Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan

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Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan

3.85 of 5 stars 3.85 · rating details · 219 ratings · 45 reviews

From the award-winning author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a riveting, intimate account of America’s troubled war in Afghanistan.

When President Barack Obama ordered the surge of troops and aid to Afghanistan, Washington Post correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran followed. He found the effort sabotaged not only by Afghan and Pakistani malfeasance but by infighting an...more From the award-winning author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a riveting, intimate account of America’s troubled war in Afghanistan.

When President Barack Obama ordered the surge of troops and aid to Afghanistan, Washington Post correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran followed. He found the effort sabotaged not only by Afghan and Pakistani malfeasance but by infighting and incompetence within the American government: a war cabinet arrested by vicious bickering among top national security aides; diplomats and aid workers who failed to deliver on their grand promises; generals who dispatched troops to the wrong places; and headstrong military leaders who sought a far more expansive campaign than the White House wanted. Through their bungling and quarreling, they wound up squandering the first year of the surge.

Chandrasekaran explains how the United States has never understood Afghanistan—and probably never will. During the Cold War, American engineers undertook a massive development project across southern Afghanistan in an attempt to woo the country from Soviet influence. They built dams and irrigation canals, and they established a comfortable residential community known as Little America, with a Western-style school, a coed community pool, and a plush clubhouse—all of which embodied American and Afghan hopes for a bright future and a close relationship. But in the late 1970s—after growing Afghan resistance and a Communist coup—the Americans abandoned the region to warlords and poppy farmers.

In one revelatory scene after another, Chandrasekaran follows American efforts to reclaim the very same territory from the Taliban. Along the way, we meet an Army general whose experience as the top military officer in charge of Iraq’s Green Zone couldn’t prepare him for the bureaucratic knots of Afghanistan, a Marine commander whose desire to charge into remote hamlets conflicted with civilian priorities, and a war-seasoned diplomat frustrated in his push for a scaled-down but long-term American commitment. Their struggles show how Obama’s hope of a good war, and the Pentagon’s desire for a resounding victory, shriveled on the arid plains of southern Afghanistan.

Meticulously reported, hugely revealing, Little America is an unprecedented examination of a failing war—and an eye-opening look at the complex relationship between America and Afghanistan.(less)

Hardcover, 384 pages

Published June 26th 2012 by Knopf (first published 2012)

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Nov 07, 2012 Chuck rated it 4 of 5 stars

Rajiv Chandrasekaran's "Little America" details his experiences and observations on the United States' efforts in Afghanistan.

Chandrasekaran continues many of the motifs of his earlier book "Imperial Life in the Emerald City". These motifs include major failures by USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. These are often driven by organizational politics and organizational incompetence. To this he adds the failures and corruption of the Afghani Government and governance struc...more Rajiv Chandrasekaran's "Little America" details his experiences and observations on the United States' efforts in Afghanistan.

Chandrasekaran continues many of the motifs of his earlier book "Imperial Life in the Emerald City". These motifs include major failures by USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. These are often driven by organizational politics and organizational incompetence. To this he adds the failures and corruption of the Afghani Government and governance structure, from the lowest levels to Afghani President Karzai.

Among the anecdotes, is a telling one at the end of the book. It shows the differences between the American and Afghani approaches. The American Marine force in Helmand province is told that the Taliban have captured the road to the critical Kajaki Dam. The Dam and it's electric generators cannot be maintained, nor can a new turbine be added until the road is re-opened. The Marines ready a massive assault to recapture the road. The Afghani Deputy Minister of Energy and Water comes down, he notes that the local tribes have tapped the power lines from the dam and are selling the power. He then says "I just don't understand what you are doing. This isn't Al-Queda. These are two tribes that don't like each other. I would sit them down and tell them that you want to put another turbine in. Everyone will get richer, there will be no battles, and everyone will be happier."

Among differences with "Imperial Life in the Emerald City" is this book's time period of the Obama Administration. There is no discussion about hiring people on the basis of their political party affiliation. There is less discussion on ideological driven attempts to force the Afghanis into a free market economy. Additionally, the Obama Administration is shown as far more engaged in overseeing the Afghani occupation than the Bush Administration was shown to be regarding the Iraq occupation.

