complete the repertoire in strategy. The author's views of the genius of General Sherman were particularly spot on.

The bad news is that for a guy who quotes Sun Tzu alot he really doesnt seem to have understoo ...more

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Oct 24, 2007 Luke Peterson rated it it was amazing

Shelves: favorites, to-reread

I bought this on recommendation of a military-history-buff friend. It was then booknapped for the better part of a year by a housemate who works in politics.

I finally read it and really enjoyed it. It's amazing to think that Hart was one of the first military thinkers of the modern era to discuss tangential strategy. That is, if you're pursuing a goal you should always be finding and employing the least costly method to reach that goal, even if it doesn't appear to be directly related to the goa ...more

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Jul 30, 2008 Lance rated it liked it

I read this after I'd joined the Navy and before I reported for boot-camp. Even though my brother (an ex-Marine) told me I wouldn't need to know anything the book had to offer, I thought I might as well learn all I could about military thinking before I went in. It was an engaging read.
I was surprised to learn that one of the most effective military strategies is economic sanctions. The author posed the theory that WWII wouldn't have lasted nearly as long if England and France had taken sanctio ...more

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Oct 24, 2012 Adam Elkus rated it liked it

Shelves: military-history, military-theory

Read with great caution. BHLH tries to shoehorn every war in the book into "the indirect approach." The last few chapters lay out his theory of strategy and are worth a read.

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Dec 21, 2014 Dtt rated it really liked it · review of another edition

There are a few universally recognized and seminal works on the nature of warfare – notably Sun Tzu’s ART OF WAR and Clausewitz’s ON WAR (and maybe Miyamoto Musashi’s BOOK OF FIVE RINGS, if one is able to extrapolate hand-to-hand combat to warfare/conflict in general).

I would also count B.H. Liddell Hart’s STRATEGY among these seminal works. Liddell Hart accomplishes the monumental task of analyzing pretty much the entire history of warfare, from ancient Greece to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in a ...more

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Aug 29, 2012 Nate Huston rated it liked it

It would be an understatement to say that Liddel Hart is a believer in the indirect approach. One might say that he is to the indirect approach as Fuller is to threes. In fact, they both tend to stretch their analysis a bit in order to make it fit the theory. That said, Liddel Hart's proposition has merit. To me, it seems a bit overly simplistic (Really? I should strike where the enemy least expects it??? BRILLIANT!). Nonetheless, it is a valuable principle and probably more-so in the context of ...more

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Dec 18, 2015 JJ rated it liked it

Tasked with reading 25 pages for school, I ended up reading the whole thing. Authors of books on strategy remind me of astrologers; war has such a broad scope and history that one can find examples to support nearly any assertion. While I enjoyed Hart's walk through time (I will delve deeper into Epaminondas, Subatai, Wolfe, and Cromwell), he lost me when he blamed Clausewitz for WWI AND WWII (p 344). A must-read for the military professional, if only to dicuss theory with peers over coffee.

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Dec 22, 2014 Pieter rated it liked it

Shelves: militair

What a pity for the dreadful lay-out! The first part requires a lot of background about the main historical battles and even the fight itself is very concisely discussed. It would have been better to spend at least a hundred pages extra on the pre-20th century wars. The author has a clear preference for the indirect method, which he clearly illustrates along history.

On the other hand, I liked the parts on WW I and WW II very much. Both from a military and psychological point of view, it provides ...more

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Apr 27, 2014 Edwin Ortega sevilla rated it it was amazing

Excelente manifiesto aún en nuestros tiempos. La Guerra de la Aproximación Indirecta de Hart lo resume en estas palabras: "comencé a comprender que la aproximación indirecta tenÌa una aplicación mucho más amplia, y que era una ley de la vida en todas sus esferas: una verdad filosófica".

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May 18, 2015 Nuray Ceyda rated it liked it · review of another edition

ilk 350 sayfası bana çok sıkıcı geldi. tarihte yaşanan savaşları çokta yorumlamadan yazmış. sonrasında dolaylı tutumun atalarindan olan, büyük taarruzdan ve Atatürk ten hiç bahsetmemiş. Bence bu şekilde bilim adamlığı olmaz ancak siyasetçi olunur. iyi okumalar

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Oct 30, 2007 Jeff rated it it was amazing

Shelves: history, strategy

Military strategy deals with finding the best way to marshal one’s limited resources to best an opponent in a zero-sum game. Even if one never has plans for a military career, one can still uses strategic principles to analyze and overcome many crisis situations. The great strategic thinkers propose themes, theories, tenets and axioms that, while intended for the military theater, can be applied to many realms of life.

Liddell Hart is of these great thinkers; some say the best of the 20th century ...more

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Aug 21, 2013 Aaron rated it really liked it

Wonderfully reasoned and argued thesis. The most successful military campaigns (also applies to non-military campaigns) were pursued through an indirect route. Hart provides evidence to support his thesis from almost every war/battle since the beginning of recorded history.

My only issue with the book lies in his consistency in giving little background or setting for many of the battles. If you are not already well versed on a particular conflict you will be completely lost. The little bit of an ...more

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May 08, 2014 Matimate rated it it was amazing

Shelves: nonfiction, 2014

Western military strategy was dissected with precise paragraphs pointing on that in each era of history the indirect approach has worked better than direct assaults.