I would recommend "Little America" to anyone interested in the United States Campaign in Afghanistan, current history, or international relations. While it is at times cringe inducing, it is a worthwhile read.(less)

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Sep 30, 2012 Mickey Hoffman rated it 5 of 5 stars

Wow. If you are at all interested in what the US has done in Afghanistan--even some
projects from the 1960s--you'll be fascinated and more than a bit dismayed by this book.
One strong point is that the government and private aid organizations and their contractors
have consistently formed policy that doesn't correspond to the actual culture and conditions
of that very foreign country. Very few people seemed to grasp this and those that did were
out shouted by higher ups in military and civilian organ...more

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Aug 26, 2012 Diane marked it as to-read

CS Monitor review: With the mostly disastrous American presence in Iraq diminishing, Chandrasekaran turned his attention to Afghanistan. His travels there included time spent in combat with the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade, as well as hanging around command headquarters. His new book, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, is rough on the Bush administration (again), but even rougher on President Barack Obama, his civilian government appointees, and his military commander...more CS Monitor review: With the mostly disastrous American presence in Iraq diminishing, Chandrasekaran turned his attention to Afghanistan. His travels there included time spent in combat with the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade, as well as hanging around command headquarters. His new book, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, is rough on the Bush administration (again), but even rougher on President Barack Obama, his civilian government appointees, and his military commanders. By any measure, based on Chandrasekaran’s findings, the war has wasted military and civilian lives with almost no positive outcomes.

The title “Little America” is telling, yet probably requires elucidation. It refers to US civilian and military efforts dating to at least the 1940s to turn the rugged, tribal based nation state into something akin to the USA, with thriving agriculture, urban oases, formal education, gender equality and longer life spans. Every American effort at transformation has failed. But lots of otherwise intelligent individuals, including Obama, seem to have learned little from the history of American failure.

The subtitle “The War Within the War for Afghanistan" is telling, too, and also probably needs explanation. The war within the war refers to turf and policy battles among decision makers who should be pulling together. Chandrasekaran’s discerning reporting and vivid writing reveal deadly disagreements between military commanders and civilian political appointees, between US forces and allied forces (especially the British), and so many other permutations that the text of the book sometimes qualifies as mind-boggling. While important people bicker, US soldiers and Afghani soldiers and members of the Taliban “enemy” forces and civilians galore die or are permanently maimed, to no apparent meaningful end.

The narrative of “Little America” includes numerous well-intentioned, impressive characters. Two stand out, appearing, disappearing, and reappearing throughout Chandrasekaran’s book. One is Larry Nicholson, a US Marine brigadier general with heavy responsibility in the southern part of Afghanistan. He allowed the Washington Post reporter remarkable freedom to observe, spoke to him often with candor, and did not try to cover up the war within the war. The other main presence is Kael Weston, a US diplomat who sometimes disagrees with Nicholson’s command decisions but can speak his mind. In fact, Nicholson and Weston have become inseparable, an unusual relationship of trust forged between a representative of the military and a representative of the civilian government.

Also interviewed on 7/6/2012 "On Point" NPR radio show.(less)

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Sep 14, 2012 Kay rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: nonfiction, best-of-2012

Before I read this book, I viewed our surge in Afghanistan as hopeless, given the corrupt Karzai administration, the number of tribal warlords, the remote location, and the tenacity of the Taliban. All those things are true, but it turns out that the biggest obstacles is us. The infighting between the State Department and USAID, between the marines and the army, and between various factions at the White House led one brigadier general to conclude: "What we have is folly."

Did you know that it cos...more

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Sep 16, 2012 Chris rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: afghanistan

I didn't want to read this book. I've read enough books about the topic. But my cousin sent me her copy and I devoured it in a day or two. It didn't leave me depressed but very angry at the incompetence of our goverment, particulary USAID and the State Department. Marines and soldiers are dying and more energy is being spent fighting each other than the enemy-whoever that might be: military vs civilian, NSC vs Holbrooke, and on and on. Some real heroes in this book fighting the bureacracy but th...more

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May 17, 2013 Mikey B. rated it 5 of 5 stars

An excellent look at the involvement of the U.S. in Afghanistan in the last few years – particularly since the Obama administration took over in 2009.

Mr. Chandrasekaran outlines the disconnects that exist at all levels between the U.S. government and the military, between the U.S. civilians in Afghanistan and the U.S. military, and even between the U.S. army and U.S. marines – who have a go it alone approach. For example some civilian groups wanted to supply and aid Afghan farmers to cultivate c...more An excellent look at the involvement of the U.S. in Afghanistan in the last few years – particularly since the Obama administration took over in 2009.

Mr. Chandrasekaran outlines the disconnects that exist at all levels between the U.S. government and the military, between the U.S. civilians in Afghanistan and the U.S. military, and even between the U.S. army and U.S. marines – who have a go it alone approach. For example some civilian groups wanted to supply and aid Afghan farmers to cultivate cotton which was feasible in many areas – but groups affiliated with the U.S. government objected because cotton is a protected crop grown by the U.S. and this would cause, they say, unnecessary or illegal competition.

We are also told of the disdain that most levels of the Obama administration have for Hamid Karzai – and with reason – the corruption, the drug smuggling, and the nepotism, are all notorious.

Both the army and the marines pushed the meaning of the counter-insurgency strategy to the outer limits – expanding military outposts to remote regions instead of consolidating urban areas. We are provided a description of a sequestered U.S. embassy where they cannot even cross the street without protocol and passwords to speak with the adjacent military people.

We are given descriptions of various personalities – from Afghan warlords who rule absolutely their territory, the flamboyant Richard Holbrook, American military personnel stationed in the nether regions of Afghanistan who valiantly try to establish some civil law within their zone of occupation, and U.S. citizens who also push for development and reform.

One comes to realize that in a country as destitute as Afghanistan these disconnects of various groups are fatal for any long term achievements. They are leaving a bad taste all around. Some in the military foresee at least 10 to 20 years of some form of occupation to attain any feasible development for Afghanistan and to rid the country of the medieval Taliban. It is very doubtful that the American people would support this in the long term, and more importantly the people of Afghanistan do not want a continued military presence in their country. In fact the U.S. military occupation is now a powerful recruiting tool for the Taliban. Mixed into – and complicating things even more, is Pakistan’s ISI which provides sanctuary and support for the Taliban.

There seems little hope for this forlorn country which is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world (and may be artificially pumped up due to all the aid it receives). This is a well written book giving us evocative views of Afghanistan.

Page 249 (my book)
In Afghanistan, Ospreys (a combination plane and helicopter) seemed to travel in both space and time. When Nicholson’s aircraft alighted upon a dirt patch next to the bazaar, it was as if he had journeyed back centuries from the modern world. Taghaz had no electricity or running water. Residents lived in adobe buildings that lacked windows and furniture. They cooked over open flames and relieved themselves in fields. Save for the odd motorcycle, the people of Taghaz lived as they had five hundred or even a thousand years before.
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Mar 13, 2013 Sara Dyck rated it 4 of 5 stars

Usually the details of the war in Aghanistan would numb me, but Chandrasekaran kept me engaged by combining the dreadful numbers about costs and losses with the equally dreadful analysis of our infighting and abysmal grasp of local conditions, plus anecdotes from his own experiences there. Each chapter offers a little story of squandered opportunities and mis-advised efforts. All too typical, for example: while cotton, a valuable crop offering employment to farmers, was an alternative to poppy c...more

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Jul 11, 2012 Nick Lloyd rated it 3 of 5 stars

Shelves: 21st-century-warfare

I would have rated this book better, but there are a few things I feel the author got wrong. Overall, I would say this is an excellent history of the Afghan war circa 2008-2011. He delves deep into the political and diplomatic situation, as well as the philosophical debate within the military regarding counterinsurgency; all necessary discussions for a proper history. However, as a veteran of 5/2 Stryker Brigade, I saw a lot of this happen personally, and feel reality was slightly different in s...more I would have rated this book better, but there are a few things I feel the author got wrong. Overall, I would say this is an excellent history of the Afghan war circa 2008-2011. He delves deep into the political and diplomatic situation, as well as the philosophical debate within the military regarding counterinsurgency; all necessary discussions for a proper history. However, as a veteran of 5/2 Stryker Brigade, I saw a lot of this happen personally, and feel reality was slightly different in several instances.

He is absolutely right that the senior commanders in southern Afghanistan did not like Colonel Tunnell. He was not a fan of Petraeus-style COIN, believing instead in an antiquated, fringe philosophy of "counter-guerrilla" operations (We were dubbed, by him, a counter-guerrilla brigade, and given counter-guerilla streamers for our guidons...). However, most of the soldiers in the brigade saw this as a farce. The officers would smile and nod their heads when he lectured on his doctrine, and then would proceed to conduct actual COIN once he returned to KAF. From a company point of view (which is where the "rubber meets the road" operationally) there was little or no difference between 5/2 SBCT and any other unit in Afghanistan.