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Jun 30, 2014 James Violand rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

Recommends it for: Anyone.

Shelves: own

A seminal work. The indirect approach wins battles and wars. Hart rewrites Clausewitz.

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Feb 02, 2016 Nick Lloyd rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: 19th-century-warfare, 20th-century-warfare, non-fiction

A very interesting book, but I think he may be stretching in the conclusions he draws from his case studies. Essentially, his argument regarding the superiority of the "indirect approach" to the "direct approach" could more accurately be called maneuver. While maneuver is important (and indeed, a Principle of War), offensive and mass are also critical. The strength of this book lies in his analysis of WWII. He also offers a strong rebuttal to Clausewitz' perceived fixation upon the offensive.

No ...more

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Feb 17, 2016 Joe Donohue rated it it was amazing

One of the greatest book written on Strategy.

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Dec 12, 2007 James rated it it was amazing

Recommends it for: Anyone interested in military strategy and tactics

Shelves: culture-and-politics, military, history, reference

If only some famous (and infamous) generals and politicians had read this and taken it to heart, millions of people who have died in the 20th century would be alive today. With many specific examples of general principles, Liddell Hart presented lessons he had learned in the trenches in World War I. The underlying idea is at of the indirect approach.

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Apr 02, 2009 Perotine Massey rated it it was amazing

Enthralling. Outstanding. Fantastic. Hart is the stodgy-looking professor who you're ready to like but then you find yourself completely in love and it's AWESOME. I don't agree with all of his conclusions, or even all of his reasoning, but the man is a genius. It is impossible to understate how important he's been to our understandings of modern warfare.

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Aug 26, 2009 Jarrod rated it really liked it

The book is more fun to read if you use a British accent while reading...

At times the book drags but culminates in Part IV with an insightful and fair minded critic of Clausewitz. Depending on ones interests they could probably read this section and forgo the prior 300+ pages and still get a great deal from the book.

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Nov 08, 2010 Lorelei Yang rated it really liked it

My middle school humanities teacher, Mr. Wandell (who is, by the way, the best teacher I've ever had), recommended this to us on a regular basis. I finally picked it up and read it this summer.

I'd like to take a moment to thank Mr. Wandell for recommending this book to us.

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Jan 29, 2010 Jfk rated it really liked it

Shelves: history

I read this for its historic influence. It’s fairly interesting if you really want to understand strategy with some historical perspective, but I think you need to be pretty into this sort of thing to appreciate it (and not be an officer in the military).

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Feb 05, 2015 Michael Trudeau rated it it was ok

Shelves: war

The book started strong, but his examples were boring.

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Nov 11, 2011 Greg rated it really liked it

Shelves: international-relations

This is a great book to understand military doctrine and strategy up to the "war on terror". Explains the concept of limited war, the prevalence and origins of guerrilla war, and the matching of startegy to grand strategy (policy aims).

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Dec 27, 2013 Ken rated it it was amazing

Loved it but I got the impression that Liddell Hart is sorta full of himself.
I was still a good book.

Also the book itself is 414 pages with the rest of the pages taking up references and the index.

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Jul 25, 2012 Bryan rated it really liked it

Read this many years ago. The Western classic on strategy, written before World War II, lifts a lot from (and credits) Sun Tzu long before most Westerners had heard of him.

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Mar 23, 2008 Michael rated it it was amazing

Recommends it for: Historians, officers.

Shelves: non-fiction, historical

An approach to military strategy with analysis of strategy and campaigns. Mostly from renaissance to World War II. Rather dense. Pictured cover is another book.

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Sep 04, 2013 Robert Palmer rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: military-theory

This is one of the great classics of western military thinking. It is one of many books I read during the time that I served as an officer in the U.S. Army.

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About B.H. Liddell Hart

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart usually known before his knighthood as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart was an English soldier, military historian and leading inter-war theorist.

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“While many lessons can be found in Frederick's campaigns, the main one would appear to be that his indirectness was too direct. To express this in another way, he regarded the indirect approach as a matter of pure manoeuvre with mobility, instead of a combination of manoeuvre with mobility and surprise. Thus, despite all his brilliance, his economy of force broke down.” — 0 likes

“Belisarius had developed a new-style tactical instrument with which he knew that he might count on beating much superior numbers, provided that he could induce his opponents to attack him under conditions that suited his tactics. For that purpose his lack of numbers, when not too marked, was an asset, especially when coupled with an audaciously direct strategic offensive. His strategy was thus more psychological than logistical. He knew how to provoke the barbarian armies of the West into indulging their natural instinct for direct assault; with the more subtle and skillful Persians he was able at first to take advantage of their feeling of superiority to the Byzantines, and later, when they learnt respect for him, he exploited their wariness as a means of outmanoeuvring them psychologically.

He was a master of the art of converting his weakness into strength; and the opponent's strength into a weakness. His tactics, too, had the essential characteristic of the indirect approach-that of getting the opponent off balance, so that a joint becomes exposed and can be dislocated.” — 0 likes

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