Additionally, the idea that "we lost a year" is hyperbolic and irrational. Admittedly, taking the vulnerable Stryker vehicles into the Arghandab River Valley was not a great idea, and the unit suffered great losses because of it, but that was only one battalion in a brigade which was responsible for most of southern Afghanistan. In Zabul, Spin Boldak, and eventually Helmand, we rarely had violent incidents during our deployment, and saw great gains in terms of local populace development, rooting out corruption, and building humanitarian projects. What's more, once 5/2 pulled out of the ARV, their replacement unit (4/82 ABN) suffered similarly high casualties, indicating that it was not the unit, but rather the area that was responsible for the SIGACTS.

Finally, while Colonel Tunnell may receive a great deal of the blame post hoc, the individual most despised at the time (2009-2010) was General McChrystal. McChrystal's extremely tight Rules of Engagement (no tolerance for civilian casualties) handcuffed US forces, who were afraid of being "hung out to dry" for firing artillery or attack aircraft in support of troops in contact. Subsequently, morale dropped, as soldiers developed the feeling that the commanding general would gladly sacrifice their lives in order to avoid accidentally killing Afghan civilians. The day General McChrystal was relieved was a great morale boost to troops in country.

Nevertheless, this book offered great insight into the inner working of the administration, and the roles of aid workers and the military in trying to find a winnable solution to the longest war in American history. (less)

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Jun 17, 2013 Keith Schnell rated it 4 of 5 stars

Little America is journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s account of American management of the war in Afghanistan, based on his coverage of that war for the Washington Post. It is in many ways a follow-up to his previous book, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, which is about the gross mismanagement of the early stages of the Iraq War under the leadership of American Proconsul L. Paul Bremer. For those who have read both books, the differences between them are illustrative, and reflect important diff...more Little America is journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s account of American management of the war in Afghanistan, based on his coverage of that war for the Washington Post. It is in many ways a follow-up to his previous book, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, which is about the gross mismanagement of the early stages of the Iraq War under the leadership of American Proconsul L. Paul Bremer. For those who have read both books, the differences between them are illustrative, and reflect important differences between the two conflicts.

Imperial Life in the Emerald City illustrated a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq that suffered from a near-total lack of planning, strategy and basic situational awareness coupled with a level of corruption and nepotism that rivaled that of the Iraqis themselves. Hindsight tells us that following the demise of the CPA, the professionals in the U.S. military and State Department were able, with a good deal of luck and support from the Iraqis, to salvage a Pyrrhic victory from a situation that was well on the road to catastrophe. Little America, in contrast, describes a situation where those same organizations, given a relatively free hand and operating as designed, were nevertheless unable to achieve the United States’ strategic goals in Afghanistan.

The overall image of the war effort in Afghanistan, as portrayed by Mr. Chandrasekaran, is one of military and civilian agencies operating under a severe handicap imposed by their own structures and cultures. These are depicted as sclerotic and unable or unwilling to adapt to the needs of the mission, with organizational incentives driven by internal politics unrelated to the war and an alarming absence of unity of command both within the U.S. government and ISAF. USAID comes in for particular criticism for having allowed its core competencies to atrophy following decades of contracting out nearly all international development assistance and analysis, while the State and Defense Departments appear to exist in a continuous muddle of vague and conflicting priorities and seem unable to effectively bring their own organic resources to bear on even the most clearly identified problems. The take-away seems to be that, 80 years after the New Deal and 60 after the Marshall Plan, the U.S. government has lost the ability for nation-building in even relatively permissive conditions, much less in the face of active and violent opposition.

Although he has done good work in highlighting these institutional failures, Mr. Chandrasekaran’s book suffers from many of the same shortcomings that have made American war reporting over the past decade so inadequate. In a country where all politics is local and first reports are always wrong, Little America focuses heavily on the schemes and dealings of a relative handful of Mandarins in Washington and Kabul. This entirely overlooks the most important part of the war – the part that is actually being waged in Afghan cities and villages, between a bewildering array of hostile tribes and groups who will collectively determine the future of the country. The author periodically makes a flying visit to U.S. Soldiers in the field and was apparently quite comfortable in doing so, but in the structure of the book these visits serve more as a narrative backdrop than an occasion for detailed analysis, and his interaction with individual Afghans is even more limited. This is no small omission, and while a reader who is interested in U.S. domestic politics will undoubtedly come away with his preconceived notions confirmed, Little America cannot provide an accurate picture of the situation in Afghanistan.

Most inexcusable of all is the author’s failure to include the poem Stellenbosch, by Rudyard Kipling, in its entirety at any point in his book. No stranger to mismanaged colonial wars himself, Kipling nailed the point that Mr. Chandrasekaran is trying to make with great precision. With luck, being in the public domain, it will be in the preface to the second edition.
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Nov 04, 2012 Ray rated it 4 of 5 stars · review of another edition

The conflict in Afghanistan is already America's longest war, and from reading any daily newspaper or watching any news show, we know that there's still much to do before the original U.S. objectives and expectations are likely to be achieved. So the fact that Chandrasekaran describes planning, organizational, civilian, military and political mistakes having been made in the Afghanistan war should surprise no one. And while we may recognize these problems in general terms, it's hard for most sta...more The conflict in Afghanistan is already America's longest war, and from reading any daily newspaper or watching any news show, we know that there's still much to do before the original U.S. objectives and expectations are likely to be achieved. So the fact that Chandrasekaran describes planning, organizational, civilian, military and political mistakes having been made in the Afghanistan war should surprise no one. And while we may recognize these problems in general terms, it's hard for most stateside civilians to fully understand the nature or extent of the problems faced by our people in Afghanistan. "Little America", explains these problems in painful detail. Chandrasekaran spent time in Country, and his first-hand accounts explain how and why huge nation building efforts are so complex, and so prone to failure due to changing plans, changing circumstances, not having a clear understanding of the local customs and values, and no clear vision of how to accomplish the goals. Particularly troubling are Chandrasekaran's descriptions of how conflicting programs and Government Agency policies lead to self defeating decisions in Afghanistan. Among these are how Agricultural experts, after determining that cotton would be a more benefical and easier to grow crop than poppies by Afghan farmers, were prohibited from implementing this program because U.S. laws prohibit helping non-U.S. farmers to raise competing cotton crops. So the result is that U.S. cotton growers, already subsidized, face no competition, and Afghan farmers continue to grow poppies, increasing drug supply in the U.S. and benefiting the Taliban insurgents. Not the type of story you want to read about after years of involvement in Afghanistan. In summary, despite the frustration of seeing how difficult it for an overreaching bureaucracy to succeed in rebuilding a failing nation, if you're interested in understanding why we weren't more successful in Afghanistan, this book is an excellent source of information. (less)

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May 13, 2013 Wes F rated it 4 of 5 stars

Excellent, informative, engaging read. This book was especially interesting to me--since it covered some of the history of early American involvement in southern Afghanistan to which I was an eyewitness, as a kid. Fascinating stuff. The modern American involvement in southern Afghanistan is mostly a sad testament to the well-worn adage that "history repeats itself." Huge, wasteful projects (USAID ones, but military ones as well) involving inexperienced and constantly-revolving managers--with lit...more

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Aug 12, 2012 Doug rated it 5 of 5 stars

American bureaucracy and political infighting between American politicians and between politicians and the military destroyed any chance we had to improve the lives of the people of Afghanistan for years to come.

Since every American group was more interested in supporting its agenda, they refused to cooperate on solutions that could have worked. Nobody involved escapes blame. Nobody involved did everything wrong.

The American people and the American military troops paid an unnecessary price but...more

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Jan 18, 2013 Christine rated it 4 of 5 stars

This was a useful but depressing book, just as Imperial Life in the Emerald City about American involvement in Iraq was. I wonder if the United States ever makes an effective intervention, especially after expending so many lives and billions of dollars. It seems the last useful one was in World War II, 70 years ago. It feels like we make the same mistakes over and over again-a lack of agreement about the overall goals so many forces, civilian and military are frequently acting counter to one an...more

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Jan 12, 2013 James rated it 2 of 5 stars

Shelves: non-fiction

Where to begin with this one? I think the most important thing to keep in mind with Little America is that it's essentially one man's view that seems to rely heavily on a few sources. Too few, in my opinion. Also, a lot of this is sensationalized.

The parts about civilian and military personnel in Kabul and the field often come off as gossipy and unprofessional. Having worked in Afghanistan (albeit in the east and a year or so after the events in the book), it's clear to me some individuals were...more

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Aug 09, 2012 Bob Fowler rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: favourites, afghanistan

This book could have been sub-titled “How to Lose a War;” or perhaps “Why has Everybody Screwed Up This War So Badly? “ This is the sinking thought a reader gets as Washington Post Journalist Rajiv Chandrasakaran argues in his book, Little America, that America’s recent surge in troops, foreign service and foreign aid workers, and huge investments of money have failed to turn the war in Afghanistan around. He begins his narrative with the interesting history of America’s previous attempts to mak...more This book could have been sub-titled “How to Lose a War;” or perhaps “Why has Everybody Screwed Up This War So Badly? “ This is the sinking thought a reader gets as Washington Post Journalist Rajiv Chandrasakaran argues in his book, Little America, that America’s recent surge in troops, foreign service and foreign aid workers, and huge investments of money have failed to turn the war in Afghanistan around. He begins his narrative with the interesting history of America’s previous attempts to make changes in Afghanistan, going back as far as 1951 when they tried to transform the arid lands of the Helmand River valley into a model farming community. Despite the infusion of tens of millions of dollars over a twenty-year period, numerous attempts failed to make any significant change. And, when the author returns in 2009, he finds that the same ineptitude lack of vision and bureaucratic attitude is leading to failure again. What makes it worse now is that the lives of thousands of troops and hundreds of millions of dollars are at risk.

The United States and other western powers have taken on the task of trying to create a new government in a land they do not understand. Afghanistan remains one of the most complex societies in the world where any political initiative crashes against long-standing tribal conflicts, where the rule of formal law has never been known in most of its corners, and the cooperation of corrupt strongmen seems necessary to gain any headway. The author traces the debate at the highest levels of the US government over strategy. Richard Holbrooke believes negotiation with the Taliban is necessary but his egotistic manner clashes with others. General Petraeus, newly appointed commander of US and NATO forces, wins out to direct a surge of US troops to follow his COIN (Counter insurgency warfare) doctrine over the objections of Vice President Biden and others who argue for a strategy of counter terrorism.

Chandrasakaran arrives in Afghanistan to find the first wave of the surge going to what he believes is the wrong place: Helmand province. He laments the fact that, although the powerful US Marine force sent there will make good progress in wresting control back from the insurgents who have successfully opposed the British forces, they should have been deployed to Kandahar province which is the key strategic centre of southern Afghanistan. Even when US army troops finally arrive in Kandahar, they are should have been in greater strength and are led by a rogue commanding officer whose aggressive attitude violates all the principles of COIN doctrine.

Chandrasakaran spent time in Afghanistan talking to military and US government on the front line and in Kabul, and to senior officials at the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department back in Washington. He writes of some officials and military officers who are dedicated to getting it right, but he observes too many others who are simply incompetent or concerned only with their own internal rivalries. Yes, this book is one-sided – there are undoubtedly many who did a great job and not enough of the successful stories are told. But this is not a history of the war from 2009 to 2011: it is critique of how the United States is managing the Afghan war, of how it is failing to deal effectively with a task which was very difficult from the start. It is in fact a record, as Chandrasakaran writes, of how “the good war had turned bad.”

This book is essential reading for anyone concerned about how we are going to proceed into a 21st century that is full of great political and military risks; the cost of making these mistakes again is too great.
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Oct 17, 2012 Roger Haskins rated it 4 of 5 stars

Very insightful read on the efforts to rebuild a nation and the way best intentions, expertise, and money just don't cut it. By imposing cultural standards rather than working through local culture, chasing metrics instead of results, allowing bureaucratic power struggles, and tolerating civilian efforts to be "lead" with ineptitude and lethargy, the US was sunk before they started. Afghanistan will live on, but it won't be a nation rebuilt.

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Dec 31, 2012 Khalid Khan rated it 5 of 5 stars

This war is about changing a world that is several thousand miles and few centuries removed from America. A decade long war, thousands of lives and close to Trillion dollars dont seem to have made a difference. As I read the book I wondered if there would be a happy end to the dream of growing cotton in Afghanistan....sadly no such luck...wars are not supposed to be constructive. Cant drop progress from the sky...

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Jan 29, 2013 David Bales rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: 2013

A very detailed description of our efforts in Afghanistan, from the 1940s until now, and the many mistakes that have been made in political infighting, massive bureaucracatic inadequacies and the inability of the United States to find reliable partners in Afghanistan's government. Interesting background about American efforts in the country which started during World War II and lasted until the 1970s. Quote: "The war in Afghanistan is not only the United States' longest war, it is our most compl...more

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Feb 02, 2013 Nick rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: international, non-fiction, politics

Another great job of interpretive, analytical reporting bu Chandrasekaran. I wish my years in the U.S. Foreign Service did not reinforce the failures of accountability, cooperation, and strategic thought and action that he documents. Unfortunately, everything he writes rings true. More people outside the Beltway should read this book and then demand change based on its lessons.

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Aug 27, 2012 Avery rated it 4 of 5 stars

Insightful view of the Afghan war and a glimpse into the complex history of the country. Discusses at length the dysfunction between the US military, NATO allies, the Afghan central government, regional governments, tribal leaders and warlords, and US political / diplomatic class. Like Charlie Wilson said, "we [messed] up the endgame."

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Aug 25, 2012 Sohini rated it 4 of 5 stars

Not bad. But Imperial Life in Emerald City was better. But may be I am biased ‘coz I knew a lot of what he talks about, which was not the case when I read his book on Iraq. But a must read for anyone who is interested in the politics of development and reconstruction. I hope he writes one on Haiti next.

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Jan 21, 2013 Patti K rated it 4 of 5 stars

Shelves: non-fiction

This respected Washington journalist tells the tale of the complexities
and mistakes made during the war in Afghanistan. His narrative reads like
a novel with compelling characters and outsized ambition and diligent
work. He reveals the battles between the diplomats and the military and
the corrupt government of Karzai with the White House. A nuanced portrayal
of this difficult place and war.

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Sep 12, 2012 Phil rated it 5 of 5 stars

His first book inspired me to focus on the Middle East. His second book, where he shifts from tribal meetings with Ahmed Wali Karzai to meetings in mansions with Richard Holbrooke without losing his perspective on the larger problems that plagued the "good" war.

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Nov 12, 2012 James rated it 3 of 5 stars

Good journalism, but Chandrasekaran extrapolates too much from a fairly narrow set of events. His insights into the effects of bureaucracy and military institutions on tactical and operational decisions--as in his previous book--are the most enlightening.

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Oct 07, 2012 Mark Selby rated it 2 of 5 stars

Rajiv tends to dwell on people's mistakes. If you like bad news, read him. However, it appears his contact with the military has started to improve his outlook. In this book, he mostly castigates the State Department.

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Sep 04, 2012 Andrew Sorrells rated it 5 of 5 stars

Shelves: audiobooks-nonfiction

This is the most insightful and concise book on the Afghanistan War that I have read. It is compelling in its argument, whereas most of the books in this genre (that I've read) are vague at in their conclusions.

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Aug 20, 2012 Daniel rated it 4 of 5 stars

Book does a great job of detailing the on going mistakes we have made militarily and politically in Afghanistan. What a waste of human life and resources that could have been used domestically. Very sad.

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Feb 09, 2013 Pete rated it 4 of 5 stars

Part of my preparation for a deployment. Probably worth a second read or taking some notes. Helps shape understanding of why things are the way they are in Afghanistan right now.

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Nov 05, 2012 Thomas rated it 5 of 5 stars

Focuses a little too heavily on the south, but this is expected when the author is embedded in...Southern Afghanistan. But this should be required reading for anyone in Government.

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Sep 21, 2012 Daniel rated it 4 of 5 stars

great analysis on the Surge and operations in Afghanistan. The author at times gets into the tactical level, but his analysis on operational and strategic level decisions was sound.

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About Rajiv Chandrasekaran

Rajiv Chandrasekaran is an Indian-American journalist. He is currently assistant managing editor for continuous news at The Washington Post, where he has worked since 1994. Originally from the San Francisco Bay area, Chandrasekaran holds a degree in political science from Stanford University, where he was editor-in-chief of The Stanford Daily.

At The Post he has served as bureau chief in Baghdad, C...more

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title link	preview: Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan
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BBCode	[url=http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/13152099-little-america?utm_medium=api&utm_source=blog_book][img]http://d.gr-assets.com/books/1343028500l/13152099.jpg[/img][/url] [url=http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/13152099-little-america?utm_medium=api&utm_source=blog_book]Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan by Rajiv Chandrasekaran[/url]

Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan

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